An International Failure
Feroz R Khan December 5, 2001
#295 Posted by mohajir on December 29, 2001 2:37:36 pm
Pakistan, India and the United States
2230 GMT, 011227
Dec 27,2001
Summary
http://www.stratfor.com/home/0112272230.htm
With al Qaeda and Taliban elements fleeing Afghanistan, the United States will continue to grapple with strategic problems concerning its traditional ally, Pakistan. There are significant differences between what President Pervez Musharraf has said he will do to fight terrorism, what he intends to do and what he actually can accomplish. The threat of an imminent Indo-Pakistani war may be just the lever Washington needs to move Islamabad.
Analysis
The United States has been engaged in intense debate regarding the next steps it must take to eradicate al Qaeda. Two main strategies have emerged of late. One argues that there can be no solution to the problem of Islamic attacks on the United States until the regime of Saddam Hussein is eliminated. The other strategy argues that Iraq`s role is secondary, and that the United States` primary mission is to prevent al Qaeda from establishing a command center in some other isolated country, like Yemen or Somalia.
Obviously, the strategies are not incompatible. Equally obviously, at least from STRATFOR`S point of view, the debate misses the point entirely: the next country on the agenda is Pakistan.
When planning for the Afghan campaign began immediately after Sept. 11, it was clear -- at least from a naive standpoint -- that Pakistan, which has an extensive border with Afghanistan and a long-standing strategic relationship with the United States, would be the strategic key to the campaign. The planners` first impulse was to deploy U.S. forces in Pakistan and prosecute the campaign from there. This proved impossible. Instead, U.S. ground forces had to deploy in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, while air attacks were carried out from carriers in the Arabian Sea and from strategic bombers on Diego Garcia and elsewhere. Clearly, some forces were deployed in Pakistan, but only under tight secrecy.
The need for secrecy is the key to everything. Simply put, the Pakistani government was not in a position to permit a war against the Taliban regime to be waged from its soil. This was not simply because of substantial sympathy for the Taliban in Pakistan, although that existed. Nor is it simply because Pushtuns, the foundation of Taliban power, live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, although they do.
Rather, it was because the Taliban was ultimately as much a Pakistani phenomenon as it was Afghan. In a sense, the Taliban was a Pakistani construct, designed to conclude -- on terms acceptable to Pakistan -- the civil war that raged in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan feared the ascendance of the Northern Alliance as well as other groups in Afghanistan, and saw in the Taliban a government that was congenial to Pakistan both strategically and ideologically. The ISI, Pakistan`s intelligence service, was in many ways the godfather of the Taliban government.
As the Taliban government provided al Qaeda with a secure operational base, the United States continued to parse the issue of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is inconceivable that the Taliban would have been able to develop its relationship with al Qaeda without the knowledge of Pakistan`s intelligence services and government, and it is difficult to imagine that they would not have given at least implicit approval. However, the United States was not prepared to frame the issue as an Afghan-Pakistani issue -- only as an Afghan problem fundamentally distinct from Pakistan.
This policy continued after Sept. 11 and throughout the campaign, despite the clear limits Pakistan placed on cooperation with the United States. Washington clearly and rationally wanted to contain the Afghan campaign. It placed sufficient pressure on President Pervez Musharraf to force him to remove senior officials who were too closely aligned with the Taliban, to permit at least some basing of U.S. forces in Pakistan and to publicly commit himself to use Pakistani forces along the frontier to prevent Taliban forces from crossing into Pakistan.
The United States recognized that much of this was cosmetic. Support for the Taliban ran deep in the government and deeper in the country. The U.S. forces based in Pakistan were hardly strategic. Finally, whatever he promised, there were significant differences between what Musharraf said, what he actually intended to do and what he ultimately was able to do.
The United States carefully refrained from pressing the issue, afraid that excessive pressure would topple Musharraf and throw Pakistan either into chaos or into a fundamentalist dictatorship. Or if excessive pressure threatened Musharraf`s survival, he might simply reverse course and turn against the United States. In any case, the United States adopted a minimax policy -- it demanded the most it could get within the limits of what Islamabad could deliver, and it lived with the three differences: what was said, what was actually intended, what could really be delivered.
The manner in which the Afghan war concluded has suddenly rendered this policy untenable. While the Taliban has abandoned the cities, it continues to exist, both in alliances with particular warlords and in its own right. Where it exists most intensely, in fact, is in Pakistan, among Taliban sympathizers as well as among hundreds or thousands of Taliban fighters that have crossed into Pakistan during the past month. A very few have been very publicly apprehended, but most have gone to ground -- some protected by Pakistani forces.
