Obsession with Borderline Issues

Punjab and Partition

Brigadier (Retd) A. R. Siddiqi

The first World Punjabi Conference in April this year at Lahore focused largely on Punjab`s cultural shock in the aftermath of Partition. Described as a `great step forward towards peace and friendship` the conference sought to advance the `cause of Punjabi language (and culture), so that we can wipe away our inferiority complex of our languages.` Except for the parenthesis, the words of Tahira Mazhar Ali, a Pakistani delegate at the conference in a letter which appeared in a prominent newspaper.

Another participant, Mr Sadiqulla, in a similar letter appearing two days later in the same newspaper wrote about the two `main objectives` i.e. the promotion of Punjabi language and `enhancement of understanding` among Pakistanis and Indians anywhere in the world. The writer would simply fail to understand — and rightly too — the `logic` of those opposing the conference for the protection of the `native language` of a people.

The above would not sound too far a cry from the thesis `Partition: the other side of freedom` (words borrowed from Prof Mushirul Hasan`s book of that name!) set out in The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia by Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya (Routledge, London). Rather than the fruits of freedom, the authors, in their well-researched work, discuss the bitter legacies of Partition and their traumatic impact on the geography, demography and integrated infrastructure of the subcontinent. The theme and rationale of the world Punjabi moot could be appreciated mainly in the context of the negative impact of Partition (as opposed to freedom) on the Punjabi language and culture.

Regardless of the views of the advocates and critics of the conference, it would be hard to deny that for Punjab, independence had been physically the other side of Partition, or vice versa. There is absolutely no exaggerating the massive suffering caused by an indecently hasty and brutally rushed Partition imposed on the land and the people of the province. Also no words of praise would be either too many or even enough for the courage and fortitude of the Punjabis, on both sides of the Great Divide, right through the worst crisis of their history.

Bengal was likewise divided but all in peace and harmony. The Muslim diaspora from the western part of the province and the neighbouring Bihar/Orissa had also been, on the whole, orderly and without the faintest touch of the genocidal mayhem accompanying the Partition of Punjab. The massive and criminal territorial vivisection notwithstanding, the Lahore moot wisely left the tortuous boundary question alone. `Nothing was said against the geographical frontiers of Pakistan.`

Fifty-three years after independence and having been through such apocalyptic traumas as the dismemberment of the one, united Pakistan, we should be bold to analyze things for ourselves and see where we might have either erred or were duped by others. Independence on the basis of an irrationally and unfairly partitioned Punjab was the sort of the Gift of Magi in one of O.Henry`s stories by that name. Reduced to dire poverty, the husband on the occasion of their wedding anniversary, sells his watch chain to buy his wife an expensive comb and the wife her hair to buy her husband a gold watch chain. It should not be difficult to decide whether Punjab, and ultimately Pakistan, got more of Independence or Partition in the light of the strange case of O`Henry`s couple. More than the end of the (pre-) Independence freedom struggle, the advent of independence was the beginning of the post-independence ordeal for Pakistan.

Ecstatic over our liberation from the double yoke of the British imperialism and Hindu hegemonic designs, we forgot all about the irreparable losses suffered through Partition. Kashmir happens to be just one of the consequences — even if the most catastrophic, viciously long enduring and far-reaching in its impact on the geo-political landscape of the subcontinent.

`To this day the overwhelming memory of 1947 for people across the whole of north India remains that of Partition, rather than that of independence` (Tank Kudaisya). Bitter memories of insane violence, break-up of families and `refugee-hood` stay etched in the minds of those still around. The third post-Partition generation, though largely unaware of the 1947 holocaust, remains its congenital carriers as well as academic researchers.

A recognized scholar and chronicler of the events leading to the Partition, G.D. Khosla, while recounting the mass frenzy and madness overtaking the people on both sides of the divide — Punjab in real terms — writes:

`History has not known a fratricidal war of such dimensions in which human hatred and bestial passions were degraded to the levels witnessed during this dark epoch when religious frenzy, taking the shape of a hideous monster, stalked through the cities, towns and countryside, taking a toll of half a million innocent lives.` Stern reckoning: A Survey of Events up to and following the Partition of India). Punjab had indeed been the hub and the epicentre of the holocaust. In reality the Partition of India would be essentially a misnomer since it involved only two of the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal, each also with its Hindu majorities in several areas at the division and district levels.

The All-India Muslim League had never exactly defined the territorial basis underlying Partition. The term `Muslim majority` areas used in support of their inclusion into the projected state of Pakistan, could be (and was eventually) used, with equal force of logic, for the inclusion of the Hindu majority areas (down to the village level) into India. The Muslim League, and ultimately Pakistan, was thus duped by its phraseology, supporting Pakistan on the basis of local communal majorities rather than on the basis of each province reckoned as one integrated whole.

The singular lack of perception on the part of the Muslim League high command cost Pakistan horribly dear in terms of land and people. Although no less a person than C. Rajagopalacharia had warned the Muslim leadership against the dire consequences of the Pakistan demand postulated on Hindu-Muslim majority areas, rather than on the basis of whole provinces, regardless of such local Hindu majorities as there might be. Bengal and Punjab, the only two provinces with overall Muslim majorities,also had large Hindu enclaves that would go to India only on a communal basis. Rajagopalacharia told the Muslim leadership in no uncertain terms, that their demand would boil down to communal as opposed to the provincial option.

The Quaid reacted strongly to Rajagopalacharia`s formulation, which in practical terms would lead to the creation of a `moth-eaten, truncated, divided and mutilated,` Pakistan. Such a Pakistan shall never be acceptable to the Muslim League. However, Rajagopalacharia`s realpolitik would eventually cancel out Muslim League`s rosy vision of Pakistan based on the inclusion of all the five Muslim majority provinces, Punjab, NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan in the north-west and Bengal in the north-east into Pakistan.

