Citizenship Rights for a Better Future

Very interesting article. The word ``Rights`` occurs 29 times in the article, and ``Responsibility`` ZERO times.

Question - Can one exist without the other?

My sense is that HAVES are using it as a political weapon - and HAVE NOTS are just reacting depending on their situation.

Re: Bilal Ahmad

Interesting article on the issues of civic responsibility.

The day of the nation state has been in a decline for over a hundred years, which brings up the question of citizenship rights. Citizenship rights in the next century will not be based on the notions of nation state bounderies, but on the idea of mobility based on the individual`s contribution to the commonwealth, what ever it might be. Look at the European Union; are the Britishers citizens of Britain or the EU.

MWZAMAN Responds:

I agree with the following statements or generalizations of the author:

``The autocracy established in colonial India is alive and well in contemporary Pakistan. It has become rather a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance. Moreover, too much power in the hands of the corrupt and unresponsive ruling elite (supported by the rule of danda and monopoly over the means of violence), an unjust system for the distribution of resources, poor economic performance, conspicuous consumption, a very high rate of population growth, and an overall lack of appreciation of nonviolent means of resolving domestic and international conflicts has created enormous difficulties for the evolution of society that recognizes and values its rights and duties...``.

However, I would most respectfully point out the following facts: It needs to be recognized that Pakistan is not known for respecting human rights. There is no heritage of democracy in Pakistan. Doubtless, the British had systematiocally employed various black laws for the purpose of sustaining their colonial rule in British India. Yet, the British rulers were known for following rule of law, notwithstanding the enactment of various unfair and immoral laws and procedures. The British were ruthless colonizers, but they not heartless autocrats. Therefore, the ruling elite of Pakistan must be given credit for introducing ``autocracy`` in independent Pakistan.

Various forms of autocratic and authoritarian modes of administration were invented and experimented once Pakistan got independence on August 14, 1947. Most of the repressive laws were replenished after the independence of Pakistan.

The roots of autocracy and authoritarianism can be traced back to the beginning of independent Pakistan even though Quaid-i-Azam, the Founding Father of Pakistan had both the charisma and authority to experiment with the rudiments of democracy in Pakistan. Instead of introducing democracy, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had laid the foundation stone of autocracy and authoritarian regime in Pakistan. I am posting the following excerpts from one of my recent articles for the perusal of the readers. Thanks. W.Zaman:

Jinnah’s Passion for Unlimited Power & Undemocratic Mode of Governance

M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was undoubtedly the most effective and powerful President of All-India Muslim League (AIML). There was a total absence of any leader of Jinnah’s stature in the entire AIML to question or challenge his policies or desires in the mid-forties. His words were like dictates from the absolute monarch. He always encouraged lieutenants or loyalists in the party, not colleagues per se.

Thus, at the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah was all of the following: Quaid-I-Azam, Governor General of Pakistan, President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (which was also the Central Legislature of Pakistan) and the President of Pakistan Muslim League.

In his seminal book titled Pakistan: A Political Study, Keith Callard, one of the early writers on the government and politics of Pakistan, had succinctly observed that people of Pakistan “looked for guidance to their Great Leader, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. There was no one else, he was Pakistan; and wherever he went he was received by vast crowds with adulation amounting almost to worship.” Keith Callard also underscored that Jinnah “was by nature a commander and leader of men. He was not to be treated as a colleague or even primus inter pares, for he demanded lieutenants who would serve him rather than partners who would argue with him. In manner he was cold, brilliant and unyielding, a man to inspire either fury or devotion. He organized the campaign for Pakistan as though he were a commander-in-chief issuing orders of the day to encourage the troops and tactical directions to control the provincial commanders” (Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (New York, N.Y: The Mcmillan Company, 1957, pp. 19-20. Henceforth this book will be cited as Keith Callard, 1957).

Jinnah’s passion for the assumption and consolidation of state powers was evident when the date of partition was nearing. He had selected himself to be the Governor General of Pakistan. According to Ayesha Jalal, “On July 2, 1947, Jinnah formally told Mountbatten that he intended to become Pakistan’s first Governor General. Of course Mountbatten was outraged. It complicated the partition process, as planned by him [Mountbatten], and especially the already odious business of dividing the Indian army. ------- He knew that as Governor-General he would have wide ranging powers over the Muslim areas, powers which he could not possibly afford to let any other individual exercise. Moreover, as the Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah felt he would be better placed to ensure the division of the army, and the army was what he needed most of all to clamp central authority over Pakistan’s provinces. At any rate, the Prime Minister of Pakistan would have to take orders from the Governor-General. ‘In my position’, Jinnah told the bemused Viceroy, ‘it is I who will give the advice and others will act on it.’ Mountbatten concluded that Jinnah had either gone ‘mad’ or was suffering from an acute form of ‘megalomania ” (Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 292).

It is apparent from Ayesha Jalal’s observation that Jinnah made a deliberate choice to assume the position of Governor General of Pakistan. He had planned ahead of time to dictate the terms of reference to the Prime Minister. As the undisputed leader of the All-India Muslim League (AIML), Mohammad Ali Jinnah had consolidated all organizational authorities and powers in his hands even before Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947.

Therefore, he knew it well that there will be no one from his party to oppose him. In fact, he used to act like the Head of the Muslim State before Pakistan was even created. Keith Callard had pointed out long time back in 1957 that as “President of the Muslim League he (Jinnah) felt that he was the effective head of the Muslim nation” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) met on August 10, 1947 (Four days before independence). Jogendra Nath Mondal was made the interim President of CAP. Aimed at controlling both the process and outcome of the Central legislature of Pakistan, Jinnah, the Governor General designate of Pakistan, expressed his desire to be the President of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The members of the CAP obliged, and on August 11, 1947, they unanimously elected Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the President and Tamijuddin Khan, the Vice President of the CAP. The CAP also passed a resolution conferring on Mohammad Ali Jinnah the title of Quaid-I-Azam (the Great Leader) – a title to be invariably employed in official correspondence of the Government of Pakistan. As noted by Keth Callard, “When Pakistan was formed the Quaid-I-Azam was recognized to be above the political battle, a figure to whom all might turn for authority and justice and protection. He became Governor- General and President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan; ---- he (Jinnah) was the personification of the state” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).



As the Governor General, Jinnah had handpicked Nwabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. There is no doubt that Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan was capable of running the administration. Yet, Jinnah decided to retain the de-facto authorities of the Head of the Government in his hands. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet had to hold offices at the pleasure of Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan.

In other words, Jinnah combined the roles of both the Head of the State and Head of the Government. Was it unconstitutional on the part of Governor General to intrude in carrying out of executive functions of the Prime Minister? I don’t think that it was unconstitutional per se because of the existence of contradictory constitutional provisions.