Far more important than the fate of the Taliban is the fate of al Qaeda`s senior commanders, including Osama bin Laden, and of its fighters. It is becoming increasingly obvious that neither the Taliban`s high command nor al Qaeda`s has been captured. The release of a new videotape that appears to have been made in the past few weeks, and perhaps as recently as last week, dealt a blow to speculation that bin Laden and the others were killed at Tora Bora. It was always problematic that bin Laden would have chosen to travel from Kandahar to Tora Bora in the chaos that followed his last known taping. This would be not only dangerous but pointless. It was far more likely that he went directly to Pakistan, where supporters hid him and may still be doing so.
Whether bin Laden is in Pakistan or has traveled elsewhere, it is clear that many of his forces as well as Taliban leaders went to Pakistan and that the vast majority of those remain. In other words, apart from native support for the Taliban and al Qaeda, elements from Afghanistan are now in Pakistan and operating under the protection of, if not the government, certainly elements of the government and powerful political forces.
If we are correct in this, then the problem the United States faces in destroying al Qaeda does not concern Somalia, Yemen or Iraq, but Pakistan. Ideally, the United States would like Musharraf to use his security and military forces to destroy al Qaeda`s forces and hand senior leaders over to the United States. Certainly, this is something that Musharraf has assured the United States he would do. However, it is not clear that he is in a position to deliver on his promise -- it is not clear his orders are being obeyed. Nor, frankly, is it clear that he wishes to see these orders carried out. Certainly, he wants to placate the United States, but there is a huge gap between saying he will act, acting, and acting effectively.
A case in point is the Dec. 13 attack on India`s parliament by gunmen, which the U.S. government says were Islamic militants based in Pakistan. There are two explanations for the attack. The first is that Musharaff knew about plans for the attack and sanctioned it. The second is that he neither knew of nor sanctioned the attack. In a real sense, it doesn`t matter which it was. Either explanation raises serious questions about the course of Afghanistan.
All this creates a strategic crisis for the United States. Its fundamental goal is to defend its own territory against al Qaeda attacks and the global destruction of al Qaeda. In our view, al Qaeda has taken refuge in Pakistan -- historically an ally of the United States, and a country that poses a military challenge on an order of magnitude beyond that posed by Afghanistan. Launching a military campaign in Pakistan is possible but requires much greater resources than in Afghanistan, as well as the destruction of Pakistan`s nuclear capability. Rather than use direct military action, the United States would prefer a more subtle lever.
The attack on India`s parliament provides precisely that lever. Obviously, the shootout was as intolerable for India as a similar attack on Congress would be for the United States. India must react. But even apart from that, India sees itself as having an unprecedented opportunity to deal not only with the Kashmir issue but with the entire issue of the nature and future of Pakistan.
Pakistan`s alliance with the United States has placed severe limits on how far India could go. However, a profound schism is developing between Washington and Islamabad as post-Sept. 11 events evolve. Clearly, both sides are doing everything to avert an open breach -- but equally clearly, if it becomes undeniable that Pakistan is harboring al Qaeda elements, a break becomes inevitable. At that moment, India would have the opening it has awaited for 50 years. The United States would be not be able to refrain from acting against Pakistan, nor could it act efficiently without Indian support and involvement. India was eager to help from the beginning; now the United States would have no choice but to accept that help.
The United States does not want an Indo-Pakistani war, but the threat of such a war is precisely what Washington needs to move Islamabad. For Pakistan, the threat of a war with India in which the United States either stood to one side or actively participated is the worst possible nightmare. By allowing the specter to rise, Washington has given Musharraf an opportunity to become more forthcoming. If he is in control but insincere, he is being shown the abyss and can change course. If he is sincere but not in control, he can show the abyss to Islamic fundamentalists in his government and bring them under control.
The problem is that many of the fundamentalists would actually welcome a war and even defeat by India. Their goal is to radicalize the Islamic world by demonstrating that Christians, Hindus and Jews have formed a vast alliance designed to crush Islam. A combined U.S.-Indian attack would be exactly what would be needed to demonstrate this to the world. The destruction of Pakistan`s nuclear capability -- whether by nuclear or conventional weapons -- would further illustrate the point. It is therefore no accident that Islamic fundamentalists struck India at what would normally be considered the worst possible moment. From their point of view, it was the best possible moment to act.