About the `centrality` of Partition in the life of the subcontinent, Tan and Kudaisya write: `The chronology of modern histories of India and Pakistan have been set up in such a manner that their narratives reach climax at Independence and Partition. Past events and movements are cast in a unilinear movement, inching towards their `tryst` in 1947.` Thus, Partition remains `trapped in chronological bind` seriously hindering a scientific assessment and critical analysis of its `long-term impact` upon the state and the society in South Asia.

A `major breakthrough` came in 1967 with the publication of The Indus Rivers: A Study of its Effects on Partition, by A. A. Michael. Michael`s study of how Partition broke up the integrated irrigation network built around the Indus river and its tributaries (the five Punjab rivers: Jehlum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas). He highlighted the enormous cost involved in building dams and canals to circumvent the disruptions and in working out water-sharing arrangements viz: The Indus Water Treaty of 1960.

Michael`s was, in effect, `a pioneering environmental study of how the setting up of political boundaries could impact upon natural resources and contest over their use.` The internationally brokered Indus water treaty of 1960 added yet another irritant to their confounding geopolitics.

Put together, hydro and geopolitics went on to aggravate the conflict in upper riparian Kashmir. And that in turn led to institutionalizing in microcosm all the historical irritants between the countries....` While it lasts, Kashmir itself stands divided between India and Pakistan, with China having its own finger in the pie.

Returning to the World Punjabi Moot, its manifold importance consists not only in making a case for the promotion of Punjabi language and culture but also serves as a paradigm shift in the conceptual and academic re-assessment of the forces — men, who while struggling for freedom, led to the break-up of the country.

The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism in Pakistan

Hamza Alavi

Religious fundamentalism has become a powerful and dangerous force in Pakistan, due mainly to the opportunism of successive political leadership that has pandered to it. Militant sectarian religious groups and parties, led by half-educated and bigoted mullahs, many of them armed to the teeth, are holding our civil society and the state to ransom. They threaten the very fabric of Pakistan’s society.

Threats of disruption from religious parties have escalated in recent decades. They have steadily grown in strength since the time of General Ziaul Haq. They now claim that they are the true custodians of Pakistan and that it was they, the mullahs, who had fought successfully for Pakistan, to establish a theocratic state for Muslims. Facts contradict such claims. With the exception of Ghulam Ahmad Parvez’s pro-Pakistan Tulu-i-Islam, group, all religious groups and parties, including the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, the Majli-i-Ahrar and the Jamaat-i-Islami, had all bitterly opposed the Pakistan Movement and abused its leadership which was secular.

The Muslim League, the Party that led the Pakistan movement, was a party of modern educated Muslim professionals and government job seekers (whom, for the sake of brevity, we may call the ‘salariat’). It had little to do with the outlook of bigoted mullahs. It was free of any millenarian ideological pretence about creating an Islamic state. It was a movement of Muslims rather than a movement of Islam. Behind it was a new class of English educated Muslim professionals and government job seekers that came into being in the 19th century. It got organized politically by the turn of the century, seeking a better deal for themselves vis-à-vis Hindus who were advancing relatively more rapidly in these fields.

When the Muslim League was founded in 1906 at a meeting convened by Nawab Salimullah at Dhaka, the new party was immediately hijacked by the Aligarh group led by Nawab Viqar ul-Mulk. Aligarh was at the vanguard of the new Northern Indian Muslim salariat class, the sons of the Muslim Ashraf [nobility], who were deeply conscious of the loss of their privileges with the advent of British rule and the relatively more rapid rise of Hindu educated classes. The main base of the Muslim salariat was in UP and Bihar for, at that time, the Muslim salariat was relatively weaker in the Muslim majority provinces.

The Muslim League was focused entirely on its secular demands of western educated Muslim professionals and the salariat. Attempts to place the issue of Islamic ideology on the agenda of the Muslim League were both rare and invariably unsuccessful. Arguably, the earliest of such attempts was one by Shibli Numani to Islamise the Aligarh syllabus. Shibli was explicitly committed to theocratic values and wanted to shift the emphasis of the Aligarh syllabus away from English and modern sciences, towards Islamic learning and the Arabic language. The response of the Muslim salariat class to that attempt is exemplified by the remarks of Sir Raza Ali, who was a close collaborator of Sir Syed’s immediate successors, Muhsin ul-Mulk and Viqar ul-Mulk. With them, Raza Ali was at the center of the Aligarh establishment. In an article in the daily Statesman opposing Shibli’s move, he remarked that the idea of reviving Arabic knowledge was, of course, beguiling for Muslims. But he warned that they should not ignore the demands of our times, for the most urgent need of Indian Muslims was to be offered education that would be beneficial in the affairs of this world; education that would help their coming generations to earn their livelihood. Sir Raza Ali spelt out the principal concern of the educated Muslim middle class at the time. Their concern was not about a hypothetical return to original Islam and the creation of an ‘Islamic State’, ruled over by mullahs, that Shibli had dreamt about. Shibli had to leave Aligarh, for it was not the place where his theocratic ideas could flourish.

Among the rare attempts to bring the issue of ‘Islamic Ideology’ on to the agenda of the Muslim League was one that was planned for the Delhi Session of the AIML in April 1943. One Abdul Hameed Kazi (backed by ‘Maulana’ Abdul Sattar Niazi) canvassed support for a resolution, which he intended to table. That would commit the Muslim League to an Islamic ideology and the creation of an Islamic state. But pressure from everyone around him forced Kazi to abandon the idea. The resolution was not even moved. The Pakistan movement remained firmly committed to its secular concerns.

