Hegemony of the Ruling Elite in Pakistan

In response to SameerJB (Reply #: 115)

Dear Sameer:

I must applaud you for your honesty and courage to admit your mistake (no big deal, however). We all get carried away occasionally due to one reason or another. I wish the Pakistani ruling elite could learn something from you. Interestingly, there are millions of good people like you in our country. The question is how to bring them together.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Leadership: A Question of Integrity?

Farhatullah Baber has raised a question of integrity of our leaders (decision-makers). Why the former Chief of the State Bank of Pakistan, Muhammad Yaqub, failed to stand up and say no to illegal financial practices? Are our ruling elite simply morally bankrupt? Is this simply power and its addiction in the absence of accountability? What role do our common people need to play? Do they need to get up and say enough is enough? Do they have the moral courage to face the rich and powerful and our coercive state apparatus? What kind of social movements are needed to make Pakistan a respectable and prosperous country in this fast shrinking world?

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

The Frontier Post, December 21, 1999

No Yaqub, the defence is spurious

Farhatullah Babar

Former Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan Muhammad Yaqub has finally opened his mouth, but how? Not by tendering an apology as General Pervez Musharraf has done. But to justify the May 1998 foreign currency freeze, absolve himself of the fiasco and lay the blame at the door of the government of the day. 

In an interview with the Financial Times reported in the Frontier Post of December 17 he said the freeze decision was `inevitable`. Then absolving him he says that he `advised Sharif government to offer conversions in equivalent rupee amounts to domestic depositors while offering a formula for a phased withdrawal to foreign depositors` implying that things would have been different if his advice had been accepted 

Yaqub has the audacity to say that the decision was `inevitable` and asserts that `weak liquid foreign reserves` dictated so. But he does not have the courage to admit that it was under his stewardship of the central bank that its reserves were criminally weakened. 

Yaqub was governor of State Bank for over six years. During his tenure successive governments illegally drew billions from these deposits for meeting their deficits. Despite a measure of autonomy granted to the central bank he failed to stand up and say no to the illegal withdrawals. It was only during hearings before the Supreme Court early this month that the nation learnt that nearly 8 billion dollars had thus been stolen. In May 1998 when the government `tore its bum`, the ultimate guardian of finance and guarantor of deposits, decamped with all the 12 billion dollars of private accounts. When custodians become robbers, robbing becomes `inevitable`. 

If, as he says, Yaqub had a better formula, which the Sharif government did not accept he should have resigned, rather than irreparably discredit the central bank. After all with his fat pension from the international financial institutions which he served he did not need a job for living. 

The freeze act of the central bank under Yaqub dealt an irreparable blow to the nation`s economy. The SBP has admitted this in its latest annual report. Sharif has acknowledged that he was wrongly advised. As no foreign investment, no remittance have come since then, General Pervez Musharraf in his address to the nation had to tender public apology for this robbery. But Yaqub says it was `inevitable`. 

Worst still, Yaqub did nothing when the big wigs transferred their dollars abroad on the eve of the freeze. The SBP even tried to withhold the information from the court. 

Yaqub also cannot easily absolve himself of the charge that the State Bank under him acquiesced in the massive loan defaults and consequent destruction of the nation`s banks. 

The central bank`s rules on lending were violated with impunity. Take the case of BEL. It violated all banking norms and regulations in advancing and writing off loans. For 30 months the SBP maintained intriguing silence. When the press exposed the conspiracy of silence, governor Yaqub issued a show cause notice to the BEL chief executive Rauf Kadiri. 

SBP under Yaqub lacked courage and competence to recover bad loans from the high and mighty. No wonder that when Yaqub took over as governor the defaulted loans stood at about Rs 50 billion. When he left, it stood at Rs 225 billion. He raised no objection to the over 400 billion rupees Mera Ghar scheme which was not even discussed with the banks which were to advance huge loans for it. The SBP closed its eyes to the obvious possibility of huge default inherent in the scheme as was witnessed in the yellow cab scheme. Defaulters were shielded, dubious projects based on political rather than economic considerations acquiesced and big banking frauds like the Mehran and BEL and names of defaulters and those who spirited away millions on the eve of freeze never made public. 

Yaqub may be credited for personal integrity. But integrity does not only mean absence of financial corruption. It also means courage of conviction and the willingness and ability to stand down when necessary. Yaqub sees the inevitability of freeze but fails to see the greater inevitability of his stepping down when the central bank was being violated. Absence of financial corruption is a virtue. But it is no substitute for competence, and strength to stand up and speak up.

In his interview with the Financial Times Yaqub also lamented ``they (the previous government) froze the foreign currency deposits and kept it like a dead body at home rather than bury it.`` Yaqub certainly would wish it dead and buried. Buried it may be but die it will not. The ghost of the greatest financial blunder will continue to haunt him.

1. Regarding India`s defence budget -- over the last ten years it has declined, as a percentage of GDP. The following is a quote from http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug9-1.html :

The decline in India`s conventional capability has been transparent for a decade. The defence

expenditure dropped from 3.6 per cent of the GDP in 1987 to 2.3 per cent last year. There has

been hardly any modernisation or replacement of equipment. The successive reports of the

Standing Committee of the Parliament have been pointing out the need to arrest the increasing

weakness in military preparedness. The army by all accounts has been short of nearly 13,000

officers.

* * *

Supposedly these facts played into the decision by Pakistan to start the Kargil affair. You will now see India`s defence budget soar, and with very little political or public opposition.