This indicated that Musharraf may not be able to gain control of the situation, even if he wanted to. Thus, he visited Beijing in late December. China has historically been an enemy of India and an ally of Pakistan. Beijing has been extremely cautious since Sept. 11, but it remembers both the EP-3 spy plane incident and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld`s redefinition of strategy toward the Pacific and against China prior to Sept. 11. Beijing is happy to see the United States diverted. It would not be happy to see India emerge without a threat on its western flank. Hence, Musharaff had a very cordial visit to Beijing.
At this point, the strategic imperative of defeating al Qaeda begins to intersect with Eurasian geopolitics. It is one thing to take Afghanistan apart, quite another to do the same with Pakistan. Afghanistan`s fate is of little significance to great powers. The fate of Pakistan matters to China, among others. At the same time, if al Qaeda is using Pakistan as a base of operations or even as a transit point and the Pakistani government can`t or won`t do anything decisive and effective about it, this strikes at a fundamental U.S. interest and cannot be tolerated.
The United States is, therefore, in the midst of a veiled crisis over Pakistan. It is an odd crisis in that Washington, fearing the consequences of a public confrontation, is trying very hard to maintain the fiction that Pakistan has been fully cooperating in the battle against al Qaeda, that it is acting effectively against the Taliban and al Qaeda and that its forces would certainly arrest senior al Qaeda leaders if they could catch them. At the same time, the United States is quietly showing Pakistan the abyss in the hopes that the plausible fiction of U.S.-Pakistani relations might thereby become reality.
The problem is that in Pakistan, there are those who prefer an open breach with the United States to accommodation. Even if we assume that Musharraf is not one of these elements, it is not clear that he can control them. If he can`t control them, the United States is faced with an extraordinary dilemma -- to go into Pakistan and get al Qaeda itself. It cannot do this without India, and India will not move unless Pakistan`s nuclear weapons are destroyed. It is not clear that U.S. precision-guided munitions are sufficient for a task that will tolerate no failure.
The rest follows logically.
2230 GMT, 011227
Dec 27,2001
Summary
http://www.stratfor.com/home/0112272230.htm
With al Qaeda and Taliban elements fleeing Afghanistan, the United States will continue to grapple with strategic problems concerning its traditional ally, Pakistan. There are significant differences between what President Pervez Musharraf has said he will do to fight terrorism, what he intends to do and what he actually can accomplish. The threat of an imminent Indo-Pakistani war may be just the lever Washington needs to move Islamabad.
Analysis
The United States has been engaged in intense debate regarding the next steps it must take to eradicate al Qaeda. Two main strategies have emerged of late. One argues that there can be no solution to the problem of Islamic attacks on the United States until the regime of Saddam Hussein is eliminated. The other strategy argues that Iraq`s role is secondary, and that the United States` primary mission is to prevent al Qaeda from establishing a command center in some other isolated country, like Yemen or Somalia.
Obviously, the strategies are not incompatible. Equally obviously, at least from STRATFOR`S point of view, the debate misses the point entirely: the next country on the agenda is Pakistan.
When planning for the Afghan campaign began immediately after Sept. 11, it was clear -- at least from a naive standpoint -- that Pakistan, which has an extensive border with Afghanistan and a long-standing strategic relationship with the United States, would be the strategic key to the campaign. The planners` first impulse was to deploy U.S. forces in Pakistan and prosecute the campaign from there. This proved impossible. Instead, U.S. ground forces had to deploy in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, while air attacks were carried out from carriers in the Arabian Sea and from strategic bombers on Diego Garcia and elsewhere. Clearly, some forces were deployed in Pakistan, but only under tight secrecy.
The need for secrecy is the key to everything. Simply put, the Pakistani government was not in a position to permit a war against the Taliban regime to be waged from its soil. This was not simply because of substantial sympathy for the Taliban in Pakistan, although that existed. Nor is it simply because Pushtuns, the foundation of Taliban power, live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, although they do.
Rather, it was because the Taliban was ultimately as much a Pakistani phenomenon as it was Afghan. In a sense, the Taliban was a Pakistani construct, designed to conclude -- on terms acceptable to Pakistan -- the civil war that raged in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan feared the ascendance of the Northern Alliance as well as other groups in Afghanistan, and saw in the Taliban a government that was congenial to Pakistan both strategically and ideologically. The ISI, Pakistan`s intelligence service, was in many ways the godfather of the Taliban government.