Henry Frank Goodnow has summarized the context: “Prior to 1956 [Constitution] the governing constitutional laws were similar, but the relationship between the Governor General and the cabinet ministers was not entirely clear. The Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order of 1947 had provided that the Governor General and the provincial governors would act on the advice of their ministers. On the other hand, an unrepealed provision of the Government of India Act of 1935 provided that the ministers were to be chosen by the Governor General and would hold office at his pleasure” (Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p.54).

In view of the above-mentioned provision of 1935 Act, Jinnah had the legal basis to establish the Governor General’s hold on the Cabinet. Yet, it needs to be recognized that he had deliberately ignored the provision in the 1947 Provisional Order in which it was stated that the Governor General would act on the advice of the Cabinet. It is also fair to suggest that it was Jinnah’s responsibility to see to it that the contradictory provision of 1935 was being repealed with the passage of 1947 Provisional order. It is very difficult for me to comprehend after so many years how and why a constitutional lawyer of Jinnah’s stature had used a dead provision of 1935 Act over a provision of 1947 for the purpose of dwarfing the independence of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

At any rate, Jinnah had created a dangerous precedent that directly impacted the relationship between the Governor General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the following years.

With assumption of the Presidency of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Governor General Jinnah virtually controlled the functions, the process, and the outcomes of the legislative branch of the central government. Such concentration of both the legislative and executive powers of the State in Jinnah’s office of Governor General was nothing short of nullification of the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branches of government. It was unfortunate that the legislative branch of the central government was rendered impotent from the very beginning of independent Pakistan.

Additionally, Jinnah had retained substantial decision-making powers of the Muslim League even though Chowudhury Khaliquzzaman was chosen to be the Chief organizer of the party (later he became the President of Pakistan Muslim League).

In his assessment of the nature of Jinnah’s power, Keith Callard observed: “No constitutional ruler and few autocrats have possessed such plentitude of power. He had full authority over the civil administration and armed forces. By his own order he could amend the existing constitution and promulgate laws that would be beyond the effective of review of any court. These were not powers which existed only on paper and which in practice were limited by the conventions of constitutional responsibility. On the contrary, cabinet ministers understood clearly that they held office as the agents of the Governor-General, and the [Constituent] Assembly, with its powerless opposition, was in no mood to challenge any action of its own President” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

Concluding Remarks

The political history of Pakistan is replete with anti-democratic tendencies and anti-people policies. The authoritarianism has always been the hallmark of government and politics of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of the nation, was known for his honesty and integrity of character.

Yet, it was Jinnah who had laid the foundation of ruthless authoritarianism and centralized political structure in Pakistan. It was Jinnah who created the precedents of undemocratic and autocratic modes of governance in Pakistan. He was as much responsible as his successors for the continuation of the undemocratic tradition of authoritarian mode of governance in Pakistan.

At the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah had both the charisma and authority to introduce democratic norms and institutions in the new nation. Yet, from the beginning, he demonstrated his disdain towards democratic norms and practices. At his behest, an oligarchy was formed for ruling Pakistan with iron fist. The ruling oligarchy was completely divorced from the rudiments of democratic principles and values.

Although Mohammad Ali Jinnah had ruled the nation only for 13 months, his tradition of assumption and exercise of “absolute” state power had dangerous effects on the subsequent rulers of Pakistan. Instead of instituting the ‘institutional rule’, he installed his ‘personal rule’. The way the nation was administered by the founding father and his chief lieutenant Liaquat Ali Khan had invariably conditioned the behavior of the successive regimes.

I have long misunderstood and undermined the significance of Mr. Jinnah as a great political leader. My judgment of Mr. Jinnah was like that the Monday morning quarterback. However, given the post-independence history of the Pakistani (and South Asian) politics, I am in the process of reevaluating some of my previous conceptualizations of Mr. Jinnah and his politics.

Mr. Manik`s article has provided an interesting twist to our understanding of the political culture of Pakistan in its early days. As Mr. Manik has himself argued that there ``is no heritage of democracy in Pakistan``, we need to see the main thrust and arguments of his article in the context of the political (or apolitical) culture of those days. As a sample, I want to quote a few paragraphs from Akbar S. Ahmad`s book Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity (1997; Routledge) and leave the audience of this forum to form their own opinions. Ahmed writes (pp. 188-89):

``Jinnah`s death early in Pakistan`s history preserved him in the minds of Pakistanis. They never knew him frustrated in office or foiled by the ambition of lesser leaders or facing the nepotism and corruption in society. To Pakistanis he remains the triumphant hero, defeating every enemy to attain a homeland for them. Since his illness was not generally known, he does not appear as a tragically sick man either. For Pakistanis he remains an almost mythical figure. They now look back nostalgically to a golden time when they were united and had a clear objective.``