* * * * *

Regarding Kissinger and the American fleet in the Bay of Bengal in 1971, here is a quote from Kissinger himself, in Bombay :

http://www.nuclear-free.com/english/kiss.htm

Asked why he advised the then U.S. President, Richard Nixon, to send the Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh War when he knew that the liberation of that country could not be prevented, Dr. Kissinger replied that the U.S. did not want India to march into West Pakistan within three months of the establishment of Sino- American relations in which the American ability to stand up to the then Soviet Union was a factor and India was having an alliance with the Soviets. He said that the U.S. had sought an assurance from the late Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi that India would not move into West Pakistan but she refused to give such an assurance. Dr. Kissinger observed that the then relations between the two countries were not made in heaven. Both the countries should have talked frankly about their objectives. But Indira Gandhi went ahead with dealing with Pakistan not because she was sure of the Americans being fair but because she knew that she would succeed.

* * *

Whether this should be interpreted as gun-boat diplomacy, and whether India should be vulnerable to it is a matter for debate. It is not something swallowed whole by the Indian public, however.

* * *

Here is a good synopsis of India`s ``paranoia`` about China :

http://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-3.html

In all the earlier Indo-Pak conflicts, China had been known for following a standard pro-Pakistan policy. To start with, the Communists were at the peak of their fight against the Guomindang regime during the first Indo-Pak conflict of 1948 and, therefore, this conflict may not have really interested Mao who was nearly one year away from founding his Communist People`s Republic. Yet, going by his later criticism of Nehru`s bourgeoise liberal democracy, in which he described it as only a transition stage towards the heralding of an era of Communism, his views on India were neither sympathetic nor very positive. Later, he was to describe Nehru as a stooge of the Western countries which clearly reflected his perception of New Delhi`s policies.

However, a more thought-out and detailed response of Chairman Mao was provided during the second Indo-Pak War of 1965. First of all, this war came too soon after the Sino-Indian War of 1962. This interlude of three years had seen China and Pakistan becoming friends against their perceived common enemy. Accordingly, following their border settlement agreement of March 1963, wherein Pakistan conceded over 5,000 sq. km. of Indian territory to the Chinese, China had gradually come to be one of Pakistan`s major suppliers of military equipment and technologies. The Pakistani generals, later, were confident about Chinese reliability and believed that Beijing had, in fact, issued New Delhi some sort of a deadline for coming to a ceasefire with the Pakistani armed forces.[ General Mohammad Musa (Retd.), My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965 (Lahore: Wajidalis Ltd., 1983), pp. 11, 92.] However, even if China did not carry them out, its veiled threats to physically intervene did constrain India to retain five of its seven mountain divisions on its northern borders. Even the other two divisions were kept only in reserve and were not put on the frontline until the ceasefire was signed.

Similarly, during the last Indo-Pak War of 1971, China had called India an adventurist,

expansionist and aggressor and both General Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had publicly

declared that, if need be, China could militarily intervene in support of Pakistan. Once again, while China may not have actually intervened militarily, it provided Pakistan weapons and equipment and even allowed Pakistan Air Force flights eastwards to over-fly from its

territory. All this did provide weight to Pakistani statements about China`s possible intervention, which had to be viewed in the backdrop of the problematic Sino-Indian ties.

Moreover, the Sino-American entante during the early 1970s and Pakistan`s role in the historic trip by Henry Kissinger to Beijing, had made things all the more complicated for New Delhi. It was in this situation that New Delhi signed the historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship which, however, did help New Delhi to withstand these pressures from Beijing and Washington DC. But again, this Indo-Soviet relationship, in fact, made Beijing all the more suspicious of India`s intentions and policies and only further strengthened China`s commitment to the successive regimes in Islamabad. This long-standing Sino-Pak ``special relationship`` was to later emerge as the single most difficult issue for India`s policy-makers as they tried to build a rapprochement with a slow-moving and reluctant Beijing.

* * *

-arun gupta

This is wonderful! It is thrilling to see how the tenacious and verbose, sometimes touching, yet pathetic, often irritating and provoking, quite annoying, needlessly malicious, insulting and thoughtlessly provoking debaters have futilely attempted to solve the Indo-Pakistan problem. The protagonists beat each other bloody with age old arguments and tales of lamentation, drawing Kuldip Nayyer, General Musharref and God-knows-who into their profound pontifications on a subject that every five year old Pakistani fully understands: WE are right, because we are on Sirat-ul-Mustaqeem, and THEY are wrong. And that`s that!

I really don`t see any problem with us continuing to despise and hate each other as other nations have done for centuries and eons. Actually, we have a much better reason to spit venom and spill blood than those who fought the Hundred Years War or that mother-of-all wars, WW2.

So let`s cut out this pretentious and pedantic debate and get on with the business of trying to solve the Kashmir problem the old fashioned way. Sophistry and polemics never won any battles.

temporal #67

`` ------I have serious misgivings about your interpretation of the event. You give too much credence to the Pakistani planners. They envisaged Kargil as a mini Siachen, nothing more. There was never any hidden China Card. Don`t read too much about the General`s visit to China nor the ISI taped, and passed to RAW,tapes.``

Nawaz Sharif visited China, too, didn`t he, after the Kargil conflict began?

`` -------Reluctantly and against logic I am being won over by the side that argues that Kashmir solution is the core of all problems among the scores of nationalities in the sub continenet. China, US, renegade Korea etc are all peripheral to the basics.

