Hegemony of the Ruling Elite in Pakistan

Bilal:

The article is here on page 1. We should direct our comments throught the inter act here.

rgds

t

gymnosophist:

(from the side lines) heheheh...humour is not extinct, yet. That is a positive sign. Bravo!

t

gymnosophist:

You had me in stitches. Brilliant.

rgds

t

Ref Sameer JB #: 166

You said about national symbols {I guess, in any from of consensus, cow, eagle, rose and mango tree will be the winners.}

The cow as the National Animal of Pakistan? Do you realize exactly where this would lead to? The National Animal cannot be slaughtered. It has to be treated with respect, just like you treat the flag with respect. Pakistan will have to pass a Cow Protection Law. Those Indian Muslims who take their cue from Pakistan (a minuscule number) will DEMAND the protection of cows in India too. The Hindus, just to be contrary, will read through their holy books and discover that all major Vedic sacrifices call for the slaughter of a cow and ceremonial offering of beef in the sacrificial fire, after which the roast beef is to be consumed by all, including the presiding Brahmins. Beef eating will become the norm in India, just so that Indians can piss off the Pakistanis by slaughtering the Pakistani National Animal. McDonald`s will have its largest number of franchises in India. The surplus Indian cattle population will disappear soon, the roads will not be full of cowdung, and Benares will have clean pathways and alleys. Worshippers of Shiva will find vibhuti (holy ash that they smear on their bodies) to be in short supply. The villages of South Asia will run short of fuel (dried cowdung patties) and will have to switch over to natural gas. This will lead to other modernizations in the villages.

Holy cow! The times, they are a-changing!

Jalal Ahmed, a citizen of Pakistan (he is not known to me) has published the following letter in the Dawn. Jalal seems to suggest that the proportional representation system of elections, coupled with the presidential system, would relieve our politics from the domination of the feudal lords. An interesting observation! How sound? At least, I don`t know. Is there a hidden agenda (in addition to personal preference and viewpoint) in this letter? I just wonder!

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Dawn Internet Edition

Monday, January 3, 2000

The bane of feudalism

FEUDALISM was abolished soon after independence in India and later in Bangladesh. But in Pakistan the feudals continue to remain in control of the legislatures.

Almost seventy-five per cent of the population is rural in Pakistan. The feudal gives loans to the tiller to keep him under his thumb. Even after he clears his debt along with the interest, he is told that he is still in debt. He remains indebted to his landlord for ever. No wonder, he casts his vote as ordered by his master. Thus one or the other feudal gets elected from almost all the constituencies. This has been happening in every election.

Maybe proportional representation coupled with the presidential system will bring about a change for the benefit of the masses.

The situation here reminds us of the plight of Turkey when the Crimean war ended in 1856. Turkish treasury was empty and Sultan Abdel Majid was forced to borrow money from European bankers at ruinous rates of interest. In 1854, Turkey was not in debt but by 1875, Sultan Abdel Aziz owed amounts equivalent to nearly one billion dollars in foreign currency to European banks. In 1881, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) was established to help repay the foreign debt. In a few years, OPDA succeeded and foreign investments started flowing into Turkey.

Insha Allah, Pakistan`s public finance specialists will come up with a solution to extricate the nation from its debt crisis.

JALAL AHMED,

Karachi

Dear Bilal Ahmad: I did not find discussion forum at Dawn.com. Is it under ``feedback``?

In response to SameerJB (Reply # 172)

Dear Sameer:

Please go the following address:

www.dawn-usa.com/pakistan.shtm#nation

I suspect the debate has just started. See in particular the replies of Bilal Ahmad (myself), Khalid Hasan, Hussain Haqqani, and Nayyar Zaidi.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

In a recent opinion piece, Shaheen Sehbai has called for accountability in journalism (see Reply # 143). Shaheen`s article was sent to all Pakistani newspapers, only the Frontier Post published it. However, the Dawn has started a discussion forum on the internet. I recommend all Chowkwalla`s to go to the Dawn site and register your views about the article. Other than myself and temporal, Benazir Bhutto, Khalid Hasan, Hussain Haqqani, and several others have already contributed.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

GENESIS OF RUTHLESS AUTHORITARIANISM AND UNDEMOCRATIC MODE OF GOVERNANCE IN THE EARLY YEARS OF PAKISTAN(1947-’55) [PART I and II]

By M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

The political history of Pakistan is replete with anti-democratic modes of governance. The authoritarianism seems to be the legacy of Pakistan. Indeed, the authoritarianism has always been the hallmark of government and politics of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of the nation, was known for his honesty and integrity of character. Yet, it was Jinnah who laid the foundation of ruthless authoritarianism and centralized political structure in Pakistan. It was him who created the precedents of undemocratic and autocratic modes of governance in Pakistan. He was as much responsible as his successors for the continuation of the undemocratic tradition of authoritarian mode of governance in Pakistan. At the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah had both the charisma and authority to introduce democratic norms and institutions in the new nation. Yet, from the beginning, he demonstrated his disdain towards democratic norms and practices. At his behest, an oligarchy was formed for ruling Pakistan with iron fist. The ruling oligarchy was completely divorced from the rudiments of democratic principles and values.

Although Mohammad Ali Jinnah had governed the nation only for 13 months, his tradition of assumption and exercise of “absolute” state power had dangerous effects on the subsequent rulers of Pakistan. Instead of instituting the ‘institutional rule’, he installed his ‘personal rule’. The way the nation was administered by the founding father and his chief lieutenant Liaquat Ali Khan had invariably conditioned the behavior of the successive regimes. The re-assessment of the nature of governance of the early years of Pakistan is quite pertinent at a critical juncture of the country when a military dictator has seized state power by force. It is imperative for observers of Pakistani political scene to look back at the past heritage of the country at a time when the military junta has virtually declared Pakistan a polity without politics and politicians.