``‘By the time that he got Pakistan for the Muslims,` wrote Admiral J. W. Jefford, Pakistan`s first naval chief, `he was a demi-god to the masses` (Bolitho 1954: 201). The Dawn carried an editorial arguing he should be crowned Shah-in-Shah Of Pakistan, imperial successor to the Mughals (also see A. Husain 1996: 60). In Pakistan Jinnah received `adulation amounting almost to worship` (Callard 1958: 19). For E. H. Enver, Jinnah is `The Modern Moses` (1990); for Professor Riaz Ahmad, `the greatest leader of the Muslims of South Asia` (1994: 178). If Jinnah had asked his people to walk into the Arabian sea, they would have done so, said Dr Zaidi.``

```A man like Jinnah is born once in a millennium; not once in a century but once in a millennium,` pronounced Dr Jaffar Qureshi of India. . . . Devdas Gandhi, son of Mahatma Gandhi, declared that Jinnah was the greatest Muslim since the holy Prophet of Islam. The Aga Khan, not easily impressed, was as emphatic in his praise: `Of all the statesmen that I have known in my life, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Churchill, Curzon, Mahatma Gandhi - Jinnah is the most remarkable. None of these men, in my view, outshone him in strength of character and in that almost uncanny combination of prescience and resolution which is statecraft` (Merchant 1990: 6).``

``The secretary-general of the Arab League called Jinnah `one of the greatest leaders in the whole world` (Mujahid 1981: 660). Even Jinnah`s opponents acknowledged him after he died. The president of the Hindu Mahasabha in India wrote: `In the death of Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Muslim world has lost a unique personality endowed with the highest qualities of head and heart` (ibid.).``

``The Times in its obituary captured the essence of his achievement: Mr. Jinnah was something more than Quaid-i-Azam, supreme head of the State, to the people who followed him; he was more even than the architect of the Islamic nation he personally called into being. He commanded their imagination as well as their confidence. In the face of difficulties which might have overwhelmed him, it was given to him to fulfil the hope foreshadowed in the inspired vision of the great Iqbal by creating for the Muslims of India a homeland where the old glory of Islam could grow afresh into a modern state, worthy of its place in the comity of nations. Few statesmen have shaped events to their policy more surely than Mr. Jinnah. He was a legend even in his lifetime. (The Times, London, 13 September 1948).``

``Jinnah`s life must be seen in the context of the huge changes taking place in the world during the last century. Consider him as a young man pursuing his studies in London late in the last century - when Queen Victoria was at the height of her power, when the world was seen through the eyes of the British empire, when the dominant values and attitudes in India were formed by the British - to the last year of his life when we already discern the global themes that would engage Muslims up to our own times.``

In response to Ferozk:

I am not sure if I could agree with the statement that the ``day of the nation state has been in a decline for over a hundred years.`` It is not clear if the notion of decline entails the decline in the number of the nation-states, or a decline in national sovereignty, or a decline in the ability to act independently of a more powerful nation

British scholars Stuart Hall and David Held argue that the nation-state is being eroded and challenged by the processes of globalization as well as regional and local nationalisms. The process of centralization that tends to create a homogenous culture within a state has currently given way to decentralization that leads to the multiplication of identities and politics. In many countries, the process of decentralization is likely to encourage separatist movement that call for the creation of homelands from the existing homelands (states). Ironically, these homelands may be threatened by the same process of national fragmentation which permitted their own birth. Furthermore, the new homelands may have to seek admittance to supranational organizations to become politically viable entities. In short, the nation-states are not only challenged by subnational identities but are under pressure to form supranational organizations (like the European Union or the SAARC).

In Europe, the nationalist rhetoric is still alive and well and the citizenship rights are still defined in a rather restricted sense. In 1992 Prime Minister John Majors said: ``We are all British citizens and we will always remain British citizens.`` He further maintained: ``I will never, come hell or high water, let our distinctive British identity be lost in a federal Europe.`` (Guardian, October 10, 1992). Hence, the community in the European Community is imagined to include both national and supranational considerations.

MWZAMAN`S RESPONSE #2

In response to BAHMAD Response # 4:

I enjoyed reading bahmad`s quotations on Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He was a man of integrity and honesty. He was the sole spokesman of Indian Muslims in 1940s. It was Jinnah who had spearheaded the Pakistan movement. Doubtless, he was admired and even adored by millions of millions of people. For millions of Pakistanis he is still Quaid-i-Azama. Yet, Jinnah was not above criticism. On genuine grounds, Jinnah`s performance as the undisputed leader and later as the most powerful Governor General of Pakistan can be subject of critical asseessment. A man who had to rule the new nation for 13 months with iron fist can hardly be characterized as the founder of democracy.

Jinnah had zero level tolerance for any kind of corruption or nepotism. Even the vehement crirtics of Jinnah couldn`t blemish his character. Yet, he was totally intolerant about criticism of his policies and programs. He left a behind a legacy of authoritarian mode of governance. That`s my point. He left behind a legacy or a precedent of an undemocratic mode of governance. The autocratic leaders like Ghulam Mohammad,Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan took the full advantage of an undemocratic and definitely authoritarian precedents. Instead of eulogizing Jinnah, it is more meaningful to initiate a critical assessment of Jinnah`s administration of 13 month. It is even more relevant to evaluate how the rulers of Pakistan since the sad and sudden demise of Jinnah had governed the country. For accomplishing that objective, I am posting the following write-up on Ghulam Mohammad`s authoritarian regime. Thank you.

Sincerely, M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

The Specter of Ghulam Mohammad’s Ruthless

Authoritarianism in Pakistan

M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

After Mohammad Ali Jinnah`s untimely death on September 11, 1948, Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy had co-opted Khawaja Nazimuddin, the Chief Minister of East Bengal, to be the Governor General of Pakistan. Yet, there was no reason for Bangalees to be gloating about such elevation of their Chief Minister. He was not only a non-Bangalee Jinnah loyalist but an anti-Bangalee collaborationist Muslim Leaguer from East Bengal. He was neither a match nor a substitute for Jinnah. He was selected to be the Head of the State because of his willingness to be subservient to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

For the first time after Jinnah’s demise, the Governor General’s office was made secondary or an appendix to the Prime Minister’s office. Nazimuddin had to remain content with various mundane and ceremonial functions of the Head of State. At Prime Minister’s initiative, the CAP had restricted certain powers of the Governor General. In other words, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan had emerged as the real head of the government. This power relationship between the head of the state and head of the government continued till Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination on October 16, 1951.

After Liaquat Ali Khan’s death, Nazimuddin stepped down from his position of Governor General to become the Prime Minister. The ruling oligarchy of Pakistan inducted Ghulam Mohammad (a Punjabi bureaucrat with well-entrenched connections with the ruling establishment), the powerful Finance Minister of Pakistan, to be the Governor General of Pakistan. It seems that Nazimuddin wanted to exercise real power as the head of the government! Unfortunately, Ghulam Mohammad had something else in his mind. One thing for sure is that the Punjabi bureaucrat was not willing to be satisfied with his ceremonial role as figurehead of the state. Therefore, Gholam Mohammad reversed the power relationship in favor of his highest office. Once again governmental powers were centralized in Governor General’s office. The Prime Minister’s office of Khawaja Nazimuddin was made an appendix to Governor General’s office.