Time is for bold decisions by India and Pakistan.

We have to go back over 5000 years in time to find a political entity proximating today`s India. (Ashoka`s times if my memory serves.)``

Could you kindly clarify what you meant by the last sentence in the context of Kashmir?

Sadhana

Might as well throw in this Kuldip Nayyar for you jay to complete your file.


The view from Kashmir

Kuldip Nayyar

How does New Delhi look from here? I posed this question at a small gathering of lawyers and intellectuals in Srinagar recently. One lawyer replied: ``It is ugly and makes me feel ashamed.`` Another one said: ``How could you criticise Pakistan for having lost democracy when you never allowed us to rule ourselves?``

Indeed, as I talked to more and more people -- lawyers, journalists, retired bureaucrats, politicians, economists and businessmen -- I found that India`s image was more smeared than before. It is not only alienation, it is a mood of indifference.

During my earlier visit, one and a half years ago, I had seen the Kashmiris expecting things to take a turn for the better. A substantial number of them had participated first in the Lok Sabha poll and then in the state assembly election in October 1996. In more than one way, they had rebuffed the forces which were pro-militant, parochial and which had stalled the process of merging with the mainstream. The anti-India elements stood somewhat isolated.

Even otherwise, the Kashmiris were tired of leading an insecure and uneasy life. The militancy had once ignited a spirit of challenge and defiance. But it had also brought in its wake the retaliation by security forces, often brusque and brutal. Enough of bloodshed had taken place. There was a realisation that all that had happened had taken them nowhere. Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah`s promise for a better deal administration sounded more credible than before. They wanted to try him again -- and also the Government of India.

New Delhi was seen learning from the Lok Sabha election in 1996 that a free atmosphere evoked a wider response. The assembly election was a welcome follow-up. Afraid of gun culture and communal sentiments overtaking their peaceful and Kashmiri way of living, many came forward to exercise their vote. Despite a boycott call by the Hurriyat leaders, who associated themselves with the demand for independence or elections under the UN, nearly 40 per cent of the Kashmiris went to the polls in 1996 to elect the assembly. It was not that they had come to accept New Delhi but it was their feeling that normalcy would give them better dividends.

Whether the Centre or Farooq Abdullah realised this or not, most Kashmiris had generally reconciled themselves to the situation provided they got good governance and secure living. Two years, from the assembly election in October 1996 to the end of 1998, was a trial period. It seems that the advantage has been blown up. The 1999 Lok Sabha election in Kashmir was the biggest fraud committed on the voters. Elections were only in name. It is a sort a blot which the Central Election Commission will not be able to rub off easily.

The rigging in the 1998 assembly election had driven young men from ballot to bullet. A feeling of disappointed had turned first into desperation and then into insurgency, with the help of the Pakistan army and arms. The same thing happened in the 1999 Lok Sabha election. More than 200 disgusted boys have crossed into Pakistan to get training. The local population is once again showing a sneaking admiration for even foreign militants, 90 per cent of them Pakistanis.

People feel that their expectations have been belied. They find the government failing in every field, particularly the administration. Nor do they find any redress of their grievance. The cost of living is going up, electricity alone, if and when available, costing 50 per cent more. On top of it, they daily come across examples of waste and unchecked corruption from top to bottom.

In fact, people have felt cheated. New Delhi is seen engrossed in security, not in the measures on how to improve their lot. Farooq Abdullah`s acts of omission and commission have come to be seen as New Delhi`s doings. The state government`s defence is that the promised economic package is yet to arrive. And the Rs 400 crore released by the Centre is inadequate.

Criticism of India, which was somewhat mute at one time, has now become loud. They feel that they have no say, much less participation, in managing their own affairs. A political solution is at the back of their mind. But a cleaner, quicker and more sympathetic administration would have gone a long way to span the ever-growing distance between the people and the government.

Even during my short visit, I found instances of harassment, maltreatment and authoritarian behaviour. People have fewer complaints against the BSF. But their main anger is directed against the special operation group (SOG) comprising the Kashmir police. The Rashtriya Rifles, which is dubbed Rashtriya Sangh, also comes in for severe criticism. Once again, there are searches by cordoning off a particular area, as was done in the early 90s. There are allegations of excesses.

The militants operate even in the city. A hand-grenade was lobbed at a place near my hotel. There was an explosion at the inauguration of a bridge by Farooq Abdullah. One thing different from the past is that such incidents do not seem to disturb people. They have begun to take such incidents in their stride. There is no hartal, no detour of the affected place by pedestrians.

While walking on the road, I found no sign of Talibanisation of the city. Very few women wore burqua and few men sported beards. There is normalcy of sorts. The number of bunkers in the city is far less than before. Even security men on the streets are not so visible as it was the last time. No doubt, there are more militants from across the border than are from within. But the local population does give them shelter and provide them guides for ``the target.`` The attack on the army headquarters at Badami Bagh is one example of local assistance.

Cross-border militancy has increased since the advent of General Pervez Musharraf`s military rule. Islamabad is also encouraging local militancy. Apart from Pakistan`s encouragement, the atmosphere of disappointment is also conducive to desperation. Since the rigging of the 1999 election, people have lost hope of changing the Farooq Abdullah men through the ballot box. Some had pinned their hopes on a third force, which Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, his daughter Mehbooba, and Muzafar Ali Beg, the three candidates, were trying to build so as to be an alternative to Farooq`s National Conference and the Hurriyat. But the defeat of the three seems to have convinced many that there is no respite from their plight except through militancy.