The main intent of this paper, then, is to examine the genesis of ruthless autocracy and authoritarianism in the early years of Pakistan with specific reference to Jinnah-Liaquat-Ghulam Mohammad regimes. Once Jinnah’s passion for the use of unlimited power and authoritarian mode of governance is overviewed, the undemocratic and autocratic behavior and actions of Ghulam Mohammad will be underscored.



Given the fact that neither Khwaja Nazimuddin nor Mohammad Ali Bogra had any real power, the timid roles of these dwarfed leaders from East Bengal will be discussed with reference to Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad. Aimed at substantiating my generalizations, some gleanings from well-recognized scholarly works will be quoted. Finally, some concluding observations will be made. Let me also point out the scope of this commentary: No attempt has been made to cover Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan years. Hopefully, each of these despicable authoritative regimes can be the focus of separate articles. The power relationship between the Central Government and the Provinces will also not be included within the purview of this paper.

Jinnah’s Passion for Unlimited Power & Undemocratic Mode of Governance

Jinnah was undoubtedly the most effective and powerful President of All-India Muslim League (AIML). There was a total absence of any leader of Jinnah’s stature in the entire AIML to question or challenge his policies or desires in the mid-forties. His words were like dictates from the absolute monarch. He always encouraged lieutenants or loyalists in the party, not colleagues per se. Thus, at the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah was all of the following: Quaid-I-Azam, Governor General of Pakistan, President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (which was also the Central Legislature of Pakistan) and the President of Pakistan Muslim League.

In his seminal book titled Pakistan: A Political Study, Keith Callard, one of the early writers on the government and politics of Pakistan, had succinctly observed that people of Pakistan “looked for guidance to their Great Leader, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. There was no one else, he was Pakistan; and wherever he went he was received by vast crowds with adulation amounting almost to worship.” Keith Callard also underscored that Jinnah “was by nature a commander and leader of men. He was not to be treated as a colleague or even primus inter pares, for he demanded lieutenants who would serve him rather than partners who would argue with him. In manner he was cold, brilliant and unyielding, a man to inspire either fury or devotion. He organized the campaign for Pakistan as though he were a commander-in-chief issuing orders of the day to encourage the troops and tactical directions to control the provincial commanders” (Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (New York, N.Y: The Mcmillan Company, 1957, pp. 19-20. Henceforth this book will be cited as Keith Callard, 1957).

Jinnah’s passion for the assumption and consolidation of state powers was evident when the date of partition was nearing. He had selected himself to be the Governor General of Pakistan. According to Ayesha Jalal, “On July 2, 1947, Jinnah formally told Mountbatten that he intended to become Pakistan’s first Governor General. Of course Mountbatten was outraged. It complicated the partition process, as planned by him [Mountbatten], and especially the already odious business of dividing the Indian army. ------- He knew that as Governor-General he would have wide ranging powers over the Muslim areas, powers which he could not possibly afford to let any other individual exercise. Moreover, as the Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah felt he would be better placed to ensure the division of the army, and the army was what he needed most of all to clamp central authority over Pakistan’s provinces. At any rate, the Prime Minister of Pakistan would have to take orders from the Governor-General. ‘In my position’, Jinnah told the bemused Viceroy, ‘it is I who will give the advice and others will act on it.’ Mountbatten concluded that Jinnah had either gone ‘mad’ or was suffering from an acute form of ‘megalomania``(Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 292).

It is apparent from Ayesha Jalal’s observation that Jinnah made a deliberate choice to assume the position of Governor General of Pakistan. He had planned ahead of time to dictate the terms of reference to the Prime Minister. As the undisputed leader of the All-India Muslim League (AIML), Mohammad Ali Jinnah had consolidated all organizational authorities and powers in his hands even before Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947. Therefore, he knew it well that there will be no one from his party to oppose him. In fact, he used to act like the Head of the Muslim State before Pakistan was even created. Keith Callard had pointed out long time back in 1957 that as “President of the Muslim League he (Jinnah) felt that he was the effective head of the Muslim nation” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) met on August 10, 1947 (Four days before independence). Jogendra Nath Mondal was made the interim President of CAP. Aimed at controlling both the process and outcome of the Central legislature of Pakistan, Jinnah, the Governor General designate of Pakistan, expressed his desire to be the President of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The members of the CAP obliged, and on August 11, 1947, they unanimously elected Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the President and Tamijuddin Khan, the Vice President of the CAP. The CAP also passed a resolution conferring on Mohammad Ali Jinnah the title of Quaid-I-Azam (the Great Leader) – a title to be invariably employed in official correspondence of the Government of Pakistan. As noted by Keth Callard, “When Pakistan was formed the Quaid-I-Azam was recognized to be above the political battle, a figure to whom all might turn for authority and justice and protection. He became Governor- General and President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan; ---- he (Jinnah) was the personification of the state” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

As the Governor General, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had handpicked Nwabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. There is no doubt that Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan was capable of running the administration. Yet, Jinnah decided to retain the de-facto authorities of the Head of the Government in his hands. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet had to hold offices at the pleasure of Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan. In other words, Jinnah combined the roles of both the Head of the State and Head of the Government. Was it unconstitutional on the part of Governor General to intrude in carrying out of executive functions of the Prime Minister? I don’t think that it was unconstitutional per se because of the existence of contradictory constitutional provisions. Henry Frank Goodnow has summarized the context: “Prior to 1956 [Constitution] the governing constitutional laws were similar, but the relationship between the Governor General and the cabinet ministers was not entirely clear. The Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order of 1947 had provided that the Governor General and the provincial governors would act on the advice of their ministers. On the other hand, an unrepealed provision of the Government of India Act of 1935 provided that the ministers were to be chosen by the Governor General and would hold office at his pleasure” (Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p.54).