In his keynote speech before the inaugural meeting of Pakistan’s new Constituent Assembly, on 11th August 1947, Mr. Jinnah spelt out the Pakistan Ideology, namely the secular and tolerant vision of the new state. That speech was not a sudden aberration, as some Islamic ideologists, and General Zia’s hacks, were later to allege. It was consistent with what Mr. Jinnah had been saying for decades. The Muslim League had always been committed to a secular society.

Following Mr. Jinnah, his political successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, too reiterated the Muslim League’s secular values. When Liaquat moved the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 he declared that ‘As I have just said, the people are the real recipients of power. This naturally eliminates any danger of the establishment of a theocracy.’ Despite that clear statement by the mover of the Objectives Resolution, later religious ideologues, notably General Zia and his hacks, have claimed that the Objectives Resolution was a charter for the imposition of the ‘Sharia’ (as they would interpret it) although the word Sharia does not occur anywhere in that Resolution. Their argument is based on some conventional generalities in the Resolution, which said that ‘Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives, in the individual and collective spheres, in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna’. That did not amount to a charter for the creation of a theocratic, ‘Islamic’ State.

Liaquat’s position on the Muslim League’s traditional secularism was, however, soon to be reversed. Not so very long after the Objectives Resolution was passed, Liaquat began to change his tune for his political base was threatened by splits in the Muslim League in the Punjab, which was the power-base of Pakistan’s ruling elite. That was due to factional conflict between Daulatana and Mamdot who left the Muslim League to form a rival Party. Liaquat was now in a panic. He decided to exploit Islamic rhetoric, to hold together his crumbling Party. He began to speak of ‘Islam in Danger’. He also began to equate loyalty to the Muslim League with loyalty to the state. Those who opposed him or his party were denounced as traitors.

There was, however, a second and a much more important reason why Liaquat decided to abandon his secular stance. Powerful regional movements had arisen in East Bengal, Sindh, Balochistan and the NWFP, whose people felt that they were not being given their due in a Punjabi dominated Pakistan. They demanded regional autonomy and fairer shares of resources. The Centre, which was seen as ‘Punjabi’, was in fact dominated by a cohesive bureaucracy, under Chaudhri Muhammad Ali as Secretary General to the Government. It was the centralised bureaucracy that ruled Pakistan whilst politicians, including Liaquat, went through the motions.

Arguably, it was the challenge to the centre from regional movements which was the more important factor in precipitating Liaquat’s ideological volte-face. Abandoning Mr. Jinnah’s (and his own) firm stand against pandering to the mullahs, Liaquat sought to negate regional demands by issuing calls for ‘unity’ in the name of Pakistan and Islam. We were all Pakistanis and Muslims, it was now argued, and therefore we could not be Bengalis or Sindhis or Baloch.

The bureaucracy, rather than Liaquat, was in effective control, and it was not prepared to make any significant concessions to the mullahs. The mullahs could be given a visible public role, but without any real share in power. For those purpose a Board of Talimaat-i-Islamia, was set up. It provided a few jobs for some senior mullahs, the Ulama. But the Board was to be no more than a façade for the newfound religious rhetoric of politicians. It was not to have any real powers. Its function was purely advisory and that too only on matters that were referred to it. When the Board did make some suggestions they were unceremoniously ignored. Nevertheless, the Ulama seemed to be content with the arrangement. They remained quiescent for nearly two decades. Recalcitrant Mullahs, such as Maulana Maududi, found themselves in jail. The mullahs were under control.

That basically peaceful scene was disturbed only temporarily in 1953, when Islamic militants launched Anti-Ahmadi riots in the Punjab and Martial Law was proclaimed. Although religious zealots of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and the Jamaat-i-Islami led the riots, they were in fact being used by cynical political forces, led by Punjab Chief Minister Mumtaz Daulatana. That was done in the context of US attempts to destabilise the Nazimuddin Government at the centre and to counter the Bengal group of MPs in the matter of the proposed Pakistan-US military Alliance which they opposed. That is a long and complicated story.

A decade and a half later, religious rhetoric was indulged in by the illegitimate regime of General Yahya Khan, but without conceding any formal role to the mullahs. General Sher Ali, redefined ‘Pakistan Ideology’ as ‘Islamic Ideology’. The Yahya government’s primary concern was to de-legitimise the increasingly powerful Bengali nationalism. Yahya’s Bengali adviser, Prof. G. W. Choudhury, had persuaded him and his coterie of Generals, that East Bengali nationalism was limited to only a handful of intellectuals, who were in the pay of the Indians and that the vast majority of Bengalis had no sympathy with them. That tragically false picture could account for the ferocity and reckless manner in which Yahya tried to suppress the Bengali people in 1971. Would they have embarked on that policy if Yahya had even the slightest inkling of the depth of Bengali feelings?

The mullahs were quiescent, however, until they were stirred into action by the foolish populist rhetoric of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who misguidedly decided to exploit religious ideology. Thereby Bhutto sowed the seeds of his own destruction, for the re-activated mullahs became the vanguard of the campaign against him. That set the scene for Gen. Zia’s coup d’etat.

It was under General Zia that narrow and bigoted religiosity became state policy. The General sought the political support of the mullahs for his illegal regime, for he had no other political base. He also sought financial support from the Reagan regime in the US. Both of these objectives, he thought, could be secured through an Islamic Jihad which he proclaimed against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The CIA took over the task of organising armed religious groups in Afghanistan, in cooperation with Pakistani agencies. When the Russians left Afghanistan, however, the CIA was withdrawn precipitately from the scene, leaving it to Pakistan to deal with the mess that they had created. Foolish Pakistani policies since then, especially under Benazir Bhutto and her successor Nawaz Sharif, got Pakistan even more heavily involved with these once US sponsored ‘terrorist groups’. The present government has done little to turn away from these policies to extricate Pakistan from the mess that was inherited from Zia’s Afghan policy.