Economically, the state has not done well. The apple crop has got spoilt and the Kargil operation has taken its toll. Many people have suffered. There are no openings for the young men leaving schools or colleges. Some of them are tempted to join the militants, who pay their parents Rs 2,500 a month regularly. For some time, the militants have been spending lavishly. If they eat at any house, they leave behind at least Rs 500. There are very few examples of extortion.

In fact, the image of the militants has improved. Lately, they are seen as ``liberators.`` When anyone of them is killed, there is a burial procession. Even youthful leader Shabir Shah argues that there may not be any other option ``if New Delhi does not listen to us.`` At present, he favours a dialogue and wants the Hurriyat leaders, who have become more credible after their detention, to be associated with the talks.

It looks as if when it comes to India, almost all Kashmiris join hands. The realisation that Islamabad is in no position to force any solution on New Delhi makes them feel helpless. And then they pick on India all the more.

Gymnosophist

I`m not sure how going from PTwNT to Gymnosophist implies a loss of anonymity! :-)

Your guess is right, though..

Cheers, AK

For those who believe in the sanctity of the printed word, here is something to chew on. In all fairness, the author has gotten the month of hte coup wrong. Also, a suggestion: any responsible chowkwallah, if genuinely interested in Kuldip Nayar`s valued opinion, could directly check with him about what he actually wanted to say in his article.

About being in denial, lets see. Can the following statement be applied to Pakistanis currently under the yoke of an unelected military government?

``Let the (Pakistanis) decide what they want to do with their future. Don`t force a solution on them. After that, on the whole, most of the Indo-Pak problems will start getting resolved. As long as people try to force their views on others, no solutions can be reached.`` (holds good for both Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf)

...

``If the average (Pakistani) isn`t supporting self-determination for Pakistan, than why doesn`t (the General) hold a vote in (Pakistan)? One should be consistent in one`s principles, and not be selective when it suits one`s own interests. If someone does not want to give the (Pakistanis) their right to (democracy)self-determination, then I would have more respect for them if they came out and stated that they do not believe in people`s right to self-determination, rather than trying to justify their stance by altering the facts regarding Kashmir.

Just hold a vote, accept the results, and get the whole problem over with. Otherwise just say that you do not believe in self-determination for human beings.``

Umaiir #69

I am not just trying to score points. There is a serious issue here concerning the future of the subcontinent. The type of governance prevailing in Pakistan heavily influences the options available to Indians including Kashmiris. You might or might not accept the fact that Pakistanis are not the only large-hearted and unselfish set of people in the world who are worried about the fate of the subcontinent including Kashmiris. Also you might or might not accept that people on this board may disagree with you for good reasons other than their own selfish nationalist interests.

Sadhana

http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/99/1203/nat.pakistan.kashmir.html

DECEMBER 3, 1999 VOL. 25 NO. 48

Taking an About-Turn?

Pakistan`s Pervez Musharraf cannot separate his domestic agenda from Afghanistan and Kashmir

By ANTHONY DAVIS

Since the army coup in September, the attention of Pakistan`s new ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has been focused squarely on domestic tasks, namely economic stabilization and a high-profile crackdown on the country`s rich and famous debt defaulters. Before long, however, Musharraf will be confronting the need to make far tougher decisions over foreign-policy issues no less critical to national security: the seemingly unending conflicts in neighboring Afghanistan and Kashmir,where Islamabad runs covert wars.

Reining in Pakistan`s cross-border entanglements is virtually inseparable from implementing Musharraf`s wide-ranging agenda. In the long term, reviving a crippled economy, reducing sectarian and criminal violence and combating the country`s notorious ``Kalashnikov culture`` of drugs and guns, depends critically on a stable regional environment. ``Under his skin,Musharraf has one main goal: internal stability for Pakistan, both socially and economically,`` reflects an Islamabad-based Western diplomat. ``But he simply can`t achieve that with these continual sores on the country`s borders.

Decisions looming in the coming months will not be made by Musharraf alone. From the post-coup reshuffle at the top of the army, a core security triumvirate has emerged. While headed by Musharraf - who doubles as chief executive as well as chief of army staff - it also includes the new director-general of Pakistan`s premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Lt.-Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed, and the new chief of general staff, Lt.-Gen. Mohammad Mir Aziz Khan. Mahmoud is a longtime friend of Musharraf`s, and Aziz was largely responsible for planning the summer`s Kargil operation that sparked a mini-war with India on the Kashmir Line of Control(LOC).

Afghan policy clearly demands sweeping review. Diplomatically,Islamabad remains largely isolated in its support for the Taliban,a pariah regime shunned by the U.N. and widely condemned for human-rights abuses, support of terrorism, runaway narcotics exports, and unblinking political intransigence. Pakistan has also been roundly criticized for condoning the role of thousands of its own citizens fighting as volunteers alongside the Taliban. In 1999, the ISI`s logistical and advisory backing failed conspicuously to bring Afghanistan`s hardline Islamic militia any closer to their goal of subduing the whole country. A late July offensive was routed by a dramatic opposition counter-thrust that cost the Taliban hundreds of casualties in a single day. The second phase of operations met even greater setbacks. Despite the capture of territory which threatened the opposition`s capital of Taloqan, the Taliban eventually lost all their gains to an October counter-offensive led by northern chieftain Ahmadshah Massoud.