In view of the above-mentioned provision of 1935 Act, Jinnah had the legal basis to establish the Governor -General’s hold over the Cabinet. Yet, it needs to be recognized that he had deliberately ignored the provision in the 1947 Provisional Order in which it was stated that the Governor General would act on the advice of the Cabinet. It is also fair to suggest that it was Jinnah’s responsibility to see to it that the contradictory provision of 1935 was being repealed with the passage of 1947 Provisional order. It is very difficult for me to comprehend after so many years how and why a constitutional lawyer of Jinnah’s stature had used a dead provision of 1935 Act over a provision of 1947 for the purpose of dwarfing the independence of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. At any rate, Jinnah had created a dangerous precedent that directly impacted the relationship between the Governor General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the subsequent years, especially when Ghulam Mohammad was the Governor-General of Pakistan. The volatile relationship between the Head of the State and Head of the Government was also a characteristic feature during the years when Iskander Mirza was either Governor-General or President of Pakistan.

With assumption of the Presidency of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Governor General Jinnah virtually controlled the functions, the process, and the outcomes of the legislative branch of the central government. Such concentration of both the legislative and executive powers of the State in Jinnah’s office of Governor General was nothing short of nullification of the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branches of government. It was unfortunate that the legislative branch of the central government was rendered impotent from the very beginning of independent Pakistan. Additionally, Jinnah had retained substantial decision-making powers of the Muslim League even though Chowudhury Khaliquzzaman was chosen to be the Chief organizer of the party (later he became the President of Pakistan Muslim League).

In his assessment of the nature of Jinnah’s power, Keith Callard observed: “No constitutional ruler and few autocrats have possessed such plentitude of power. He had full authority over the civil administration and armed forces. By his own order he could amend the existing constitution and promulgate laws that would be beyond the effective of review of any court. These were not powers which existed only on paper and which in practice were limited by the conventions of constitutional responsibility. On the contrary, cabinet ministers understood clearly that they held office as the agents of the Governor-General, and the [Constituent] Assembly, with its powerless opposition, was in no mood to challenge any action of its own President” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

The Specter of Ghulam Mohammad’s Ruthless Authoritarianism in Pakistan

After Jinnah’s death on September 11, 1948, Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy had co-opted Khawaja Nazimuddin, the Chief Minister of East Bengal, to be the Governor General of Pakistan. Yet, there was no reason for Bangalees to be gloating about such elevation of their Chief Minister. He was not only a non-Bangalee Jinnah loyalist but an anti-Bangalee collaborationist Muslim Leaguer from East Bengal. He was neither a match nor a substitute for Jinnah. He was selected to be the Head of the State because of his willingness to be subservient to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan. For the first time after Jinnah’s demise, the Governor General’s office was made secondary or an appendix to the Prime Minister’s office. Nazimuddin had to remain content with various mundane and ceremonial functions of the Head of State. At Prime Minister’s initiative, the CAP had restricted certain powers of the Governor General. In other words, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan had emerged as the real head of the government. This power relationship between the head of the state and head of the government continued till Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination on October 16, 1951.



After Liaquat Ali Khan’s sudden death on October 16, 1951, Khwaja Nazimuddin stepped down from the position of Governor-General to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The ruling oligarchy of Pakistan inducted Ghulam Mohammad (a Punjabi bureaucrat with well-entrenched connections with the ruling establishment), the powerful Finance Minister of Pakistan, to be the Governor-General of Pakistan. It seems that Nazimuddin wanted to exercise ‘real power’ as the Prime minister! Unfortunately, Ghulam Mohammad had something else in his mind. One thing for sure is that the Punjabi bureaucrat was not willing to be satisfied with his ceremonial role as figurehead or ceremonial Head of the State. Therefore, Gholam Mohammad reversed the power relationship in favor of his highest office. All Ghulam Mohammad had to do was to follow the precedents left by Jinnah, the first Governor-General of Pakistan. Once again governmental powers were centralized in the office of Governor-General of Pakistan. The Prime Minister’s office of Khawaja Nazimuddin was made an appendix to the Governor-General’s office.



Following the legacy of the founding Father of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad had also exercised absolute authoritarianism in one form or another during his tenure as the Governor-General of Pakistan. However, he had outshone and superceded the Quaid-I-Azam in the process of employing absolute powers as the Governor General of Pakistan! For instance, he had summarily dismissed Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin and his Cabinet in 1953 even though the Prime Minister was apparently enjoying the confidence of a substantial majority in the Constituent Assembly. In lieu of employing appropriate parliamentary procedure for dismissing a Ministry for valid cause, Ghulam Mohammad had used the following capricious and arbitrary statement for removing the Prime Minister (issued on April 17, 1953): “I have been driven to the conclusion that the cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country. In emergency which has arisen I have felt it incumbent upon me to ask the cabinet to relinquish office so that a new cabinet better fitted to discharge its obligations towards Pakistan may be formed.”



The dismissal of Nazimuddin’s Cabinet by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad was discussed by most of the celebrated writers on government and politics of Pakistan of that period (including Keith Callard, K.J. Newman, Khalid Bin Syed and Frank Goodnow). Most of them discredited the Governor General for dwarfing the role of office of the Prime Minister. For example, K.J. Newman had observed in 1959 that “Ghulam Mohammad left the path of constitutional government by dismissing Prime Minister Nazimuddin in 1953, even though the latter enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the Constituent Assembly” (K.J. Newmamn, “ Pakistan’s Preventive Autocracy and Its Causes,” Pacific Affairs, 32, 1959, p. 25; cited by Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, 1964, p. 55).

Instead of providing an opportunity to the dismissed Prime Minister to demonstrate that he enjoyed majority support in the central legislature (CAP) by seeking a vote of confidence, Ghulam Mohammad conveniently handpicked Mohammad Ali (Bogra), another spineless Jinnah loyalist from East Bengal, to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was reported that that the members of Mohammad Ali Bogra’s first cabinet were selected by the Governor General. It has been widely stressed by many scholars that during his tenure as Prime Minister, he was a captive in Ghulam Mohammad’s hand. Quite often the Cabinet was shuffled or reshuffled at the behest of the Governor General.