When he seized power illegally, Zia badly needed some source of legitimacy for his regime. Being politically bankrupt, he decided to exploit the credulity of Pakistani Muslims by invoking Allah. He claimed to have experienced ilham (a divine revelation) in which, he declared, he was enjoined by the Almighty himself to Islamise Pakistan and to transform it into a fortress of Islam. New ‘Islamic Laws’ were promulgated that were crude and cruel distortions of Islamic teachings, such as his Hudud Ordinance which, for example, had the effect of punishing a rape victim (for fornication) while the perpetrator of the rape went scot-free because of impossible conditions of proof now needed to prove his guilt!

Zia also bequeathed to his successors undemocratic Shariat Courts that are answerable to no one. They issue binding decisions on the state and on the people, in the name of the Sharia. That role, in the name of Islam, is rejected by the philosophy of Sir Syed Ahmad who pointed out that Islam did not decree the office of a Pope with powers to issue binding decrees in the name of the faith. Islam, he said, is a religion of the individual conscience. No person or institution has the right to issue binding fatawa, laying down what Islam is and what it is not. Indeed, no other Muslim country has the equivalent of our Shariat Courts. They were set up by Zia’s illegitimate regime and should be dissolved.

The Shariat Courts are manned by persons who hold rigid religious views. Their most damaging decision so far is an order that requires the abolition of interest, ‘in all its forms’, by 30th June, 2001. This threatens to bring Pakistan’s already very shaky economy to a complete halt. No enemy of Pakistan could have devised a more potent weapon to destroy the country. In arriving at their decision the judges of the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the advice of a very large number of scholars who came before it as witnesses, who resisted this interpretation of the Sharia.Instead, the Court appears to have been misled by bogus claims of ‘Islamic Banking’. They seem to be ignorant of how a modern economy functions and do not seem to have understood at all the obvious implications of their decision in a modern day capitalist economy such as that of Pakistan. They appear to be ignorant of the difference between interest in a modern capitalist economy ( sood) and usury (riba) in pre-capitalist economies to which Quranic strictures apply. What the Shariat Courts have produced is a time bomb which, if allowed to go off, threatens to blow up Pakistan’s economy.

The present Government seems to be paralyzed in the face of the die-hard religious lobby which seems to be triumphant about this. It has poor advisers. As soon as the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court announced its decision, the Minister of Finance, who is an ex-banker, declared, without pausing to think, that the Court’s decision would be implemented in full. But, after months of deliberations by several high powered committees, the Government still has no idea whatever of what is to be done. It speaks with two voices. At a recent meeting, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs declared that the Government has drafted all required laws and regulations, which are ready to be promulgated and that the Government is ready to implement the Shariat Court’s decision in full, and without qualifications. But at the same meeting, the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan (the country’s central Bank) declared that they do not as yet know how the Shariat Court decision can be implemented. He said that the Government needs more time to work out viable solutions and that it has asked for an extension of time.

The Government does not seem to understand the gravity of this issue. They should know that they cannot allow the economy to collapse. But they also appear to be too intimidated by religious fundamentalists to overturn the Shariat Court’s decree. Meanwhile, the top nine religious parties in the country have declared that they will launch a mass anti-Riba movement, on the lines of the movement that brought down Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, if the Government fails to abolish interest by the date laid down by the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court, namely the end of June, 2001. They have declared, ominously, that the time has come for a decisive war between Islamic and secular forces in the country!

A major factor in the present situation is a development since the time of Zia. That is the proliferation of deeni madaris, religious schools that have spread throughout Pakistan. They receive generous foreign funding, not least from Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia. The deeni madaris have little difficulty in recruiting pupils (taliban), who are turned into fanatics, ready to die for what they are taught to believe are sacred causes. A factor that has greatly helped their recruitment is the creation of a huge number of unemployed families, people without a livelihood and without hope, as a consequence of farm mechanization, especially in the Punjab. Every tractor displaces at least a dozen families of sharecroppers. Hundreds of thousands of them are now without a source of livelihood. In that context, the appearance of the well financed deeni madaris, who take over their children, give them free ‘tuition’, accommodation and food, cannot appear to be anything other than a great blessing. The enthusiastic young taliban are taught to recite the Quran. They are also indoctrinated, their minds filled with distorted and intolerant ideas about what Islam is and what it prescribes. The taliban are thus turned into fanatics. Most of the ‘ deeni madaris also give them military training for jihad initially ostensibly against the Soviets and now for the liberation of Kashmir. But already Pakistan itself is experiencing the inevitable heavy fallout from this. The armed groups, many of them with battle-hardened taliban, are in the vanguard of sectarian killings throughout Pakistan, which are on the increase; killings of members of rival sects, Sunnis against the Shi’a, Deobandi Sunnis against Barelvi Sunnis and so on. They have also begun to issue threats against the state itself and the society in Pakistan.

Instead of a viable policy designed to disarm and liquidate such groups, successive regimes in Pakistan have pandered to them. The current military government, unlike the military regime of General Zia, has not indulged much in religious rhetoric, except for the occasional utterances of its Federal Minister for Religious Affairs. Indeed, the Government’s liberal interior minister, General Moinuddin Haider, has given calls, from time to time, about doing something to bring the so-called deeni madaris under some sort of control, reforming their syllabi to introduce some useful, career related, educational input into their activities. For that he has become the bête noir of the religious parties, who have warned the government, firmly, against meddling in their affairs.