Since the coup, Pakistani policy has been in what one intelligence source describes as ``holding mode.`` Some new shipments of munitions have crossed the border, but in the field, ISI officers have been withdrawn from advisory roles with Taliban forces. Coming at the same time as an army closure of the Afghan border to crack down on smuggling, Islamabad`s shift has sparked alarm among the Taliban. The militia are already under pressure from U.N.-mandated sanctions imposed over the sanctuary they give the U.S.`s Public Enemy No. 1, terrorist suspect Osama bin Laden (though they have offered to talk).

Pakistan`s military triumvirate must now confront a tough dilemma: continue backing the Taliban`s campaign to subdue the north; or concede the improbability of a military solution and cut back support. Pushing on - likely to appeal to ISI hardliners -would necessitate backing a renewed spring offensive. The alternative would be to dump Pakistan`s long-cherished goal of Afghanistan united under a friendly regime. This would entail urging the Taliban to reach a compromise on a coalition government. The outlines of such a set-up are far from obvious, but unpalatably for Islamabad would probably need to include in some capacity the stridently anti-Pakistani Massoud.

The trouble is, reducing support is also fraught with risks. A concerted opposition push in the spring could break the militia`s shaky hold on the north. Such a collapse would inevitably trigger political upheavals in Taliban ranks and create chaos in southern Afghanistan. ``For Pakistan that scenario would pose a major foreign-policy disaster and a security risk,`` reflects one Western analyst.

As for Kashmir, because of Kargil, Musharraf is widely perceived in India as a hawk. Islamabad-based analysts, however, view him as keen to reduce tensions with New Delhi. ``The army wants a solution in Kashmir as much as anyone else, but on their own terms and in their own time,`` says a senior Western diplomat.

Achieving real tension reduction will not be easy given Indian suspicions and the difficulties of reaching specific, step-by-step agreements that might include a deal on stopping cross-LOC shelling or even a mutual downsizing of forces along the LOC. Complicating matters are the Pakistan-based religious organizations committed to holy war in Kashmir. Says a diplomat: ``At some stage the Pakistan army will have to control what they`ve let loose.`` But attempting to close down militant training and infiltration could well trigger a domestic backlash pitting the religious parties against the military regime.

The snows now settling across the mountains of both Afghanistan and Kashmir give Musharraf and his colleagues breathing space to review various uninviting options and to explore diplomatic openings. As they will be discovering, dampening holy wars is far more difficult than cheering them on.

Ref rajanjua #: 71

You ask {I don`t understand why they censored this post of yours earlier-apart from some paragraphs its quite reasonable.}

It is better to let the editors of Chowk explain it than for us to attribute motives to them! I wanted it published as an article only to generate more debate. (And to bait Omar1974!)

You say {I want your opinion on why there has never been a strong call by the Indians for reduction in their own defense budget}

I would attribute it to three reasons. The first is that during the period 1947-1962, India totally neglected defense. The government did not analyze what threats to the country`s security might arise from its neighbors (perhaps, other than from Pakistan) and this led to the problem with China in 1962. At that time, Nehru was worried about the world being destroyed by nuclear war between Russia and the US but not about losing territory to China because he never understood the Chinese mindset. Even after the Chinese intervention in Tibet in 1950 and the outright takeover in 1958, Nehru did not understand how to handle the Chinese or their claims to Ladakh, NEFA, and a few other places. India was so unprepared for the 1962 war with China that Indian troops didn`t have snow shoes to fight the war and this was in the winter. This has so scarred the psyche of the nation that China is considered Enemy Number One by India. The statement by George Fernandes last year that China is a major threat to India is only a public acknowledgement of what all Indians (except perhaps the Communists of West bengal) believe.

Because of that war, defense thinking in India has undergone a change. India is attempting to put itself in a position where it cannot be blackmailed by any other country. If you read any of Altaf Gauhar`s articles (published in The Nation a few months back) on the 1965 Indo-Pak war, he claims that Chou En-Lai offered to assist Pakistan if that war if Ayub Khan was serious about Kashmir. The offer was for China to occupy more of Ladakh, thus diverting India`s attention away from the Uri-Poonch sector where the initial Pak incursions took place.

The other issue that is always brought up is that the US sent an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal in 1971 as a veiled threat to India. This was most likely a gesture to India not to go too far in dismembering Pakistan. Strategically, this made no sense: the real threat was that India would invade West Pakistan after settling the score in the East. Sending the aircraft carrier to the Arabian Sea would have signalled that if India attacked in the West, the US would come to the assistance of Pakistan. But this issue is dredged up repeatedly by the Govt of India as well as the newspaper columnists and mindlessly accepted by the Indian public. The fear of Chinese intervention in 1971 was so great that India signed a 20-year defense treaty with the USSR. The Chinese card always comes up in India`s defense planning.

Thus, India believes that the only way to handle the Chinese is to be militarily prepared even though the possibility of getting back lost territory in Ladakh (14000 square miles) is remote.

The second reason is that the defense budget is a smaller portion of the overall budget or the GDP. Thus, India doesn`t feel the bite as much as Pakistan does.

The third reason for India`s defense budget can only be described as delusions of grandeur. Instead of being pacifist and non-interventionist as India was in the 1950s, the strategic thought is that if India does not dominate the Indian Ocean, somebody else will. Effectively, the US does that now and India has no way of throwing the US out. The fear again is that the US might withdraw in favor of the Chinese and the Chinese at least should be denied dominance over the Indian Ocean. It is going to take India compounded annual growth of 20-30% a year for the next 20 years if it is to dream of a blue-water navy. The current growth rate, about which Indians are ecstatic, is 8% which is better than the ``Hindu`` growth rate of 3%. This, and the typical lackadaisical work ethic inside India, guarantees that this will remain a pipe dream.