As the Taliban government provided al Qaeda with a secure operational base, the United States continued to parse the issue of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is inconceivable that the Taliban would have been able to develop its relationship with al Qaeda without the knowledge of Pakistan`s intelligence services and government, and it is difficult to imagine that they would not have given at least implicit approval. However, the United States was not prepared to frame the issue as an Afghan-Pakistani issue -- only as an Afghan problem fundamentally distinct from Pakistan.
This policy continued after Sept. 11 and throughout the campaign, despite the clear limits Pakistan placed on cooperation with the United States. Washington clearly and rationally wanted to contain the Afghan campaign. It placed sufficient pressure on President Pervez Musharraf to force him to remove senior officials who were too closely aligned with the Taliban, to permit at least some basing of U.S. forces in Pakistan and to publicly commit himself to use Pakistani forces along the frontier to prevent Taliban forces from crossing into Pakistan.
The United States recognized that much of this was cosmetic. Support for the Taliban ran deep in the government and deeper in the country. The U.S. forces based in Pakistan were hardly strategic. Finally, whatever he promised, there were significant differences between what Musharraf said, what he actually intended to do and what he ultimately was able to do.
The United States carefully refrained from pressing the issue, afraid that excessive pressure would topple Musharraf and throw Pakistan either into chaos or into a fundamentalist dictatorship. Or if excessive pressure threatened Musharraf`s survival, he might simply reverse course and turn against the United States. In any case, the United States adopted a minimax policy -- it demanded the most it could get within the limits of what Islamabad could deliver, and it lived with the three differences: what was said, what was actually intended, what could really be delivered.
The manner in which the Afghan war concluded has suddenly rendered this policy untenable. While the Taliban has abandoned the cities, it continues to exist, both in alliances with particular warlords and in its own right. Where it exists most intensely, in fact, is in Pakistan, among Taliban sympathizers as well as among hundreds or thousands of Taliban fighters that have crossed into Pakistan during the past month. A very few have been very publicly apprehended, but most have gone to ground -- some protected by Pakistani forces.
Far more important than the fate of the Taliban is the fate of al Qaeda`s senior commanders, including Osama bin Laden, and of its fighters. It is becoming increasingly obvious that neither the Taliban`s high command nor al Qaeda`s has been captured. The release of a new videotape that appears to have been made in the past few weeks, and perhaps as recently as last week, dealt a blow to speculation that bin Laden and the others were killed at Tora Bora. It was always problematic that bin Laden would have chosen to travel from Kandahar to Tora Bora in the chaos that followed his last known taping. This would be not only dangerous but pointless. It was far more likely that he went directly to Pakistan, where supporters hid him and may still be doing so.
Whether bin Laden is in Pakistan or has traveled elsewhere, it is clear that many of his forces as well as Taliban leaders went to Pakistan and that the vast majority of those remain. In other words, apart from native support for the Taliban and al Qaeda, elements from Afghanistan are now in Pakistan and operating under the protection of, if not the government, certainly elements of the government and powerful political forces.
If we are correct in this, then the problem the United States faces in destroying al Qaeda does not concern Somalia, Yemen or Iraq, but Pakistan. Ideally, the United States would like Musharraf to use his security and military forces to destroy al Qaeda`s forces and hand senior leaders over to the United States. Certainly, this is something that Musharraf has assured the United States he would do. However, it is not clear that he is in a position to deliver on his promise -- it is not clear his orders are being obeyed. Nor, frankly, is it clear that he wishes to see these orders carried out. Certainly, he wants to placate the United States, but there is a huge gap between saying he will act, acting, and acting effectively.
A case in point is the Dec. 13 attack on India`s parliament by gunmen, which the U.S. government says were Islamic militants based in Pakistan. There are two explanations for the attack. The first is that Musharaff knew about plans for the attack and sanctioned it. The second is that he neither knew of nor sanctioned the attack. In a real sense, it doesn`t matter which it was. Either explanation raises serious questions about the course of Afghanistan.
All this creates a strategic crisis for the United States. Its fundamental goal is to defend its own territory against al Qaeda attacks and the global destruction of al Qaeda. In our view, al Qaeda has taken refuge in Pakistan -- historically an ally of the United States, and a country that poses a military challenge on an order of magnitude beyond that posed by Afghanistan. Launching a military campaign in Pakistan is possible but requires much greater resources than in Afghanistan, as well as the destruction of Pakistan`s nuclear capability. Rather than use direct military action, the United States would prefer a more subtle lever.