The government, for its part, seems to be intimidated by the militant Islamic groups. In December last, for example, one Maulana Muhammad Akram, leader of the Tanzimul Ikhwan, threatened to march on Islamabad with ‘hundreds of thousands’ of his followers, to force the Government to promulgate the Sharia. The Government’s response was to placate him. It despatched the Punjab Home Secretary and the Inspector General of Police to parley with Akram. That was apparently not enough, for it then sent Dr. Mahmood Ghazi, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, as reinforcement. After long drawn out talks, Maulana Akram ‘graciously agreed’ to defer his plan to storm the capital. It has been suggested by the media that Maulana Akram has ‘a lot of influence among middle-ranking officers of the army’. If that is so, that must surely be extremely worrying. Could it be that which explains the Government’s apparent paralysis in the face of serious threats from fanatical religious groups? It must know that a do nothing policy will not solve anything. Left to itself, the situation can only get worse.

Theories of the state, democratic or otherwise, are premised on the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. But here we have a situation where the state’s monopoly of force is undermined by the numerous armed religious groups (who often work in concert) that have agendas of their own. The Government must realise that the more they try to accommodate religious zealots, the stronger and the more intransigent they become. What the situation demands is a firm and well thought out policy to disarm such groups and bring them under control. It is surprising that Pakistan’s professional military does not yet seem to have realised the very serious threat that this situation poses to itself as well as to the State and society as a whole. In the meantime, until something is done, Pakistan will continue to stagger towards an uncertain future, with contradictory state policies.

Professor Hamza Alavi is Pakistan’s leading sociologist and educationist. He read this paper at the South Asian Conference on Religious Fundamentalism held in Dhaka on June 1-2, 2001

Ideological crossroads

Najum Mushtaq

If it is not anti-Indianism, then in what other terms could we possibly render Pakistani-Muslim nationalism? Musharraf chose the holy day of Eid-e-milad to reprimand ``irresponsible religious leaders`` whose ceaseless war cry against India is harming Pakistan`s interests. Economic growth, he said, has been undermined by religious militancy and sectarianism that distort Pakistan`s image in the international community.

This change of heart is welcome. But this new tune from Islamabad is bound to have widespread and deep political and social ramifications.

It is surprising that the general was so selective in identifying those whose belligerent posture towards India undercuts Pakistan`s national interests. The `ideology of Pakistan` as defined to students at every school and college in the country is nothing except anti-Indianism. In every walk of life in Pakistan-from academia to journalism, from sports to bureaucracy-a vast majority of people have been inculcated with fantastic anti-India notions.

But the most obvious place to look for unflinching anti-Indianism is of course the military itself. Phrases like the ``Hindu mentality`` and ``devious Indian psyche`` are part of the daily military talk. The jehadi groups that are now being berated for their ``irresponsible statements`` have always enjoyed a close relationship with the Pakistan military. In fact, the trend of religious and sectarian militancy is a direct consequence of the policies which Musharraf`s predecessor from the army, Ziaul Haq, was so proud of.

Anti-Indianism, in short, runs deep in Pakistani state and society. It is a state of mind that cannot be switched off by mere statements of disapproval. People have no other alternative frame of reference in which to define Pakistani nationalism.

This sentiment dominates Pakistan`s other policy choices as well. In his Seerat Conference statement, Musharraf argued that, after the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Pakistan is militarily strong and what needs to be done now is to make its economy strong. But Pakistan`s economy is weak exactly because a disproportionately large chunk of the resources has always been used for defense (against India) at the expense of social development and economic growth. Had it not been for the India factor there would have been little logic in building up such mammoth defenses.

But the most sinister manifestation of Pakistan`s misdirected India policy is the mushrooming of sectarian militant outfits in the name of jehad in Kashmir. Pakistani society has been fragmented along sectarian lines. Violence in Pakistan has increased in direct proportion to the rise in the number of religious militant groups (who, according to Musharraf, misuse jehad funds).

Read the following three headlines from The News on June 7, 2001, the same issues that also carried Musharraf`s historic statement. ``Violence leaves 13 injured in Karachi``; ``24 people killed in (Kashmir) valley clashes``; and ``Bomb destroys bookshop in Karachi``.

In the first instance, two Sunni groups fought a gun battle to decide which party`s flag should be hoisted atop a mosque on the eve of the last Prophet`s birthday celebrations. The bookshop that was blown up by a booby-trap belonged to Jaish-e-Mohammad, Maulana Azhar Masood`s Kashmir freedom fighters group. The front-page picture in the same day`s paper showed an armed policeman overseeing a road in Rawalpindi where a 12th Rabi-ul-Awal procession was about to pass.

To change the fateful course of history and save Pakistani society from further degeneration, the role of religion in Pakistan`s foreign and domestic policy needs to redefined. If religion is not a factor in Pakistan`s relations with, say, China or Nepal, it should also be delinked from Islamabad`s India policy.

Musharraf has made a correct diagnosis of what ails Pakistan. However, blaming the religious right-wing alone is likely to complicate and deepen the country`s crisis of ideology. It remains to be seen if Musharraf has the will to overhaul the entire ideological edifice of the state of Pakistan and rebuild it in conformity with Jinnah`s ideals.

The writer is an assistant editor at The News

najummushtaq@hotmail.com

From Dawn May 29, 2001

Road to Kandahar

By M.P. Bhandara

ARE we on our way to becoming the camp-followers of an obscure, bigoted mullah living in Kandahar? Perhaps not, but in an ideological sense he is a role model for thousands of our youth. For many misguided souls he has stellar qualities. Qom, once the leading centre of radical Islam, has lost its primacy to Kandahar. And Imam Khomeini, who in the 1970s was the undisputed leader of resurgent Islam, is regarded as a renegade in the sanctum of Kandahar.