You ask {-and whether this situation should be remedied.}

Probably, yes. But national pride over Kashmir and Ladakh won`t let India do anything about it. That is why you see the BJP winning the elections: not on the basis of domestic policy but because it is thought to be a strong international player. That is why they got 91% approval rating for the nuke tests in the big cities. That is why Abdul Kalam is a hero for the missile development efforts. Even the Hindutva ideology is being projected as a projection of India on the world scene; after all, the 83% Hindu population guarantees dominance over any minority inside the country.

Anyway, these are my opinions. Let us see what others have to say.

Regards.

KASHMIR SOLUTION- ANOTHER CROSS ROAD.

Solution to kashmir has passed another cross road, recently, that is after the major junction at Kargill. In the past one week there had been three bomb explosions in `azad` kashmir, two days ago all shops were closed in protest against the bomb, a scenario quite familiar on the indian side.

One recommendation after kargill is to put RAW under the control of the military, a situation similar to ISI of pakistan.

At last there are plans for symmetrical responses. I am heartened by the indian response, for once pakistanis are in the lead, they are showing the way and indians are following. At least general PM has a new approach, he is a leader.

Re: #63 gmnosophist

I don`t understand why they censored this post of yours earlier-apart from some paragraphs its quite reasonable.

``The remedies that have been suggested are a reduction in tension along the border with India, a non-aggression or no-war pact, and simultaneous reduction in the armed forces of both India and Pakistan. The previous Pakistani attempts at maintaining parity with India have come back to haunt it because parity is still desired, though at lower force levels.``

You are right that one of the major reasons for Pakistani problems is the overwhelming defense budget, but no amount of international gaurantees can result in a unilateral reduction of arms by Pakistan. It has to be bilateral.

I want your opinion on why there has never been a strong call by the Indians for reduction in their own defense budget-and whether this situation should be remedied.

Regards,

Amir

This appear to be an `un-edited` version, at least I havnt tampered with it.

Normality is what is required first

By Kuldip Nayar

MILITARY dictators tend to be simplistic in their approach. It is either black or white. There is no grey area for them. General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistan Chief executive, is of the same mould. From the day he has taken over, he has been harping on one point: there will be no peace with India until the Kashmir issue is resolved.

This is the difference between a democratic government and a military junta. The former knows the price that people have to pay when hostilities break out. Neither Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto nor Nawaz Sharif, not even the two martial law administrators, General Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq, ever said: either Kashmir or no peace.

At one time, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto talked of a thousand-year war with India. But he withdrew the threat. He came to realize that normality between Islamabad and New Delhi was a prerequisite for reconciliation. In an interview at Rawalpindi two months before the Simla conference, he told me that a step-by-step approach was necessary to reach the Kashmir settlement. The Simla agreement, like the Tashkent Declaration, listed several steps to normalize relations between the two countries. The fault was not with the proposed steps but with Islamabad which simply did not implement them.

The Lahore process was yet another attempt to create a favourable climate to tackle Kashmir. If the behind-the-scene negotiations were any indication, the problem was nearing a solution. Gen. Musharraf should know that he is being blamed in India for sabotaging such a possibility. Anyone will tell him that the anti-Pakistan lobby in India had collapsed after Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee took the bus ride to Pakistan and said in Lahore that the integrity of Pakistan was essential for the integrity of India.

It was the intrusion at Kargil which reignited the anti-Pakistan sentiments in India. How should the country take Musharraf`s words, ``I am for peace,`` seriously when he is seen as the author of the Kargil tragedy? Why was the Lahore process sabotaged when it was moving towards a direction where all problems, including Kashmir, were sought to be settled in a give-and-take spirit? Maybe, Musharraf knows the answer.I have just returned from Srinagar. The situation there is really depressing. It is not to the liking of anyone. The city has no electricity for most of the time. After dark, there is eerie silence and even trees look like men standing with stenguns. Both the security forces and the militants can take shots at one another if they are so inclined. People are exasperated and stay indoors out of fear. During the day, the activity is limited and the youth - most of them unemployed - roam the streets. Political parties may make any claim but they are becoming increasingly irrelevant. There is an attitude of indifference to whatever is promised or, for that matter, what is happening.

But Musharraf is not helping the Kashmiris when the militants from Pakistan are allowed to enter Kashmir. After his takeover, the activity of militants has considerably increased. I am not defending the excesses committed nor the Lok Sabha election in the valley. It was more of a formality than of people exercising their vote. Let guns fall silent first. Peace is necessary for any effort to fructify. The solution will then begin to appear.

Islamabad can play a positive role if it stops the cross-border militancy, to begin with, for one year. Local militants, who are generally dependent on Pakistan, can be influenced by it to declare a cease-fire for that much time. In turn, New Delhi should stop military and other operations. This will create the climate for talks.

However, the basis of any solution cannot be religion. Many people in Pakistan hawk about a proposition that the Muslim areas, primarily the valley, should be integrated with Pakistan, and the Hindu and Buddhist areas of Jammu and Ladakh with India. Were this to be ever accepted, the wounds of partition would be reopened. History might repeat itself. One shudders to imagine the consequences.