Following the legacy of the founding father of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad had also exercised absolute authoritarianism in one form or another. Yet, he outshone and superceded the Quaid-I-Azam in the process of employing absolute powers during his tenure as the Governor General of Pakistan! For instance, he had summarily dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin and his cabinet in 1953 even though the Prime Minister was apparently enjoying the confidence of a substantial majority in the Constituent assembly. In lieu of employing appropriate parliamentary procedure for dismissing a Ministry for valid cause, Ghulam Mohammad had used the following capricious and arbitrary statement for removing the Prime Minister (issued on April 17, 1953): “I have been driven to the conclusion that the cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country. In emergency which has arisen I have felt it incumbent upon me to ask the cabinet to relinquish office so that a new cabinet better fitted to discharge its obligations towards Pakistan may be formed.”



The dismissal of Nazimuddin’s Cabinet by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad was discussed by most of the celebrated writers on government and politics of Pakistan of that period (including Keith Callard, K.J. Newman, Khalid Bin Syed and Frank Goodnow). Most of them discredited the Governor General for dwarfing the role of office of the Prime Minister. For example, K.J. Newman had observed in 1959 that “Ghulam Mohammad left the path of constitutional government by dismissing Prime Minister Nazimuddin in 1953, even though the latter enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the Constituent Assembly” (K.J. Newmamn, “ Pakistan’s Preventive Autocracy and Its Causes,” Pacific Affairs, 32, 1959, p. 25; cited by Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, 1964, p. 55).

Instead of providing an opportunity to the dismissed Prime Minister to demonstrate that he enjoyed majority support in the central legislature (CAP) by seeking a vote of confidence, Ghulam Mohammad conveniently handpicked Mohammad Ali (Bogra), another spineless Jinnah loyalist from East Bengal, to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was reported that that the members of Mohammad Ali Bogra’s first cabinet were selected by the Governor General. It has been widely stressed by many scholars that during his tenure as Prime Minister, he was a captive in Ghulam Mohammad’s hand. Quite often the Cabinet was shuffled or reshuffled at the behest of the Governor General.



Although Mohammad Ali Bogra was known for his timidity and loyalty to Ghulam Mohammad, he was conniving with the members of CAP for curtailing the powers of Governor General. In fact, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was in the process of further reducing the powers of the Governor General. In his (infamous) book titled Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 50), the self-declared President Ayub Khan mentioned: “He [Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra] told me quietly that his colleagues wanted some amendment to be made in the Government of India Act [1935] by which Governor-General’s powers would be limited. A resolution was printed in the middle of the night and placed in the pigeonholes of Members of the National Assembly [CAP]. In the morning the [Constituent] Assembly met as a Constitution-making body, an hour before its scheduled time, and revoked Sections 9, 10, 10-A, 10-b, and 17 of the Government of India Act [1935], thus stripping the Governor –General of the powers in exercise of which he [Ghulam Mohammad] had dismissed the Nazimuddin Cabinet [on April 17, 1953]. The Resolution was moved and passed within ten minutes. The Governor General was convalescing in Abbotabad at that time.”



In retaliation, the Governor General had dismissed the Cabinet and dissolved the Constituent Assembly --- the highest law-making body of Pakistan. Obviously, his hostility toward democratic principles and parliamentary institutions got fully exposed when he dissolved the (first) Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on October 24, 1954 by issuing the following Proclamation: “The Governor General having considered the political crisis with which the country is faced has, with deep regret, come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has broken down. He, therefore, has decided to declare a State of Emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function” (cited by Goodnow, 1964, p. 57; and also by Callard, 1957, p. 141).



Henry Frank Goodnow succinctly summarized the situation: “On October 24, 1954, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad reacted by declaring emergency. Censorship was imposed on all Karachi newspapers. All gatherings of more than five persons were banned on October 25. A strong police cordon was placed around the building in which the Constituent Assembly customarily held its meetings, and members of the Constituent Assembly were forcibly prevented from entering” (Goodnow, 1964, p. 57).

Goodnow also noted that according to one constitutional authority [Goodnow was referring to K.J. Newman’s observations which he made in his 1959 Pacific Affairs article on “Pakistan’s Preventive Autocracy…”], Governor General’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954 was “clearly unconstitutional since the Governor General’s powers had been specifically amended so as to exclude the power to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. ----- Governor-General’s Ordinance 22 of 1947, issued according to Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, by which paragraph 5 and 6 of Section 19 of the Act of 1935 were validly amended” (Quoted in Henry Frank Goodnow’s, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p. 57).

The Governor General’s arbitrary dissolution of the Constituent Assembly pushed the new nation of Pakistan to the brink of a serious constitutional and political crisis that was avoided with the implementation of Supreme Court’s creative verdict by forming the second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. As pointed out by Donald N. Wilbur: “the dissolution of the first constituent assembly by the governor general touched off a chain reaction of judicial activity which, but for the good judgment of the Federal Court and the patience of the governor general, might have resulted in complete legal chaos in Pakistan” (Donald N. Wilbur, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p.238).

Although the Chief Court of Sind (Tamizuddin Khan, the President of the CAP, had challenged the action of the Governor General) found Governor General’s actions as “illegal” and “ultra vires,” the Supreme Court (federal court) had reversed the decision. Briefly stated, while Sind Court asserted that since the Acts of the Constituent Assembly did not require the “assent” of the Governor General, he (Ghulam Mohammad) had “no power of any kind to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.” On the contrary, the Federal Court of Pakistan quickly declared that the Provincial (Sind) Court “had no authority to issue such writs because the 1954 amendment to the Government of India Act (1935), had never received the assent of the Governor general” (Donald N.Wilbur’s above mentioned book, p. 239). The Federal Court finally came out with the verdict that the Governor General had lawfully “dissolved the First Constituent Assembly”, and the constitutional legislation needed the “assent” of the Governor General. The verdict also ordered the Governor General to form a new Constituent Assembly.

However, there was a gestation gap between the court deliberations and court decisions. Yet, there also remained a constitutional vacuum between dissolution of the first CAP and the formation of second CAP (approximately six months). While the Federal Court decisions provided a bridge to fill the gap, Ghulam Mohammad`s disdain for democratic principles and constitutional process was responsible for creating legal chaos throughout Federal Government. Wilbur (in the above-mentioned book) succinctly summarized the immediate legal effects of Gholam Mohammad’s willful violation of constitutional principles: “since the [Constituent] Assembly for seven years [1947-‘54] had assumed that the assent of governor general to ‘constitutional’ legislation was not required, the Federal Court’s decision [in favor of Governor General’s arbitrary actions] created general consternation. Altogether, forty- four acts of far-reaching legal consequences suddenly were found to be invalid. The implications were staggering. The provincial legislatures had been elected under voided procedures. The governors of three provinces, under emergency conditions, had issued 143 acts, all of which were invalid. The State Bank of Pakistan had been regulating the currency and exercising exchange controls under invalidated legislation. The administration of Karachi [Federal Capital] had been illegal since 1948. Many persons had been imprisoned, including some convicted of conspiracy, under invalidated laws. It was even discovered that one of the federal judges in the case had been appointed under one of the invalidated acts. (He was quickly re-appointed under a different law.)” (Donald N. Wilbur, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p. 239).