Although Mohammad Ali Bogra was known for his timidity and loyalty to Ghulam Mohammad, he was conniving with the members of CAP for curtailing the powers of Governor General. In fact, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was in the process of further reducing the powers of the Governor General. In his (infamous) book titled Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 50), the self-declared President Ayub Khan mentioned: “He [Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra] told me quietly that his colleagues wanted some amendment to be made in the Government of India Act [1935] by which Governor-General’s powers would be limited. A resolution was printed in the middle of the night and placed in the pigeonholes of Members of the National Assembly [CAP]. In the morning the [Constituent] Assembly met as a Constitution-making body, an hour before its scheduled time, and revoked Sections 9, 10, 10-A, 10-b, and 17 of the Government of India Act [1935], thus stripping the Governor –General of the powers in exercise of which he [Ghulam Mohammad] had dismissed the Nazimuddin Cabinet [on April 17, 1953]. The Resolution was moved and passed within ten minutes. The Governor General was convalescing in Abbotabad at that time.”



In retaliation, the Governor General had dismissed the Cabinet and dissolved the Constituent Assembly --- the highest law-making body of Pakistan. Obviously, his hostility toward democratic principles and parliamentary institutions got fully exposed when he dissolved the (first) Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on October 24, 1954 by issuing the following Proclamation: “The Governor General having considered the political crisis with which the country is faced has, with deep regret, come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has broken down. He, therefore, has decided to declare a State of Emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function” (cited by Goodnow, 1964, p. 57, and also by Callard, 1957, p. 141).



Henry Frank Goodnow succinctly summarized the situation: “On October 24, 1954, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad reacted by declaring emergency. Censorship was imposed on all Karachi newspapers. All gatherings of more than five persons were banned on October 25. A strong police cordon was placed around the building in which the Constituent Assembly customarily held its meetings, and members of the Constituent Assembly were forcibly prevented from entering” (Goodnow, 1964, p. 57).

Goodnow also noted that according to one constitutional authority [Goodnow was referring to K.J. Newman’s observations which he made in his 1959 Pacific Affairs article on “Pakistan’s Preventive Autocracy…”], Governor General’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954 was “clearly unconstitutional since the Governor General’s powers had been specifically amended so as to exclude the power to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. ----- Governor-General’s Ordinance 22 of 1947, issued according to Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, by which paragraph 5 and 6 of Section 19 of the Act of 1935 were validly amended” (Quoted in Henry Frank Goodnow’s, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p. 57).

The Governor General’s arbitrary dissolution of the Constituent Assembly pushed the new nation of Pakistan to the brink of a serious constitutional and political crisis that was avoided with the implementation of Supreme Court’s creative verdict by forming the second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. As pointed out by Donald N. Wilbur: “the dissolution of the first constituent assembly by the governor general touched off a chain reaction of judicial activity which, but for the good judgment of the Federal Court and the patience of the governor general, might have resulted in complete legal chaos in Pakistan” (Donald N. Wilbur, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p.238).

Although the Chief Court of Sind (Tamizuddin Khan, the President of the CAP, had challenged the action of the Governor General) found Governor General’s actions as “illegal” and “ultra vires,” the Supreme Court (federal court) had reversed the decision. Briefly stated, while Sind Court asserted that since the Acts of the Constituent Assembly did not require the “assent” of the Governor General, he (Ghulam Mohammad) had “no power of any kind to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.” On the contrary, the Federal Court of Pakistan quickly declared that the Provincial (Sind) Court “had no authority to issue such writs because the 1954 amendment to the Government of India Act (1935), had never received the assent of the Governor general” (Donald N.Wilbur’s above mentioned book, p. 239). The Federal Court finally came out with the verdict that the Governor General had lawfully “dissolved the First Constituent Assembly”, and the constitutional legislation needed the “assent” of the Governor General. The verdict also ordered the Governor General to form a new Constituent Assembly.



However, there was a gestation gap between the court deliberations and court decisions. Yet, there also remained a constitutional vacuum between dissolution of the first CAP and the formation of second CAP (approximately six months). While the Federal Court decisions provided a bridge to fill the gap, Ghulam Mohammad`s disdain for democratic principles and constitutional process was responsible for creating legal chaos throughout Federal Government. Wilbur (in the above-mentioned book) succinctly summarized the immediate legal effects of Gholam Mohammad’s willful violation of constitutional principles: “since the [Constituent] Assembly for seven years [1947-‘54] had assumed that the assent of governor general to ‘constitutional’ legislation was not required, the Federal Court’s decision [in favor of Governor General’s arbitrary actions] created general consternation. Altogether, forty- four acts of far-reaching legal consequences suddenly were found to be invalid. The implications were staggering. The provincial legislatures had been elected under voided procedures. The governors of three provinces, under emergency conditions, had issued 143 acts, all of which were invalid. The State Bank of Pakistan had been regulating the currency and exercising exchange controls under invalidated legislation. The administration of Karachi [Federal Capital] had been illegal since 1948. Many persons had been imprisoned, including some convicted of conspiracy, under invalidated laws. It was even discovered that one of the federal judges in the case had been appointed under one of the invalidated acts. (He was quickly re-appointed under a different law.)” (Donald N. Wilbur, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p. 239).

The most interesting fact is that the Governor-General, the creator of that constitutional nightmare, had complicated the crisis further through his arrogant actions. In response to the constitutional limbo, Ghulam Mohammad had declared another emergency (based on his interpretation of 1935 India Act) for the purpose of assuming “legislative powers under such conditions, promulgated an ordinance retroactively validating thirty-five of forty-four invalidated laws and, at the same time, amend certain provisions of the existing Constitution Order to preclude suits against the government in respect of any acts arising out of the emergency proclamation. The Federal Court within a few weeks declared that the governor general had gone beyond his legislative powers and threw out the emergency ordinance” (Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p. 239).