The attack on India`s parliament provides precisely that lever. Obviously, the shootout was as intolerable for India as a similar attack on Congress would be for the United States. India must react. But even apart from that, India sees itself as having an unprecedented opportunity to deal not only with the Kashmir issue but with the entire issue of the nature and future of Pakistan.
Pakistan`s alliance with the United States has placed severe limits on how far India could go. However, a profound schism is developing between Washington and Islamabad as post-Sept. 11 events evolve. Clearly, both sides are doing everything to avert an open breach -- but equally clearly, if it becomes undeniable that Pakistan is harboring al Qaeda elements, a break becomes inevitable. At that moment, India would have the opening it has awaited for 50 years. The United States would be not be able to refrain from acting against Pakistan, nor could it act efficiently without Indian support and involvement. India was eager to help from the beginning; now the United States would have no choice but to accept that help.
The United States does not want an Indo-Pakistani war, but the threat of such a war is precisely what Washington needs to move Islamabad. For Pakistan, the threat of a war with India in which the United States either stood to one side or actively participated is the worst possible nightmare. By allowing the specter to rise, Washington has given Musharraf an opportunity to become more forthcoming. If he is in control but insincere, he is being shown the abyss and can change course. If he is sincere but not in control, he can show the abyss to Islamic fundamentalists in his government and bring them under control.
The problem is that many of the fundamentalists would actually welcome a war and even defeat by India. Their goal is to radicalize the Islamic world by demonstrating that Christians, Hindus and Jews have formed a vast alliance designed to crush Islam. A combined U.S.-Indian attack would be exactly what would be needed to demonstrate this to the world. The destruction of Pakistan`s nuclear capability -- whether by nuclear or conventional weapons -- would further illustrate the point. It is therefore no accident that Islamic fundamentalists struck India at what would normally be considered the worst possible moment. From their point of view, it was the best possible moment to act.
This indicated that Musharraf may not be able to gain control of the situation, even if he wanted to. Thus, he visited Beijing in late December. China has historically been an enemy of India and an ally of Pakistan. Beijing has been extremely cautious since Sept. 11, but it remembers both the EP-3 spy plane incident and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld`s redefinition of strategy toward the Pacific and against China prior to Sept. 11. Beijing is happy to see the United States diverted. It would not be happy to see India emerge without a threat on its western flank. Hence, Musharaff had a very cordial visit to Beijing.
At this point, the strategic imperative of defeating al Qaeda begins to intersect with Eurasian geopolitics. It is one thing to take Afghanistan apart, quite another to do the same with Pakistan. Afghanistan`s fate is of little significance to great powers. The fate of Pakistan matters to China, among others. At the same time, if al Qaeda is using Pakistan as a base of operations or even as a transit point and the Pakistani government can`t or won`t do anything decisive and effective about it, this strikes at a fundamental U.S. interest and cannot be tolerated.
The United States is, therefore, in the midst of a veiled crisis over Pakistan. It is an odd crisis in that Washington, fearing the consequences of a public confrontation, is trying very hard to maintain the fiction that Pakistan has been fully cooperating in the battle against al Qaeda, that it is acting effectively against the Taliban and al Qaeda and that its forces would certainly arrest senior al Qaeda leaders if they could catch them. At the same time, the United States is quietly showing Pakistan the abyss in the hopes that the plausible fiction of U.S.-Pakistani relations might thereby become reality.
The problem is that in Pakistan, there are those who prefer an open breach with the United States to accommodation. Even if we assume that Musharraf is not one of these elements, it is not clear that he can control them. If he can`t control them, the United States is faced with an extraordinary dilemma -- to go into Pakistan and get al Qaeda itself. It cannot do this without India, and India will not move unless Pakistan`s nuclear weapons are destroyed. It is not clear that U.S. precision-guided munitions are sufficient for a task that will tolerate no failure.
The rest follows logically.
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#294 Posted by sherdil on December 23, 2001 2:37:21 am
(Continuation of my previous post ...)
Having gone through the different possible suspects in the last post, I keep coming back to the extremists within Pakistan and the Pakistani military/ISI rather than the others I listed. No real surprise but it had to be looked at from all angles. It has to be these guys because the results that such an attack (on the Indian Parliament) would bring are:
1. Increased pressure on Musharraf from the US and India to crack down on the Kashmiri groups. On this there are clearly limits - there is only so much Musharraf can do without being thrown out (or worse) of office for betraying Kashmir.