Even otherwise, India cannot endanger its secular polity. It is already facing a tough time at the hands of the Hindutva forces. It cannot accept a position where it is told that the Muslims in Kashmir, even after 52 years, want to separate on the basis of religion. Any referendum will be reduced to the Quran versus the Gita. The Red Shirts in the North West Frontier Province were decimated when the referendum was held for the fate of the state after the creation of Pakistan because then religion became an arbiter. How can secular India afford to go over the same exercise?

This is the reason why it is so important to avoid a situation which may land India in the vortex of religion and its aftermath. And what kind of solution will it be if it is based on the lines of religion? The crust of enmity will become still harder. Kashmir is only a symptom, not the disease.

Normality is what is required first. The two countries must learn to live like neighbours. Only then can they take up a knotty problem like Kashmir. So far they have either fought wars or behaved in a manner which has threatened peace. There has never been harmony, much less true understanding. It may have been said in a lighter vein but it is true that the foreign policy of India is formulated in Islamabad and Pakistan`s in New Delhi.

Since there has been no real contact between the two, not even an exchange of newspapers or books, both sides are dismally ignorant about each other. The young people of the two countries have no interaction and the old have not given up their age-old prejudices. History which is taught in Pakistan does not recognize the Indian heritage. Nor do students know about the period before the advent of Islam in the subcontinent. That there is no cogent reply to the question asked on the missing link in history is one problem. The other, more important one - and this applies to India as well - is that the people in both countries have grown up in the midst of doubt, suspicion and fear.

Tackling Kashmir first is putting the cart before the horse. The ground has to be prepared for any structure to come up. General Musharraf may begin with trade and commerce. He needs to improve his country`s economy. India can help a lot in this matter. We should also be willing to accept exports from Pakistan without any duty. People on both sides will develop a vested interest in the economic relationship and this in turn will generate genuine goodwill. Kashmir will be easy to tackle in that atmosphere.

Devolution and Provinces

Devolution is process of decentralization that entails transfer of power from the national (center) level to the local and/or regional level. The need for devolution exists due to: (1) the presence of dissatisfied or nonconforming groups within a society (nation-state); (2) the need for an effective governance and delivery of public goods and services according to the needs and wishes of local and regional communities. The following letter by M. Shamim Raza suggests that the issue of devolution is not as simple as some people (including General Musharraf) thinks. A bureaucratic solution of the centralization-decentralization debate may not bring desired results. Devolution is a serious political issue, it needs to be dealt with through a (democratic) political process. Comments welcome.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Dawn Internet Edition, December 20, 1999

Devolution of power

Devolution of power plainly suggests transfer of power from the centre to the provinces and from the provincial to the local government as actually enshrined in the Constitution (now suspended). Any deviation from this recognised path will damage the equation and make the `cracks` grow bigger.

The SNF executive presided by its chief Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto has been critical of the move of the administration to transfer power to the districts for the benefit of the people in solving their problems locally (Dec 10). The party is clearly suspicious of the mode of transfer from the Centre which has been ignoring the just and long-standing demands of the smaller provinces.

The contention of the SNF is that power should be transferred to the provinces and it is for the province to manage local affairs. The power struggle between the centre and the provinces has been agonising. With the passage of time and myopic attitude of the Centre the distrust has grown so much that neither of the two is prepared to accept the words of another.

It is an irony of fate that 1973 Constitution, though drafted in a hurry and approved unanimously by all the parties in the parliament at that time, did not provide a binding base for our living together. The fault was not with the constitution. It has fully met the demands of provincial autonomy. It is simply unfortunate that we could not evolve a mechanism to transfer those given power to the provinces. This is now the core issue of equation between the federation and its units.

In his address to the nation (17-10-99) the Chief Executive in his 7-point agenda promised to strengthen the Federation and remove inter-provincial disharmony. It would be a great achievement if it is realized early.

Two months have already passed but nothing is visible how this solemn promise will be effected and the confidence of the aggrieved provinces restored to their satisfaction.

Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto has clearly stated in the said executive meeting that the Council of Common Interest (CCI) could be the only platform to speed up this issue in the light of the ground realities and evolve a mechanism to transfer power to the provinces.

The issue is very sensitive and has been agitating the minds of the smaller provinces since long. Having the entire state machinery and a viable think tank at his disposal it is now the golden time for the CE to solve this problem of distrust for good. The idea put forward by Mr. Bhutto also needs sober consideration.

M. SHAMIM RAZA

Karachi

Let the Kashmiris decide what they want to do with their future. Don`t force a solution on them. After that, on the whole, most of the Indo-Pak problems will start getting resolved. As long as people try to force their views on others, no solutions can be reached. What to talk of Kashmir, people (including me) do not even want others to force their own views on them at Chowk. I have no problem with loc=ib, as long as the Kashmiris have no problem with it. Otherwise, this solution is just an attempt by India to legalize its atrocities in Kashmir.

I am suprised to see that so many Indians are still in a state of denial, and think that the Kashmir problem is only being cause by some fundamentalists. If the average Kashmiri isn`t supporting self-determination for Kashmir, than why doesn`t India hold a vote in Kashmir? As I stated on another thread, if someone opposes the Muslim conquerors right to rule the Hindus, if they support the Indians efforts for self-determination against the British, then I do not see how they cannot support the Kashmiris right for self-determination. One should be consistent in one`s principles, and not be selective when it suits one`s own interests. If someone does not want to give the Kashmiri`s their right to self-determination, then I would have more respect for them if they came out and stated that they do not believe in people`s right to self-determination, rather than trying to justify their stance by altering the facts regarding Kashmir.