Ghulam Mohammad’s vanity knew no bounds. He could never settle with the idea that even the Governor General of Pakistan was not above law. He had “issued a proclamation assuming to himself, until other provision could be made by the constituent assembly, such powers as were necessary to validate and enforce laws designed to avoid a breakdown in the constitutional and administrative machinery of the country. He then again validated retroactively most of the laws in question” (Wilbur, 1964, Ibid, pp. 239-240).



The Second Constituent Assembly that consisted of 80 members (40 from each wing) was formed in June 1955. Pursuant to Governor General’s order, the Provincial Assemblies elected the CAP. The second CAP met for the first time on July 8, 1955. (What were the chief accomplishments of second CAP? It validated most of the legislation/acts that were hanging in between the dissolution of the first CAP and creation of the second CAP; it passed the “One Unit” bill; and the adoption of the 1956 Constitution).

As noted earlier, Ghulam Mohammad had concentrated all executive powers in his office. Mohammad Ali Bogra could be characterized as the ‘ceremonial’ Prime Minister of Pakistan. There were instances when Mohammad Ali Bogra was rebuked or scolded like a grade school boy by the Punjabi Governor General. For example, it is on the record that the Prime Minister was hurriedly summoned back to Karachi by the Governor General from the middle of a trip to North America before the first CAP was dismissed. On his arrival at the Mauripur Airport at midnight of October 23, 1954, he (the Prime Minister) was surrounded by the emissaries of the Governor General “as soon as he came down the runway of the aircraft. ……. Like a prisoner Mr. Ali [Mohammad Ali Bogra] was escorted to the car and driven to the residence of the Governor General.” It was reported that Mohammad Ali Bogra was “weeping when he came out” of Ghulam Mohammad’s residence. It was said that Ghulam Mohammad gave him an ultimatum: ‘Do as I order or go to prison’.” (Joyti Sengupta, “Eclipse of East Pakistan’, cited in Mazharul Islam’s Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib, Agamee Prakashanee, 1993, pp. 151-152).

The way the Governor General had scolded and reprimanded the incumbent Prime Minister of Pakistan was less than civilized or dignified. Yet, the prestigious position of Prime Minister was more preferable to Mohammad Ali Bogra than to be satisfied with a sense of self-respect and dignity. Although he was allowed to retain his title as Prime Minister, a new cabinet was formed by Ghulam Mohammad on October 24, 1954. That Cabinet included, among others, General Ayub Khan, the Commander Chief of Armed Forces (took over Defense Ministry), Iskander Mirza, Governor of East Pakistan, (became Minster of Interior), Choudhri Muhammad Ali (Finance) and Dr. Khan Shahib. (To the chagrin of many Bangalee leaders including Awami League president Maulana Bhasani, H.S. Suhrawardy had joined the so-called talent-cabinet in December 1954 as Law Minister. He, however, resigned from that cabinet in August 1955].

It is a verified fact that Ghulam Mohammad had appointed the members of the so-called “Cabinet of Talent” without any input even from Mohammad Ali Bogra, the lame-duck Prime Minister. There is little wonder why this cabinet was dubbed as “Ghulam Mohammad’s Cabinet.” However, the formation of this cabinet subsequently had paved the way for the Army Generals and bureaucrats to take over the political process of the country. As noted earlier, the second Constituent Assembly was formed in June 1955. Once the second Constituent Assembly met in July 1955, Mohammad Ali Bogra’s “obedience” or “subservience” to the Governor General was not enough for him to continue as the Prime Minister. Although Mohammad Ali Bogra had managed to win a seat in the second CAP from East Pakistan, he did not have any real constituency being the sole Muslim League member from East Pakistan. (He had literally pleaded the Members of East Bengal Legislative Assembly to elect him to the second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan). This renegade from East Pakistan was no more capable of serving any useful purpose for the Punjabi dominated ruling coterie of Pakistan. Therefore, Mohammad Ali Bogra was ejected from the position of Prime Minister. The members of the ruling Muslim League parliamentary party decided to lend their support to Chaudhri Mohammad Ali to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was on August 11, 1955 when Chadhuri Mohammad Ali, a Punjabi bureaucrat (he was Finance Minister of Pakistan since Ghulam Mohammad was selected to be the Governor General), became the fourth Prime Minister of Pakistan.



It was once again demonstrated that the Prime Minister of Pakistan could be recruited, retained, disciplined and fired by the Governor-General of Pakistan. It was obvious that the Prime Minister could hold office only at the sweet will and pleasure of the Governor General. Being disgusted with the humiliating experience of both Khwaja Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali Bogra, H.S. Suhrawardy had said the following in the Second Constituent Assembly on September 10, 1955: “to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan which has been held by certain honouarable gentlemen who have turned out, taken by the ears and thrown out as it suited the ruling coterie is not a matter of very great honour” (quoted by Khalid Bin Sayeed, “The Political Role of Pakistan’s Civil Service,” Pacific Affairs, 31, 1958, p. 137 cited in Goodnow, 1964, p. 155).

The worst brunt of the Governor General’s unlimited power fell on Bangalees when Ghulam Mohammad summarily and unilaterally dismissed the elected provincial Government of Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Huq in East Bengal in 1954. After dismantling the Huq’s United Front Cabinet, Ghulam Mohammad had promulgated the Governor’s rule in East Bengal through the use of infamous section 92 (A), an instrument enacted during Jinnah’s tenure as the Governor General. Although Jinnah had employed various tactics to dictate the terms of reference to the provincial Governors, his successors introduced the infamous “Governor’s Rule,” through the use of section 92(A), in the following provinces: Punjab from January 1949 through April 1951; Sind from December 1951 through May 1953; and East Bengal from May 29, 1954 through June 6, 1955.