The most interesting fact is that the Governor General, the creator of that constitutional nightmare, had complicated the crisis further through his arrogant actions. In response to the constitutional limbo, Ghulam Mohammad had declared another emergency (based on his interpretation of 1935 India Act) for the purpose of assuming “legislative powers under such conditions, promulgated an ordinance retroactively validating thirty-five of forty-four invalidated laws and, at the same time, amend certain provisions of the existing Constitution Order to preclude suits against the government in respect of any acts arising out of the emergency proclamation. The Federal Court within a few weeks declared that the governor general had gone beyond his legislative powers and threw out the emergency ordinance” (Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p. 239).

Ghulam Mohammad’s vanity knew no bounds. He could never settle with the idea that even the Governor General of Pakistan was not above law. He had “issued a proclamation assuming to himself, until other provision could be made by the constituent assembly, such powers as were necessary to validate and enforce laws designed to avoid a breakdown in the constitutional and administrative machinery of the country. He then again validated retroactively most of the laws in question” (Wilbur’s above mentioned book, pp. 239-240).



The Second Constituent Assembly that consisted of 80 members (40 from each wing) was formed in June 1955. Pursuant to Governor General’s order, the Provincial Assemblies elected the CAP. The second CAP met for the first time on July 8, 1955. (What were the chief accomplishments of second CAP? It validated most of the legislation/acts that were hanging in between the dissolution of the first CAP and creation of the second CAP; it passed the “One Unit” bill; and the adoption of the 1956 Constitution).



As noted earlier, Ghulam Mohammad had concentrated all executive powers in his office. Mohammad Ali Bogra could be characterized as the ‘ceremonial’ Prime Minister of Pakistan. There were instances when Mohammad Ali Bogra was rebuked or scolded like a grade school boy by the Punjabi Governor General. For example, it is on the record that the Prime Minister was hurriedly summoned back to Karachi by the Governor General from the middle of a trip to North America before the first CAP was dismissed. On his arrival at the Mauripur Airport at midnight of October 23, 1954, he (the Prime Minister) was surrounded by the emissaries of the Governor General “as soon as he came down the runway of the aircraft. ……. Like a prisoner Mr. Ali [Mohammad Ali Bogra] was escorted to the car and driven to the residence of the Governor General.” It was reported that Mohammad Ali Bogra was “weeping when he came out” of Ghulam Mohammad’s residence. It was said that Ghulam Mohammad gave him an ultimatum: ‘Do as I order or go to prison’.” (Joyti Sengupta, “Eclipse of East Pakistan’, cited in Mazharul Islam’s Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib (Agamee Prakashanee, 1993, pp. 151-152).

The way the Governor General had scolded and reprimanded the incumbent Prime Minister of Pakistan was less than civilized or dignified. Yet, the prestigious position of Prime Minister was more preferable to Mohammad Ali Bogra than to be satisfied with a sense of self-respect and dignity. Although he was allowed to retain his title as Prime Minister, a new cabinet was formed by Ghulam Mohammad on October 24, 1954. That Cabinet included, among others, General Ayub Khan, the Commander Chief of Armed Forces (took over Defense Ministry), Iskander Mirza, Governor of East Pakistan, (became Minster of Interior), Choudhri Muhammad Ali (Finance) and Dr. Khan Shahib. (To the chagrin of many Bangalee leaders, Suhrawardy had joined the so-called talent-cabinet in December 1954 as Law Minister. He, however, resigned from the cabinet in August 1955].

It is a verified fact that Ghulam Mohammad had appointed the members of the so-called “Cabinet of Talent” without any input even from Mohammad Ali Bogra, the lame-duck Prime Minister. There is little wonder why this cabinet was dubbed as “Ghulam Mohammad’s Cabinet.” However, the formation of this cabinet subsequently had paved the way for the Army Generals and bureaucrats to take over the political process of the country. As noted earlier, the second Constituent Assembly was formed in June 1955. Once the second Constituent Assembly met in July 1955, Mohammad Ali Bogra’s “obedience” or “subservience” to the Governor General was not enough for him to continue as the Prime Minister. Although he had managed to win a seat in the second CAP from East Pakistan, he did not have any real constituency being the sole Muslim League member from East Pakistan. This renegade from East Pakistan was no more capable of serving any useful purpose for the Punjabi dominated ruling coterie of Pakistan. Therefore, Mohammad Ali Bogra was ejected from the position of Prime Minister. The members of the ruling Muslim league parliamentary party decided to lend their support to Chaudhri Mohammad Ali to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was on August 11, 1955 when Chadhuri Mohammad Ali, a Punjabi bureaucrat (he was Finance Minister of Pakistan since Ghulam Mohammad was selected to be the Governor General), became the fourth Prime Minister of Pakistan.



It was once again demonstrated that the Prime Minister of Pakistan could be recruited, retained, disciplined and fired by the sweet will and pleasure of the Governor General. Being disgusted with the humiliating experience of both Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali Bogra, H.S. Suhrawardy had said the following in the Second Constituent Assembly on September 10, 1955: “to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan which has been held by certain honouarable gentlemen who have turned out, taken by the ears and thrown out as it suited the ruling coterie is not a matter of very great honour” (quoted by Khalid Bin Sayeed, “The Political Role of Pakistan’s Civil Service,” Pacific Affairs, 31, 1958, p. 137 cited in Goodnow, 1964, p. 155).

Some more serious changes in the political leadership of Pakistan also took place at that time. Given the fact that Ghulam Mohammad was seriously ill since late 1954, Iskander Mirza was acting as Governor General when the Governor General decided to take leave for treatment. Of all the cabinet members, Ghulam Mohammad had trusted Iskander Mirza to be officiating as Governor General during his absence! Iskander Mirza, a master of cliques and tricks, had devised a blueprint to oust the Governor General. It was on August 11, 1955 when Iskander Mirza unceremoniously replaced Governor General Ghulam Mohammad in office.

Ghulam Mohammad’s successors (Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan) also demonstrated their insatiable passion for ruthless authoritarianism and centralized mode of governance. Of all the notorious political characters, it was Iskander Mirza who had formally invited the military take-over of Pakistan Government. What was the making of Iskander Mirza? What were his accomplishments? What was his mode of governance? What were the main features of 1956 Constitution? How did he treat the Prime Ministers during his tenure first as Governor General and later as the President of Pakistan? How did he abrogate the 1956 Constitution and introduce Martial Law in October 1958 ? Hopefully, most of the concerned or well informed or at least open-minded Pakistanis know the answers to these truthful questions.

The worst brunt of Governor General’s unlimited power fell on Bangalees when Ghulam Mohammad had summarily dismissed the elected provincial Government of Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Huq in East Bengal in 1954. After dismantling the Huq’s United Front Cabinet, Ghulam Mohammad promulgated the Governor’s rule in East Bengal through the use of infamous Article 92 (A), an instrument enacted during Jinnah’s tenure as Governor General. (Jinnah had also used 92-(A) provision to oust the Prime Ministers of both Sind and West Punjab). The mistreatment of the provinces especially of East Pakistan in the hands of the arrogant rulers of Pakistan have always been source of discontent throughout Pakistan`s 52 years history.