Ahmad Rashid, a well known Taliban expert, recently made a telling point. One of the reasons for the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, he said, was the cultural acceptance of the pre-Islamic heritage by the Shia population of the Hazarajat. The destruction of the Buddhist relies was not an act directed against the Buddhists of the world but a slap on the face of the rebellious Shias - a reminder that there is no place for a pluralistic vision of Islam in Kandahar.

There were good reasons for Pakistan promoting the Taliban in mid 1990s. Afghanistan was in deep chaos after the fall of Najeebullah. The Taliban were almost Pakistani products. These Afghan youths, educated in our borderland madrassahs, run by our religio-political organizations, had little memory of their homelands. They were the trampled flowers of the Afghan Diaspora. Phoenix-like they rose from the ashes. Unspoiled, uncorrupted, these single-minded youth had Afghanistan at their feet by the consent of a tired populace.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), after an initial period of skepticism, decided to back up the Taliban. There were good reasons for doing so then. Therefore, almost any price can be considered for a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul which will neither raise the Pukhtoonistan stunt nor create problems on our western border. Some of our military planners, afflicted with the fever of the Soviet Afghan war, much later developed the concept of `strategic depth`.

This spurious theory postulates that in the event of war with India, Afghanistan would provide sanctuary for our military aircraft and provide bases for retaliation from there. If indeed our bases can be knocked out by the enemy, what would prevent it from knocking out our planes tucked away in Afghanistan? one may ask. After all, all is fair in war.

What is undeniable, however, is that a two-front security situation could pose a serious problem for Pakistan`s armed forces. If our western border was restive during a conflict with India, we would require the equivalent of two armies. And remember no army in history has ever succeeded in disciplining the unruly Afghan. Therefore, to keep Afghanistan as an ally or as a dependent friendly state is a strategic imperative.

In sum, so long as the Kashmir problem is not resolved, we have to configure India as a potential enemy and Afghanistan as an ally.

The questions that must concern us relate to the physical, psychological and geopolitical costs of this confrontation with India and keeping Afghanistan as a friendly state. Are we fated to this paradigm for the rest of our lives? Or, are there alternative models that could be considered without giving up the basic objectives?

The costs are clear enough. In the last decade of confrontation with India, we have received little or no military aid from any quarter and little economic aid since 1998. As a result, our total public debt rose from Rs 155 billion in 1980 to Rs 3,200 billion in 2000. It is over six times the revenue collected annually and 2 per cent higher than our GDP at market price. The level of our internal and external debt is probably the highest in the world (Italy, by GDP measure, is higher but not as a percentage of revenue). Assuming our population now is 142 million, any child born today inherits a debt of Rs 22,500 as his legacy from Pakistan`s past.

What have the people of Pakistan gained from being one of the most indebted countries in the world? Our literacy rate, a half-century after independence, is less than 50% measured by a fairly broad definition; less than 35% by a stricter definition. Clearly the confrontation with India has been financed with borrowed external and internal money - some of it borrowed on high rates of interest. Does it make sense to keep up a confrontation with a perceived enemy at the expense of the country`s assured bankruptcy? Zulfikar Ali Bhutto never ate grass in pursuit of the nuclear ambition, while the borrowings provided the necessary capital for corruption.

But there are even more severe costs. To be the sole supporter of a regime, which has almost pariah status in the comity of nations, is to acquire that sorry status for yourself. If a man is known by the company he keeps, so is a nation. The Taliban regime we support is bad news for the Afghans themselves (women in particular), for the region and for the world of Islam. If Mullah Omar remains in power for another decade, Afghanistan might be half-emptied of Afghans by war, disease, starvation, or migration - or worse: the Islamic Emirate might end up with the world`s highest per capita of drug addicts (Remember Ziaul Haq`s famous non-prediction: ``Muslims will never take to heroin - the faith prevents them from doing so).``

What are we to do? Should we give up Kashmir and cosy up to India? Certainly not. What we have to learn is to wage a war without fighting losing battles or, for that matter, any battles. To relearn the wisdom of the Clauswitzean cliche: `war by other means`. The model in this regard is the 50-year-old diplomatic war waged by China to reclaim its US-backed province of Taiwan. The Chinese have threatened invasion of Taiwan accompanied by the most violent gestures, but it has always been a war of words and dire threats. The last years of Chairman Mao were marked by reckless policies, but apart from the early years of the communist regime and the late Maoist aberration, China as an economic fortress has been the constant imperative.

China alone is the economic miracle of the 20th century. It has sustained an average growth rate of about eight per cent over the past two decades - an all-time high of over ten per cent in the past three years. No other country in recent history has achieved this. How did it happen? It abandoned all ideological considerations and previous fixations for the sake of economic growth. But never for a moment did it abandon its war of words against Taiwan. On the contrary, it has encouraged the Taiwanese to invest in China. Billions of Taiwanese dollars have helped make the Chinese economic miracle. Taiwanese tourists by the thousands are welcomed to spend their holiday dollars in China. As a result, China draws a line between the people and the government of Taiwan. The `people` visits have played a significant role in changing attitudes on both sides of the divide.

Equally successful has been Chinese foreign policy. Notwithstanding acrimonious verbal duels with the US in parallel with threatening admonitions for the Taiwanese politicians seeking a status other than reunification with the mainland, Chinese policy has been marked by cycles of carefully measured belligerence followed by troughs of cooling off periods. In the process, China has kept Taiwan on the red-hot burner of world concern while extracting every conceivable economic benefit from the US and the West.