Some more serious changes in the political leadership of Pakistan also took place at that time. Given the fact that Ghulam Mohammad was seriously ill since late 1954, Iskander Mirza was acting as Governor-General when he decided to take leave of absence for treatment. There lies a tragedy that of all the cabinet members, Ghulam Mohammad had trusted Iskander Mirza, a descendant of infamous “Mirzaffor” (Mirzafar Ali Khan), to be officiating as the Governor General during his absence! Iskander Mirza, a master of cliques and tricks, had devised a blueprint to oust the Governor-General. It was on August 11, 1955 when Iskander Mirza replaced Ghulam Mohammad as the Governor-General of Pakistan.

Summary & Conclusion



Neither mohammad Ali Jinnah nor his handpicked Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, had demonstrated any sincerity in establishing democratic institutions in Pakistan. Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, both before and after the 1971 genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bangladesh, was not known for instituting any semblance of a democratic mode of governance. In fact, the government of Pakistan during pre- or post-1971 era can be characterized as a laboratory of ruthless authoritarianism and centralization. It is crucial to underscore that neither Jinnah nor Liaquat Ali Khan was a champion of decentralized and federal system of government. They had installed a centralized system of government, and as long as they were alive they had wholeheartedly propagated the benefits of a strong centralized form of government. They had little or no concern for ensuring provincial autonomy and democracy.

The relationship between Governor-General Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat was unequal. Jinnah’s unlimited power and personal charisma did provide no opportunity for the Prime Minister to question any of his action. Given the fact that Liaquat Ali Khan was a loyal lieutenant of Jinnah from pre-independence years, that convenient arrangement worked well as long as Jinnah was alive. Yet, the founding father of Pakistan had left behind a dangerous precedent. However, Liaquat Ali Khan emerged as a strong Prime Minister (first and last) when Khwaja Nazimuddin was co-opted as the titular Governor General (first and last) of Pakistan after the demise of Jinnah.

After Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination on October 16, 1951, Nazimuddin became the Prime Minister, and the Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad was selected to be the Governor-General of Pakistan. However, Ghulam Mohammad concentrated all executive powers of the government in Governor-General’s office. He fired Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin and his cabinet in 1953. In place of Khwaja Nazimuddin, he appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra, who was not even a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, as the new Prime Minister. It was Ghulam Mohammad who had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Prime Minister of Pakistan could hold office only at the pleasure of the Governor-General.

Ghulam Mohammad had declared Emergency throughout Pakistan and dissolved the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He pushed the new nation of Pakistan to an unprecedented constitutional crisis. It was Ghulam Mohammad who had become the source of law when there was no Central Legislature in Pakistan during the gestation period between the dissolution of the first CAP on October 24, 1954 and the convening of the second CAP on July 8, 1955. It is not very difficult to comprehend why several political scientists had characterized Ghulam Mohammad’s excesses and intrusions in legislative and constitutional matters as Pakistan’s “constitutional autocracy’ or “preventive autocracy.”

The founding leaders of Pakistan including Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat ali Khan were not at all sincere believers of democratic rule in Pakistan. Nor were they the champions of a decentralized and federal form of government. Instead of fostering better understanding between and among diverse peoples of the new Republic through nurturing diversity, they had demanded hardcore uniformity. They were the greatest champions of “one nation,” “one state,” “one religion,” “one government,” “one leader,” “one party,’ and of course “one language.” Their successors (non-Bengali East Pakistani Khwaja Nazimuddin, ruthless Punjabi bureaucrat-turned-autocrat Ghulam Mohammad, most obedient collaborationist Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra, notorious traitor Iskander Mirza, Dictator General Ayub Khan and Jallad General Yahya Khan) had unsuccessfully tried to implement the policy of deadline uniformity, centralization and authoritarianism through the use of brute force. In sum, personal rule, authoritarianism and autocracy were the salient features of government and politics during early years of Pakistan.

Re: #158 Sameer

Sameer sahib and all other chowk friends:

Wish you all, and your families, very happy new year! let`s hope and pray that the sub-continent stays quite for at least another full year.

Regards.

PS: Sameer - My post didn`t make through Chowk staff for most admired people (with detailed reasons) for last few centuries. They were: Guru Gobind Singh, M. Gandhi, Kemal Ataturk, Abe Lincoln and Karl Marx.

Re: #158 Sameer

Dear Sameer,

Happy New Year!! Wishing you and your family all the best.

Amir

Re:SamirJB#158

Happy new year and best wishes to your family as well !!

Amit

Dear Bilal Ahmad (# 165): This is a very good example of the way and mindset of the ruling elites in Pakistan. There is absolutely no logic or any sort of consensus in making this or other decisions regarding naming missiles, planes, cities, roads and parks etc. I see at least two types of mindsets of the elites. One is based on pure ego, to impose their personal desires and biases imposed on others and the second group, mostly above-ankle shalwar kameez wearing Islamists who try to find names from Arabic and Islamic history. The current case, however, examplifies the elites of former kind because of no markhor instead of camel and deodar instead of berg-ul-deodar type names loaded with Al- and Ul-.

Here is one possible imaginary scenario leading to this decision:

On a weekend evening, few generals, after having one too many drinks, were discussing hunting or their expertise. A leading so-called expert of mountain warfare was describing his skills and comparing it with Markhor`s way of defending his territory. All the yes-men sitting there applauded at the comparison; what a smart metaphor! Another general probably considered expert in desrt warfare compared his tactics of camoflauge during daytime and using the moon light to attack, used Chakor as an example. Another one might have had experience with the deodar trees in some way. Well their egos were translated into national animals, national bird and national tree. Although this is just an imagination but believe me this is how such decisions are made in Pakistan. Now our jornalists will start writing articles about the wisdom and logic behind these choices.