In response to Mr. MWZaman`s response #2:

I am delighted to read Mr. Manik`s response. His essay on Ghulam Mohammad`s authoritarian regime is very informative. Thank you for sharing this excellent piece with all of us.

One major purpose of my reference to the material from Akbar S. Ahmad`s book was to suggest that Mr. Jinnah was a product of a period when the ruling elite in many parts of South Asia uncritically imitated the values and attitudes of the British ruling elite. Yet Mr. Jinnah possessed some qualities which distinguished him from most other political leaders in Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah governed Pakistan under very difficult circumstances. A political history of Pakistan`s early days has yet to be examined critically and contextualized adequately. If Mr. Jinnah was not the founder of democracy in Pakistan, he may at least be viewed as the founder of absolutist-bourgeois democracy in Pakistan.

Regards, Bilal Ahmad

In response to reply #1 (by Nameless):

An interesting, though inaccurate, observation. Although the issue of rights and obligations (duties; responsibilities) go hand in hand, they cannot be reduced to simple statistics. Let me state my position, only briefly.

British scholar David Held, in his book Models of Democracy (1987: 284-85; Stanford), wrote: ``If people are to be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives, and enjoy equal rights as well as equal obligations in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, they must be in a position to enjoy a range of rights not only in principle, but also in practice. The rights of citizens must be both formal and concrete. This entails the specification of a far broader range of rights, with a far more profound ‘cutting edge`, than is allowed typically [in the West]. Such a ‘system of rights` would both constrain and enable collective activities across a broad domain.``

In a society governed by an unscrupulous and unresponsive ruling elite, the question of rights needs to be recognized and struggled for the empowerment of common people. Obligations cannot be enforced by corrupt, authoritarian regimes. This has long been a dilemma that we need to understand and try to deal with. Empowerment of the people, I think, would slowly and gradually lead to a balance between rights and obligations. The following letters provides a glimpse of my position on the issue of rights (and responsibilities).

Frontier Post, June 25, 1999

Peace, not war



The ruling elites in most so-called less-developed countries are obsessed with: (1) the lust for power; and (2) the expectation of sacrifices from the common people without protecting their basic citizenship and human rights. The Pakistani ruling elites are, in addition, obsessed with the desire to make a fool of Pakistani people by diverting their attention from the issues of their everyday livelihood and welfare. This process must stop.



We are on the verge of another bloody war. The Pakistani ruling elites need to truthfully and effectively inform the people around the world (which includes Pakistan) that Pakistan wants peace and not war. Peace in South Asia is necessary for the welfare of common Pakistani citizens and for earning global respect for our homeland and our people. Is Pakistan`s credibility at stake at the moment?

Bilal Ahmad

USA



Frontier Post, June 11, 1999

Protect minorities, ensure national unity



The Quid-e-Azam was very sensitive to the minority question. In pre-Partition India, particularly during the 1930s and the 1940s, the Muslim minority developed a sense of insecurity. It was this sense of economic, political, and cultural insecurity that eventually led to the creation of Pakistan.

Given the ethno-linguistic setup of Pakistan, the Baluchis, the Pukhtuns, and the Sindhis are some of the leading minority groups. Pakistan, however, is the home of numerous additional minority groups. Majority-minority relations exist in every province of Pakistan. Can we say with pride that the minorities in Pakistan are fully protected against the kind of alienation, oppression, and deprivation that the Indian Muslim minority felt some fifty-two odd years back?

The imagined community of the Indians was shattered in the late 1940s. Can we protect ours in this period of gradual and persistent decadence? If we, as a Pakistani nation, have some hope, then we must find ways to save ourselves from further disintegration. One major step would be to show real concern for our socially and geographically variable economic, political, and cultural insecurities.

Bilal Ahmad,

USA

mwzaman,

A very interesting and objective analysis about the circumstances and events leading upto the autocratic and undemocratic style of governance in Pakistan from its formative years to the current.

A majority of Jinnah`s admirers are unable to differentiate between Jinnah,the founding father, and Jinnah, the administrator- the Governor General of the state. Most of the salutory quotes, as mentioned by BAHMAD`s post, are in the context of the former Jinnah. There are few quotes

regarding Jinnah`s running the Govt. They, however, are not complimentary.

The most visible and significant autocratic and undemocratic actions by Jinnah as GG that come to my mind are three:

1. Urdu as the national language; was his decision without consultation or consensus. This, to me, was the beginning of the end of East Pakistan.

2. Karachi as the nation`s capital; again a personal decision.

3. Dismissal of an elected govt. of Abdul Gaffar Khan and instalment of a minority Muslim League in NWFP in its place. Khan was imprisoned and later was exiled in Afghanistan.

If you know the circumstances and events leading upto Khan`s dismissal, I would like to know . Also, what,if any, legal course resorted to justify it?

MWZAMAN`S Response # 3

In response to Mr. Bilal Ahmad`s reply # 7:

I found Mr (Dr.?)Bilal Ahmad`s article very interesting and informative. I think that he deserves our thanks for writing and posting such an excellent article on relevant topic. However, many of his observations and generalizations are global and vague. Some of his comments are even evasive. His comments on Pakistan`s autocratic tendencies are facial at best. Bilal Ahmad needs to speak the whole truth. However, his articles deserves wider dissemination.

I decided to comment on Bilal Ahmad`s article with great deal of hesitancy. Given the fact that I am from Bangladesh, my comments could be quickly misconstrued or distorted by the so-called patriotic Pakistanis as anti-Pakistanis. Therefore, I have posted my comments on this thread simply because of the fact that I have open mind, and I would like to hear what the objective observers of Pakistan politics-- past and present- have to say. Neither my observations nor my conclusions are cast in concrete. I want to learn more.

Another reason is that the CHOWK management has thus far not carried some of my write-ups on Pakistan`s political heritage. I thought one of the best ways to share my thoughts with the readers of CHOWK is to add response to some of the relevant articles. In all fairness, I need to say that I found Mr. Bilal Ahmad`s article on the rights of the citizens very relevant. I have no hidden agenda. My sole objective is to make critical assessment of Pakistan`s past. I want to fully comprehend the fundamental nature of Pakistan`s Government and Politics. I want to understand the main reasons for the break up of Pakistan. I want to know why democracy could never flouriish in Pakistan. I would like to know why authoritarianism had become the hallmark and characteristic feature of Pakistan from the early years of her emergence. In other words, I would like to examine the INHERITANCE of today`s Pakistan.



In general, Pakistani scholars are very shy in admitting that there was no rudiments of democracy in Pakistan. To my mind, Bilal Ahmad`s short note was bold enough considering the fact that many Pakistani scholars have serious difficulty in dealing with hard facts. Most of the Pakistani scholars even point out that democracy could not take its roots in Pakistan because the Founding Father Jinnah died too soon on September 11, 1948.

They also claim that the assissination of Liaquat Ali Khan on October 16, 1951 was a serious blow to the prospect of establishing true democracy in Pakistan. Such claims are based on the wrong assumption that both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were champions of ``democracy`` in Pakistan. As if they were serious advocates of democracy. These claims have neither relevance nor credibilty to the truth.

In fact, it is a travesty of truth to claim that Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were working hard to establish democracy in Pakistan. Neither their policies nor their utterances demonstrated their willingness to give democracy a chance in Pakistan. Their actions and postures against the MAJORITY people of Pakistan were less than democratic. Thanks a lot for perusing my comments.