Ideological shenanigans must be jettisoned. For example, just look at the time, money and effort wasted on trying to determine whether or not modern banking interest is Riba. Likewise, consider the national waste of manpower, when the flower of our youth, deprived of all avenues of gainful employment, is forced into ethnic, sectarian or wars of ``liberation`` from Chechnya to Kashmir - or plain robbery. Modern banking, foreign investment and employment are all parts of one single paradigm.

The military has had two opportunities in the past two decades to modernize Pakistan and make it an ``economic fortress``. It has miserably failed to do that. And so have the politicians. To take a U-turn on the road to Kandahar requires courage and vision of the highest order. It required a Deng Xiaoping to change the direction of China from a deeply embedded communist ideology to market economy without a revolution. For a military ruler to bring modernization to Pakistan is somewhat unlikely. He has no political base. The task calls for a courageous politician who can convince public opinion that the road to Kandahar leads to a failed state and an ultimate walk-over by the perceived enemy.

The pace of change in our neighborhood can no longer be casually waved aside. To mention just one little noticed fact. General Electric (GE) had a turnover last year of over a billion dollars in India. The next generation of advanced super-fast and fuel-efficient locomotives are being designed not in the US or Europe but in Bangalore by GE.

There are over 130 world class multinationals doing much the same sort of thing in our neighboring country. Indian foreign exchange reserves are over 20 times that of Pakistan today and in three years may well be over a hundred times of our reserves. At least three states in India have achieved full literacy.

What all this means for Pakistan is obvious. When in a competitive situation with others what matters is the game not its ideology. International rules of conduct and behavior apply to playing cricket, hockey or football. Much the same applies to nations. If you inflict your rules for playing football - as the Taliban did on our football team, by shaving off their heads - then no one will be willing to play with you.

The upshot of this discussion is that you cannot have two or more national goals at one time. It is not possible to have the goal of an ``economic fortress`` and, at the same time, the rules of a theocratic state or make Kashmir to be the be-all and end-all of your foreign policy. All three goals are mutually incompatible.

The option for Pakistan today is some form of theocracy - the road to Kandahar - or a return to Jinnah`s vision of a democratic, progressive, economically vibrant and self-respecting Pakistan. The choice is obvious.

Hummm! Very surprising and interesting too. Someone on Chowk (whom I presume was born Muslim) has found that there are interesting parts to Hindu belief and faith. Reminds me of my Muslim Indian friends back home in India (at least two of whom know a lot of Sanskrit unlike me!)

Sadna: Where have you been? Welcome back. The guy praying without taking off his shoes is not me. I take off my shoes before getting into spirituality related rituals.

lo kar lo baat, nimaaz with shoes on?

Something heard third-hand:
A mosque in the US where the Pakistani moulvi? is leading a campaign for social boycott of a member of the Pakistani community. Why? This member faithfully follows many-times-a-day namaz routine whereever he is, but doesnot take off his shoes while doing so.

Re: Romair #92

``To clarify my definition furthur (sic), I consider a person a noble freedom fighter if he is a genuine volunteer, fighting against oppressors, is supporting an indigenous struggle with the backing of the local people, and does not deliberatley target civilians. What else should I call him?``

I wonder what you would call the following criminals who perpertrated this act: (Mujahideen? Freedom fighters?)

http://sg.news.yahoo.com/010507/1/ombp.html

Islamic guerrillas massacre seven in Indian Kashmir

JAMMU, India, May 7 (AFP) -

``Suspected Islamic separatist guerrillas Monday massacred at least seven people, including two children, in a frontier region of Indian-administered Kashmir, police said.``

``An unspecified number of guerrillas who had abducted two young boys from Poonch`s Sangla region shot dead with automatic weapons three men who had come to rescue the children, a police spokesman said.``

``The gunmen then mowed down their two young captives, he said.``

``At about the same time, unidentified guerrillas fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the home of a village chieftain in Poonch`s Marhot region, killing two teenaged boys in the complex.``

TAhmed #562

Cat was never meant to be politicians by me.

They can be kicked like this ``in one Chutki``

We are just trying to rationalize things.

Who will take care of people.

Our elite and rich will found a way to take care of themselves in ANY SYSTEM.

And PM if you mean Pervez Musharraf in the last analysis is only going to take care of his constituency. Meaning Civil and Military bearreaucracy and Industrial-Feudalist.

How can you expect them to divert money for education and progress of people, if ever Pakistan has money.

That is beyond my comprehension.

53 years of Pakistan History is a sufficient proof of it.

Only elected representative of people who are answerable to people can take care of their problems.

The only reason for SOFT Martial law at this time is that Pakistan cannot afford to alienate its own population in such a difficult circumstances.

But if history is any guide, I have no doubt about the fate of Majority of Pakistanis at the hands of these rulers.

In this soft situation, the best option is to get the most constitutional rights of people.

BENEVOLENT ELITES is a misnomer for all practical purposes.

krsahid #561 Who will bell the cat, you ask. I assume from the rest of your post that by bell you mean democracy and the rule of law and the cat being political power in Pakistan. I dont think you or I can bell the cat, or even PM. These things require a cultural change in the direction of respect of more rational thinking and respect for the individual as well as for different beliefs and different communities of people. What the individual chowk posters (like you and me) can do is to demonstrate this in our posts at all times. This is in addition to other things we may be doing in real life to this end. But we have to be patient - there is no magic wand that will bring about this change overnight.

TAhmed321#

I think you skipped rest of my post.

Who will bell the cat?

There is no choice but to fight for these aims.

I can label you with full force of state power as most corrupt person of this century from an FIR filed in 1981(filed today off course with back date).

Can you defend yourself? You will continue to run from one court to another for the rest of your life to prove your innocence.