You are right as any rational individual should be, seeing no logic or consensus and merely imposing worthless decisions from the top. I guess, in any from of consensus, cow, eagle, rose and mango tree will be the winners.

According to an APP report, the present regime has approved the following national symbols (considered necessary to identify them for promoting national identity, where-ever so required ):

National Animal: Markhor

National Bird: Chakor

National Flower: Jasmine

National Tree: Deodar

Can somebody explain the logic of this selection? How the present regime reached this decision? Is this another example of imposition from above without public consent?

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

(MWZAMAN Manik #I, December 31, 1999)

THE LEGACY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN:

GENESIS OF RUTHLESS AUTHORITARIANISM AND UNDEMOCRATIC MODE OF GOVERNANCE IN THE EARLY YEARS OF PAKISTAN(1947-’55) [PART I]

By M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

The political history of Pakistan is replete with anti-democratic modes of governance. The authoritarianism seems to be the legacy of Pakistan. Indeed, the authoritarianism has always been the hallmark of government and politics of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of the nation, was known for his honesty and integrity of character. Yet, it was Jinnah who laid the foundation of ruthless authoritarianism and centralized political structure in Pakistan. It was him who created the precedents of undemocratic and autocratic modes of governance in Pakistan. He was as much responsible as his successors for the continuation of the undemocratic tradition of authoritarian mode of governance in Pakistan. At the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah had both the charisma and authority to introduce democratic norms and institutions in the new nation. Yet, from the beginning, he demonstrated his disdain towards democratic norms and practices. At his behest, an oligarchy was formed for ruling Pakistan with iron fist. The ruling oligarchy was completely divorced from the rudiments of democratic principles and values.

Although Mohammad Ali Jinnah had governed the nation only for 13 months, his tradition of assumption and exercise of “absolute” state power had dangerous effects on the subsequent rulers of Pakistan. Instead of instituting the ‘institutional rule’, he installed his ‘personal rule’. The way the nation was administered by the founding father and his chief lieutenant Liaquat Ali Khan had invariably conditioned the behavior of the successive regimes.

The re-assessment of the nature of governance of the early years of Pakistan is quite pertinent at a critical juncture of the country when a military dictator has seized state power by force. It is imperative for observers of Pakistani political scene to look back at the past heritage of the country at a time when the military junta has virtually declared Pakistan a polity without politics and politicians.

The main intent of this paper, then, is to examine the genesis of ruthless autocracy and authoritarianism in the early years of Pakistan with specific reference to Jinnah-Liaquat-Ghulam Mohammad regimes. Once Jinnah’s passion for the use of unlimited power and authoritarian mode of governance is overviewed, the undemocratic and autocratic behavior and actions of Ghulam Mohammad will be underscored.

Given the fact that neither Khwaja Nazimuddin nor Mohammad Ali Bogra had any real power, the timid roles of these dwarfed leaders from East Bengal will be discussed with reference to Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad. Aimed at substantiating my generalizations, some gleanings from well-recognized scholarly works will be quoted. Finally, some concluding observations will be made.

Let me also point out the scope of this commentary: No attempt has been made to cover Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan years. Hopefully, each of these despicable authoritative regimes can be the focus of separate articles. The power relationship between the Central Government and the Provinces will also not be included within the purview of this paper.

Jinnah’s Passion for Unlimited Power & Undemocratic Mode of Governance

Jinnah was undoubtedly the most effective and powerful President of All-India Muslim League (AIML). There was a total absence of any leader of Jinnah’s stature in the entire AIML to question or challenge his policies or desires in the mid-forties. His words were like dictates from the absolute monarch. He always encouraged lieutenants or loyalists in the party, not colleagues per se. Thus, at the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah was all of the following: Quaid-I-Azam, Governor General of Pakistan, President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (which was also the Central Legislature of Pakistan) and the President of Pakistan Muslim League.

In his seminal book titled Pakistan: A Political Study, Keith Callard, one of the early writers on the government and politics of Pakistan, had succinctly observed that people of Pakistan “looked for guidance to their Great Leader, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. There was no one else, he was Pakistan; and wherever he went he was received by vast crowds with adulation amounting almost to worship.” Keith Callard also underscored that Jinnah “was by nature a commander and leader of men. He was not to be treated as a colleague or even primus inter pares, for he demanded lieutenants who would serve him rather than partners who would argue with him. In manner he was cold, brilliant and unyielding, a man to inspire either fury or devotion. He organized the campaign for Pakistan as though he were a commander-in-chief issuing orders of the day to encourage the troops and tactical directions to control the provincial commanders” (Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (New York, N.Y: The Mcmillan Company, 1957, pp. 19-20. Henceforth this book will be cited as Keith Callard, 1957).

Jinnah’s passion for the assumption and consolidation of state powers was evident when the date of partition was nearing. He had selected himself to be the Governor General of Pakistan. According to Ayesha Jalal, “On July 2, 1947, Jinnah formally told Mountbatten that he intended to become Pakistan’s first Governor General. Of course Mountbatten was outraged. It complicated the partition process, as planned by him [Mountbatten], and especially the already odious business of dividing the Indian army. ------- He knew that as Governor-General he would have wide ranging powers over the Muslim areas, powers which he could not possibly afford to let any other individual exercise. Moreover, as the Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah felt he would be better placed to ensure the division of the army, and the army was what he needed most of all to clamp central authority over Pakistan’s provinces. At any rate, the Prime Minister of Pakistan would have to take orders from the Governor-General. ‘In my position’, Jinnah told the bemused Viceroy, ‘it is I who will give the advice and others will act on it.’ Mountbatten concluded that Jinnah had either gone ‘mad’ or was suffering from an acute form of ‘megalomania``(Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 292).