Sincerely,

W.Zaman Manik

Potscript: Let me share with you the concluding part of my earlier comments on Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Ghulam Mohammad, and Mhammad Ali Bogra:



A SHORT NOTE ON THE EARLY RULING ELITE OF PAKISTAN

M. Waheeduzzaman Manik





Neither Mohammad Ali Jinnah nor his handpicked Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, had demonstrated any sincerity in establishing democratic institutions in Pakistan. This is an established fact. Both before and after the 1971 genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bangladesh, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was not known for instituting any semblance of a democratic mode of governance. In fact, the government of Pakistan during pre- or post-1971 era can be characterized as a laboratory of ruthless authoritarianism and centralization.



It is crucial to underscore that neither Jinnah nor Liaquat Ali Khan was a champion of decentralized and federal system of government. They had installed a centralized-- unitary system of government, and as long as they were alive they had wholeheartedly propagated the benefits of a strong centralized form of government. They had little or no concern for ensuring provincial autonomy and democracy.

The relationship between Governor General Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat was unequal. Jinnah was both head of the state and head of the government. Jinnah’s unlimited power and personal charisma did provide no opportunity for the Prime Minister to question any action of Jinnah. Given the fact that Liaquat Ali was a loyal lieutenant of Jinnah from pre-independence years, that convenient arrangement worked well as long as Jinnah was alive. Yet, The concentration of executive powers of the Centarl Government of Pakistan in the hands of Governor General Jinnah was against the acceptable norms of a Parlimentary democracy. Thus, the founding father Jinnah had left behind a dangerous precedent of authoritarian mode of administration.

However, Liaquat Ali Khan emerged as a strong Prime Minister (first and last) when Khwaja Nazimuddin was co-opted as the titular Governor General (first and last) of Pakistan after the demise of Jinnah.

After Liaquat Ali Khan`s assassination on October 16, 1951, Nazimuddin became the Prime Minister, and the Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad was selected to be the Governor General. Ghulam Mohammad concentrated all executive powers of the government in Governor General’s office. He had fired Nazimuddin and his cabinet. He appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra as the new Prime Minister.

It was Ghulam Mohammad who had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Prime Minister of Pakistan could hold office at the pleasure of the Governor General. He had dissolved the newly elected Government of East Pakistan and introduced infamous Governor’s Rule there in 1954 through the use of Article 92(A). He had declared Emergency throughout Pakistan and dissolved the first Constituent Assembly. He pushed the country to an unprecedented constitutional crisis.

It was Ghulam Mohammad who had become the source of law when there was no Central Legislature in Pakistan during the gestation period between the dissolution of the first CAP on October 24, 1954 and the convening of the second CAP on July 8, 1955. It is not very difficult to comprehend why several political scientists had characterized Ghulam Mohammad’s excesses and intrusions in legislative and constitutional matters as Pakistan’s “constitutional autocracy’ or “preventive autocracy.”

The worst brunt of Governor General’s unlimited power fell on Bangalees when Ghulam Mohammad had summarily dismissed the elected provincial Government of Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Huq in East Bengal in 1954. After dismantling Fazlul Huq’s United Front Cabinet, Ghulam Mohammad promulgated the Governor’s rule in East Bengal through the use of infamous Article 92 (A), an instrument enacted during Jinnah’s tenure as Governor General. (Jinnah had also used 92-(A) provision to oust the Prime Ministers of both Sind and West Punjab).

The founding leaders of Pakistan including Jinnah and Liaquat were not at all sincere believers of democratic rule in Pakistan. Nor were they champions of a decentralized and federal form of government. Instead of fostering better understanding through nurturing diversity, they had demanded hardcore uniformity. They were the greatest champions of “one nation,” “one state,” “one religion,” “one government,” “one leader,” “one party,’ and of course “one language.”

Their successors (non-Bengali East Pakistani Jinnah loyalist Khwaja Nazimuddin, ruthless Punjabi bureaucrat-turned-autocrat Ghulam Mohammad, most obedient collaborationist Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra, notorious traitor Iskander Mirza, Dictator General Ayub Khan and Jallad General Yahya Khan) had unsuccessfully tried to implement the policy of deadline uniformity, centralization and authoritarianism through the use of brute force. In sum, personal rule, authoritarianism and autocracy were the salient features of government and politics during early years of Pakistan.

Dr. M. Waheeduzzaman Manik writes from Tennessee, USA whose e-mail address is: Mwzaman@Aol.Com

In response to Dr. Manik`s response #3 (reply # 10):

I am thankful to Dr. Manik for his appreciation of my effort. The purpose this short article was threefold: (1) to bring into focus the issue of citizenship rights in contemporary Pakistan; (2) to identify the authoritarian nature of the Pakistani state; and (3) to suggest the need for a national covenant of state-civil society partnership based on the notion of citizenship rights. My article is in a way non-conventional since it provides several social-theoretic insights for understanding the dilemma of Pakistan. I, however, expect the readers to help in highlighting some concrete aspects of the problem at hand. Dr. Manik has definitely taken the first step.

I agree with Dr. Manik that some of my generalizations (abstractions) are global. One can easily notice that, for some of my theoretical insights, I have relied upon two noteworthy scholars: T. H. Marshall and Ranajit Guha. Nevertheless, Dr. Manik finds an element of vagueness and evasiveness in some of my statements. This is a point that I would like him to elaborate. He has also asked me to speak the whole truth. This suggests that my article is based on partial truth. I would like him to elaborate his point too.

The history of South Asia is full of some very sad moments (particularly the Partition of India and the fall of East Pakistan). I have no problem with Dr. Manik`s Bengali background. I also have no problem with his narrative of the evolution of democracy or autocracy during the early years of Pakistan. I can`t understand why some of his writings were not accepted by the Chowk. Dr. Manik has every right to form his opinions based on his perspective and background. Don`t we all have our own perspectives and backgrounds. However, I commend him for his contribution and hope that he would write an unbiased and critical treatise on the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.

Although I definitely prefer democracy over autocracy, I don`t view the representative form of democracy as a flawless political system. I also do not view too much centralization as conducive for the health of any socio-political system. As the Pakistani state is overly centralized, a decentralized system of governance may lead to good governance and peoples` empowerment.

Regards, Bilal Ahmad

P.S. On July 2, I published the following letter in the Frontier Post:

Another Call for Devolution



Many Pakistani citizens have recently stressed the need for a change in the structure of power through devolution. Devolution refers to the transfer of power from the center to a subnational jurisdiction. In Pakistan, a call for devolution is basically a call for some sort of provincial autonomy. Interestingly, Benazir Bhutto has also shown her belief in the devolution of decision-making since it would provide a more effective government to our people (Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, June 28).



In her letter, she further maintains that ``greater regional autonomy`` would ``help our people make the best use of available resources ... in tackling the problems of poverty, illiteracy and backwardness``. I wonder what she really means by ``our people,`` a select few or all Pakistani citizens irrespective of their class, gender, ethno-linguistic, religious, and other bases of individual and collective identities? Regardless of her real intent, the significance of devolution cannot be undermined since this measure may lead to greater citizen empowerment, a responsive government, and above all, national unity and security. If there is any merit in these expectations, then the issue of devolution must be placed on the forefront of our national agenda.