Do you remember the hanging of Bhutto when majority of judges were changed to get the CORRECT decision. (Even that correct decision was 3:4). Did you forget how interested Zia-ul-Haq was before his death in the time of delivery of Bilawal, son of Benazir so as to arrange election on correct time.

To only certain way of winning is CONTINUE TO HARP these points and Continue to serve our rulers.

Rest is farce or a continuous struggle, the fruits of which may be eaten by future generations.

krashid #559 ``You can definitely run on three point programme.``

I bet if we had a referendum on these points, they would be passed in a landslide.

TAhmed #558

You can definitely run on three point programme. And lets hope sane people get into politics.

But the power struggle in Pakistan will not be as simple.

I think priority needs to be altered. As the money moves the system, so our elite and rich will find a way to run the system according to their advantage.

It is the common man who needs leadership by people, who can stand for them. One thing which has been to advantage to Pakistan has been the alternative economy which was keeping the common man alive. Instead of more control by Government, I would tend to encourage the local solutions to the problems with possible help from Government or Private sector.

The struggle in Pakistan is at a stage where small provinces have different political outlook and solutions to their problems. They want a social justice for all but especially to them.

My view will be this on political matters.

1- President should be directly elected and should represent the Administration and should have sufficient power. As evidenced by Farooq Leghari and GIK, their job is as representative of Administration.

2- Prime Minister as Chief of Legislative and should be able to work without interference from Armed forces etc.As they are elected representative, they have to and will take care of their constituency Due to the concerns of small provinces, I think Senate should be directly elected body. I don`t foresee any change in balance between the powers of Senate and National Assembly.

3- Judiciary should be completely independent.

4- Local bodies should be strengthened, to solve the problems at local levels.

I think if our intellentia is powerful enough and guide the nation with force and intellect, the pseudo-Islamist will be forced to change their rhetoric and level of their discussion.

krashid #557 Thanks for the figures. I think you will agree that they indicate that the overriding problem is the large share of nonproductive (in which I would include military) expenditures in the budget. If funds are distributed to the provinces on a population basis, as you indicate, then that would seem to be a reasonably fair way to proceed. I say ``reasonably fair`` since a better way would be to look at things in a totally different way: (1) take actions to minimize nonproductive expenditures (these would be drastic actions like changing the entire tone of relations with India to one of friendship, reduce civil and military services to a tenth of their current size, and so on). (2) use funds freed up to (a) strengthen law enforcement, increase salaries of people in key regulatory institutions (state bank, SEC, judiciary) and so on) and (b) promote IT infrastructure, (c) promote education. (3) Declare Pakistan to be a plain republic (drop the ``Islamic`` part): Islam belongs in the hearts of people, not on their sleeves, and nowhere is it prescribed in the Quran that a state must have the name Islamic before it (indeed, it was a state that was run by a non-muslim, the Queen of Sheba, that was praised in the Quran as being a well-run state where the ruler consulted with others - a clear indication in the direction of democracy). Introduce additional penalties (in addition to what the criminal law provides) on any crimes that are committed in the name religion or ethnicity. (This item of course requires no funding).

PS You think I could run for elections in 2002 based on this 3-point agenda? :-)

krashid #555 On the military expenditure, you are right that too much is spent on the military. And you are also right that the Panjabis are in the majority (due to tradition and due to their being the majority ethnic group in the country). However: the real problem is the high military expenditure as well as other wasteful expenditures in the government. Fix this problem, and the problem of who is over- or underrepresented in the military and civil services disappears. The real problem is the lack of employment opportunities overall. This problem is due to due to poor economic progress over the past couple of decades. That poor economic progress is due to lack of private investment. And lack of private investment is due to the fact that Pakistan cannot compete for private capital due to (a) political instability; (b) reputation for lawlessness; (c) lack of trained manpower.

Moral: Instead of fighting among ourselves and with India (thereby worsening rather than improving the underlying problems as listed above), we should learn to live in peace among ourselves and our neighbors and focus on educating the next generation. And deep down most Pakistanis know that too, I think.

TAhmed # 321 I will try to give a glimpse into revenues. These are current figures from ministry of finance.

In millions of rupees

1- Total revenues: 247,622

a) Tax : 204,926

b) Non-Tax : 42696

2- Total expenditure current: 298,962

a) Interest : 103,791

b) Defense : 61,247

c) Development and net : 28,459

lending

d) Unidentified expendi : 1,491

e) Budget deficit : 78,307

Now see the break up of total expenditure in a different format:

Total expenditure (provisional: 327,421

Total expenditure current: 298,962

a) Federal : 219,611

1)Interest payment : 103,791

2)Defense : 61,247

3)General Administration: 32,256

4)Grant to NG : 8,452

5)Subsidies : 13,814

6) others : 48

7)Provincial : 79,351

8) Development and net : 28,459

9) PSDP : 41,716

The provincial pool is distributed according to population formula.

Also you can see very well, the cuts will be done at which level to balance the budget and what will be the sources of deficit financing.

There is an interesting site on web giving up the break up of employees in Federal service according to domicile.

Also there is break up of SHO`s and high ranking police officers in different Thanas in Sind.

If you are interested I can post it or I will give you the link to see for yourself.

It would be also interesting to see the tax revenues from different areas. It would be interesting because of my earlier presumptions.

As Federal Government income includes both Federal and Provincial Revenues and includes Income Tax, Property Tax, Excise duty, Sales Tax, Motor Vehicle Tax, Surcharges etc etc, it would be interesting to see the break-up of these Tax Rupees from different Industries, Agriculture, Minerals etc.

The Federal Government operation does not give a break up from different areas of Pakistan.