Just hold a vote, accept the results, and get the whole problem over with. Otherwise just say that you do not believe in self-determination for human beings.

Arun:

Hi, nice to seeya here again.


``Good India-China relations are in Pakistan`s interest IF good relations lead to a reduction in India`s defence budget. Pakistan can then commensurately reduce its defence budget.``

------Your IF is a loaded, big time IF. Am afraid the Pakistani politicised civilian, nor the army has the luxury of time at its disposal.

``As the recent Kargil conflict shows, reliance on China to back Pakistan`s position on Kashmir is going to be disappointing. The China card has not trumped India yet.``

------I have serious misgivings about your interpretation of the event. You give too much credence to the Pakistani planners. They envisaged Kargil as a mini Siachen, nothing more. There was never any hidden China Card. Don`t read too much about the General`s visit to China nor the ISI taped, and passed to RAW, tapes.


``A three-way rapproachment (Pakistan, India, China) with the goal of lower level of armaments and not necessarily involving a final solution to Kashmir is in all our interests. Again, to keep China from arming up, a China-US dialog on East Asian security needs to be pushed for.``

-------Reluctantly and against logic I am being won over by the side that argues that Kashmir solution is the core of all problems among the scores of nationalities in the sub continenet. China, US, renegade Korea etc are all peripheral to the basics.

Time is for bold decisions by India and Pakistan.
We have to go back over 5000 years in time to find a political entity proximating today`s India. (Ashoka`s times if my memory serves.)

The dilemma for Pakistani junta is obvious and has been stated to death recently.

It is in India`s own interest to see a stable and strong Pakistan. Or else, the ``domino effect`` some Indian policy analyst believe that will affect Indian unity will not start from Kashmir but from a disintegrating Pakistan.

If ever there was a time when we could gain or lose together, this is it. We are the inseparable siamese twins desparately looking for individual survival and identity. Time for bold decisions, indeed.

rgds

t

Zeemax:

Went back to that post #443 you referred to. Some interesting ideas. Overeall, I think it should be rethought some more.

And now the relevant points. I asked your thoughts on curtailing and effectively reducing defense budget:

From your post I will reproduce the relevant points: My rejoinder in parenthesis.

Defence

1) No-War-pact to be signed with India. Bilateral and simultaneous withdrawal from the Line of Control and the International Borders. A summit to be held in either Delhi or Lahore with the single-point agenda to honour the war-dead of both countries. (Won`t fly. Idea has been floated in the past and been rejected by one or the other.)

2) Line of Control to be made permanent into an International Border in return for India agreeing to withdraw from Siachen. Siachen to be declared as no-man`s-land by mutual treaty. (Track two diplomats were working on this angle according to K. Nayyar and others.)


3) Immediate cessation of active militant interference in Kashmir. A recognition and expression of the realities as follows:

a) Kashmir does not belong to Pakistan regardless of historical events during partition, and is not likely to belong to Pakistan even after a referendum or self-determination. If Kashmir thus is a secessionist movement it is an internal matter of India. (Who are we to determine the fate of Kashmir. Only Kashmirirs can decide for themselves. The moment India and Pakistan honestly recognise this dictum with all its implications, the region will be on its way to
peaceful coexistence.)
b) Human rights violations in Kashmir are wrong and the party will continue to raise it`s voice on purely humanitarian grounds as called for in Chechneya or Kososvo or any other such spots in the world. The Party has faith that the United Nations and other bodies also will intervene to prevent human rights abuses in Kashmir. (Are you alluding to lip service only? Faith in UN? You must be joking. It is alright to have faith in heavenly masters, but one must tie down the camel before going to sleep.)

c) Pakistan is not at military parity with India nor equipped to to occupy Kashmir by force. Even if it was, it would be an agressive and expansionist act which is morally wrong and unacceptable to the world community. Therefore a complete disavowment of any military action for resolution of the Kashmir dispute. (wow---this is a mouthful---- you are saying too much here--- ah let` see----I agree with the first sentence here----As for Pakistan deciding the fate of Kashmiris I can only reiterate-- let us leave it to the will of the Kashmiris.)

d) A realisation that although solution of the Kashmir Dispute is ingrained in our hearts by our environmental and political influences, policies of losing Pakistan in the pursuit of gaining Kashmir cannot be sustained. (sorry, you are losing me here.)

e) Nuclear program to be maintained in line with the regional balance of power. CTBT to be signed unilaterally as well as the Nuclear Non-Profileration Agreement. Nuclear program to be developed solely on computer simulated testing basis. (Again, this is loaded and am afraid need a bit more cohesive thinking.)



Zeemax, I was hinting and looking at more creative ways to reduce the defense budget and transferring those amounts to other much needed areas ---education, health, environment etc.


The goal of the Pakistani Army ( and I am no expert here) aims for defensive parity with India. Experts elsewhere have opined that given the terrain this can be achieved at 25-35% of the Indian defense spending. Even that I find an abhorrent violation of the average Pakistani`s fundamental rights.

What I would like to see debated in this respect is how can we creatively shift the emphasis from hi tech planes, missiles and tanks to lesser and equally effective and more cost effective defense deterrent while still maintaining defensive parity. This will free a percentage of the budget to be re-allocated to other needed areas.

Digression: I had certain thoughts post Oct 12 shenanigans. If interested send me your email address. You will find mine at my Chowk home page in the Leafy Glade Inn called Dargah.

rgds

t