Bilal Ahmad

USA

The problem in Pakistan is exactly the opposite of what you say. Instead of having a repressive an autocratic state that suppresses our rights as citizens, Pakistan has a very weak state that seems incapable of enforcing law and order precisely because it is competing with a civil society full of armed power centers. If the state was, as you say, repressive and autocratic, we might be better off in having the order and stability that promotes public works and investment.

Secondly, instead of inheriting the mantle of the British Raj, Pakistan has turned what was an efficient state apparatus into an ineffectual one.

Your characterization of Britain`s political development misses one very important issue: democratic institutions always come after a state establishes itself by eliminating all competition (usually through violence and repression). A strong state is a pre-requisite for democracy, not the other way around, as you seem to think.

What Pakistan needs is strong central authority (i.e. law and order), efficient tax collection (i.e. public funds), and an end to the looting of government money. All of the above, I fear, will only come with repression (i.e. disciplinary measures).

Wasiq Nawaz

In response to Reply #12 (Wasiq Nawaz`s response #1):

Repression and autocracy are signs of weakness (not strength). In this sense, you are right that Pakistan is a weak state. A weak state has every reason to violate the citizenship rights since it cannot by its very nature (capacity) honor such rights.

A state facing a legitimation crisis cannot effectively enforce law and order. The condition becomes much more severe when the state is controlled by corrupt an unresponsive ruling elite.

You are right that the government of Pakistan (Central or otherwise) is currently competing with a civil society full of armed power groups. This is a phenomenon that needs much more serious and critical scholarly attention. It is, however, important to realize that the kind of dilemma that we are facing in contemporary Pakistan is very much a product of the way that state has been controlled by the unscrupulous ruling elite. In my commentary of Dr. Mubashir Hasan`s article (published in the South Asian Survey, Vol 4, No. 1, pp. 7-12), I wrote:

``In drawing some indirect parallels between the colonial and post-independence state institutions, Hasan suggests that the existing state institutions in South Asia suffer from a legitimation crisis due to: (1) the misallocation of resources, and (2) the use of brute physical force against the common people. He argues that the coercive South Asian states lack the capacity to win public support because they are controlled by unscrupulous elites who cannot afford to let ``consideration of ethics and esthetics, environment and morality, and peace and war come in their way when power or profit are at stake.`` He (a la K. K. Aziz) identifies nine characteristics of the Pakistani ruling elites. These are: (1) intolerance, (2) self-righteousness, (3) inconsideration, (4) selfishness, (5) hypocrisy, (6) irresponsibility, (7) emotionalism, (8) violence, and (9) hatred. Although Hasan suggests that most common people do not possess these negative attributes, he portrays the vast majority of them as ``childlike in manner, emotional in disposition, and spontaneous in response.`` In the final analysis, he links the predicament of the people of South Asian to the lack of capacity and confidence of the ruling elites to provide leadership. Are the ruling elites the only source of leadership? Hasan fails to raise this question. Why should the people look toward those who have repeated failed to provide leadership? Shouldn`t the leadership evolve organically from us: ``We the people. . . .``? `` (Pakistan Link, March 12, 1999).

Mr. Nawaz, I invite you to read the rest of my commentary where Hasan`s (and my) solutions to the problems of Pakistan are diametrically opposite to the ones that you have suggested. For example, you suggest centralization and violence (repression), where we suggest decentralization and non-violence. Moreover, I want to focus on the extension of the ideal of citizenship whereas you want to focus on increasing coercive power of the state.

The point raised by you in the second paragraph of your response is already covered in my statement that: ``The autocracy established in colonial India in alive and well in contemporary Pakistan. It has become rather a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance.``

Regarding the British state and politics, I would like to point out that my little understanding is somewhat different from that of yours. I view state formation as a contingent process in which the state, civil society, and economy shape each other in a rather complex manner. I am, nevertheless, prepared to learn if you kindly suggest me a few references.

Regards, Bilal Ahmad

Ref: BAhmed Repy # 8

Sorry, I do not get it. What is inaccurate? I was not challenging your views on RIGHTS. I only asked a fundamental question. ``Can Rights exist without responsibilities?``.

If your answer is yes - we are poles apart (even though you seem to recognize only one pole!)

If answer is no - talking of one without the other is meaningless (at least for me).

In response to Reply #14:

I need not stress that you have every ``right`` to form an opinion about the issue at hand (and other matters too). I think, I have already answered your questions in my earlier response (Reply #8).

However, I should make my point explicit regarding the word ``inaccurate.`` You found no mention of responsiblity in my article (zero time). It is the word ``zero`` that makes your observation inaccurate. Kindly read the following part of my article and decide yourself. I wrote:

The autocracy established . . . and resistence. Moreover, too much power . . . created enormous difficulties for the evolution of society that recognizes and values its rights and duties.``

In my Reply #8, I have used ``duties``, ``obligations``, and ``responsibilities`` interchangeably. However, in Pakistan, the rights of a large number of ``duty-conscious`` citizens are violated by the state apparatus on a routine basis. This is something deplorable. You can see the evidence of such violations in our free (and responsible) press--such as the Dawn, the News, and the Frontier Post. My plea for the citizenship rights is for the future health of Pakistan and her citizens.

Regards, Bilal Ahmad

MWZAMAN`S RESPONSE # 5

ADEENDUM to MWZAMAN`s Response # 4

In response to KANTEPATEL (reply # 9), the following segments of my commentary got inadvertently deleted from my earlier post:

Pursuant to Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Government of India Act, 1935, with necessary and proper adaptations, was to be employed as the Interim Constitution of Pakistan.

Although 1935 Act of India had a semblance of a Federal system, the Governor General of British-India had retained methods and procedures for controlling and monitoring the governments of Provinces. However, most of the Indian provinces including Bengal from 1937 till independence in August 1947 had gained some degree of self-governance. Therefore, it was reasonably expected that Pakistan would have genuine Federal Governmental structure in which the constituent units and provinces would be granted provincial autonomy. Yet, after Pakistan emerged as independent nation-state, the provinces had lost out to the Central Government whatever rudimentary form of self- rule they enjoyed under the British from 1937 through August 14, 1947.

For instance, the Central Government of Pakistan from the days of Jinnah had ruthlessly used the powers of Governor General’s office for dislodging or controlling provincial ministries. Aimed at installing a Muslim League Government in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Governor General Jinnah had dislodged the pro-congress Ministry of Dr, Khan Sahib (brother of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan) immediately after independence. In fact, Dr. Khan Shahib’s Ministry was dissolved on August 22, 1947. False and frivolous charges of “conspiracy” against Pakistan were brought against the Chief Minister even though the British Governor of that province vouched that Dr. Khan Shahib was not at all disloyal to Pakistan. (Adul Gaffar Khan was arrested in June 1948 for allegedly instigating masses and “conspiring” against the Government of Pakistan, and he was imprisoned for six years).

Thank you.

Sincerely, M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

July 18, 1999