It is apparent from Ayesha Jalal’s observation that Jinnah made a deliberate choice to assume the position of Governor General of Pakistan. He had planned ahead of time to dictate the terms of reference to the Prime Minister. As the undisputed leader of the All-India Muslim League (AIML), Mohammad Ali Jinnah had consolidated all organizational authorities and powers in his hands even before Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947. Therefore, he knew it well that there will be no one from his party to oppose him. In fact, he used to act like the Head of the Muslim State before Pakistan was even created. Keith Callard had pointed out long time back in 1957 that as “President of the Muslim League he (Jinnah) felt that he was the effective head of the Muslim nation” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) met on August 10, 1947 (Four days before independence). Jogendra Nath Mondal was made the interim President of CAP. Aimed at controlling both the process and outcome of the Central legislature of Pakistan, Jinnah, the Governor General designate of Pakistan, expressed his desire to be the President of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The members of the CAP obliged, and on August 11, 1947, they unanimously elected Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the President and Tamijuddin Khan, the Vice President of the CAP. The CAP also passed a resolution conferring on Mohammad Ali Jinnah the title of Quaid-I-Azam (the Great Leader) – a title to be invariably employed in official correspondence of the Government of Pakistan. As noted by Keth Callard, “When Pakistan was formed the Quaid-I-Azam was recognized to be above the political battle, a figure to whom all might turn for authority and justice and protection. He became Governor- General and President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan; ---- he (Jinnah) was the personification of the state” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

As the Governor General, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had handpicked Nwabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. There is no doubt that Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan was capable of running the administration. Yet, Jinnah decided to retain the de-facto authorities of the Head of the Government in his hands. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet had to hold offices at the pleasure of Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan. In other words, Jinnah combined the roles of both the Head of the State and Head of the Government. Was it unconstitutional on the part of Governor General to intrude in carrying out of executive functions of the Prime Minister? I don’t think that it was unconstitutional per se because of the existence of contradictory constitutional provisions. Henry Frank Goodnow has summarized the context: “Prior to 1956 [Constitution] the governing constitutional laws were similar, but the relationship between the Governor General and the cabinet ministers was not entirely clear. The Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order of 1947 had provided that the Governor General and the provincial governors would act on the advice of their ministers. On the other hand, an unrepealed provision of the Government of India Act of 1935 provided that the ministers were to be chosen by the Governor General and would hold office at his pleasure” (Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p.54).

In view of the above-mentioned provision of 1935 Act, Jinnah had the legal basis to establish the Governor -General’s hold over the Cabinet. Yet, it needs to be recognized that he had deliberately ignored the provision in the 1947 Provisional Order in which it was stated that the Governor General would act on the advice of the Cabinet. It is also fair to suggest that it was Jinnah’s responsibility to see to it that the contradictory provision of 1935 was being repealed with the passage of 1947 Provisional order. It is very difficult for me to comprehend after so many years how and why a constitutional lawyer of Jinnah’s stature had used a dead provision of 1935 Act over a provision of 1947 for the purpose of dwarfing the independence of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. At any rate, Jinnah had created a dangerous precedent that directly impacted the relationship between the Governor General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the subsequent years, especially when Ghulam Mohammad was the Governor-General of Pakistan. The volatile relationship between the Head of the State and Head of the Government was also a characteristic feature during the years when Iskander Mirza was either Governor-General or President of Pakistan.

With assumption of the Presidency of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Governor General Jinnah virtually controlled the functions, the process, and the outcomes of the legislative branch of the central government. Such concentration of both the legislative and executive powers of the State in Jinnah’s office of Governor General was nothing short of nullification of the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branches of government. It was unfortunate that the legislative branch of the central government was rendered impotent from the very beginning of independent Pakistan. Additionally, Jinnah had retained substantial decision-making powers of the Muslim League even though Chowudhury Khaliquzzaman was chosen to be the Chief organizer of the party (later he became the President of Pakistan Muslim League).

In his assessment of the nature of Jinnah’s power, Keith Callard observed: “No constitutional ruler and few autocrats have possessed such plentitude of power. He had full authority over the civil administration and armed forces. By his own order he could amend the existing constitution and promulgate laws that would be beyond the effective of review of any court. These were not powers which existed only on paper and which in practice were limited by the conventions of constitutional responsibility. On the contrary, cabinet ministers understood clearly that they held office as the agents of the Governor-General, and the [Constituent] Assembly, with its powerless opposition, was in no mood to challenge any action of its own President” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

(TO BE CONTINUED)

Dear Bilal Ahmad # 162: Not many persons of south asian origin will disagree with your post about the millenium (or millennium) and Eurocentrism, in general terms. The millenium stuff is, at least to me, not a serious matter. It is mostly marketed/propagated for its commercial significance like many other festive occasions. Anyway, rationally or scientifically, such events do not have any deeper meaning. The famous Harvard Palientologist, Stephen J. Gould wrote a book recently about the insignificance of any particular number including year 2000, except for historic record keeping. In the presence of so many other time keeping calenders, this one has more acceptance due to the European domination of last 500 years as well as recent success of western science and technology worldwide. I accept it, in a way, Europeans accepted Pheonician alphabets, Indian/Arabic decimel and zero and Egyptian concepts of year, month and week.

The Eurocentrism is different. It is biased towards non-white people and effects the psyche of non-whites terribly. It should not be accepted.

Besides being holiday and traditional wishing this and wishing that business, the new year day is just another day like yesterday and tomorrow. I liked the Chineese approach today when President Jiang Ximen marked the new year occasion as a celebration of 5000 years of continuous Chineese civilization and Egypt used this occasion to attract foreign tourists. It almost went unnoticed among 1 billion people of south asia except for insignificant celebration in Columbo and major Indian cities. The millenium business will be with us for one year until December 31, 2000 and unlike Eurocentrism, we would not need to worry about it. It is a useless issue from Pakistan and Pakistani standpoint.