2. Possible war with India, which would provide a renewed rallying point for the extremists recently discredited.
3. Derailing potential talks and trade with India.
4. Forcing the US to come down hard on Pakistan and thus labeling the US as using Pakistan for its own (and India`s purposes) yet again. (A potent rallying point).
All these are aimed directly at Musharraf, and have the potential to rejuvenate the extremist`s agenda, as they see it.
I think they are wrong in their assessments. For one thing, their hopes rely on the backing of most Pakistanis. This is why the attack was Kashmir-centric in nature (ie directed at the Indian Parliament knowing it will be the Kashmiri groups that will be accused). Kashmir is the issue that Pakistanis will rally toward, no doubt, but things have changed recently. Everywhere I have been, the Pakistanis I talked to think Musharraf is the one who will do the right thing for the Kashmir problem - it is his approach that they will back. The extremists have lost a great deal of ground to Musharraf. Of course if India attacks, then all bets are off. And what if the US pushes Musharraf too far on cracking down on the Kashmiri groups as `terrorists`? Bush is treading a fine line here as well. One indication of how far things may go is to remember what the US officials at the State Department were saying in the beginning of the Afghan war: They said the battle would not be won in Afghanistan at the cost of losing Pakistan (to the extremists). That is the risk facing us today if either Pakistan or India falters. This entire extremist scenario depends on India realizing the battle Musharraf is facing, and helping rather than hindering him. And more so for Pakistan: Musharraf cannot afford to falter or backtrack on the course he has taken. He has to rid Pakistan of the extremists. The US would like to help him and is willing to do just that. India must and should (because it is in their best interests). And Pakistanis have absolutely no choice but to help him in this. That is a battle for us Pakistanis. We cannot expect the Americans to rid us of our baggage - that is a problem of our own doing and we are the ones who have to now reorient ourselves from the path of extremism. Easier said than done, I know, but just look at the reaction of the extremists to Musharraf. Their act speaks of desperation. It says that what Musharraf is doing is having an effect, and that his educational plans will have a still greater and longer lasting effect of removing the narrow focus of the madrassahs. The question is will he be given time? Is the Indian government mature enough to realize this? It looks like Vajpayee may be, but the Advani-types seem to be making things dificult for him.
At the moment, it looks to me like the war posturing is going to back off and the US influence will prevail. What has really helped is the restrained posture Pakistan has taken, in not getting into the tit-for-tat game with India, but realizing that Vajpayee`s government needs to let off some belligerent steam to blunt the emotions of some Indians. The hope is that India will allow a third party (the UN Security Council or the US) to help in the investigative process. It is to the advantage of all (except the terrorists).
Having gone through the different possible suspects in the last post, I keep coming back to the extremists within Pakistan and the Pakistani military/ISI rather than the others I listed. No real surprise but it had to be looked at from all angles. It has to be these guys because the results that such an attack (on the Indian Parliament) would bring are:
1. Increased pressure on Musharraf from the US and India to crack down on the Kashmiri groups. On this there are clearly limits - there is only so much Musharraf can do without being thrown out (or worse) of office for betraying Kashmir.
2. Possible war with India, which would provide a renewed rallying point for the extremists recently discredited.
3. Derailing potential talks and trade with India.
4. Forcing the US to come down hard on Pakistan and thus labeling the US as using Pakistan for its own (and India`s purposes) yet again. (A potent rallying point).
All these are aimed directly at Musharraf, and have the potential to rejuvenate the extremist`s agenda, as they see it.
I think they are wrong in their assessments. For one thing, their hopes rely on the backing of most Pakistanis. This is why the attack was Kashmir-centric in nature (ie directed at the Indian Parliament knowing it will be the Kashmiri groups that will be accused). Kashmir is the issue that Pakistanis will rally toward, no doubt, but things have changed recently. Everywhere I have been, the Pakistanis I talked to think Musharraf is the one who will do the right thing for the Kashmir problem - it is his approach that they will back. The extremists have lost a great deal of ground to Musharraf. Of course if India attacks, then all bets are off. And what if the US pushes Musharraf too far on cracking down on the Kashmiri groups as `terrorists`? Bush is treading a fine line here as well. One indication of how far things may go is to remember what the US officials at the State Department were saying in the beginning of the Afghan war: They said the battle would not be won in Afghanistan at the cost of losing Pakistan (to the extremists). That is the risk facing us today if either Pakistan or India falters. This entire extremist scenario depends on India realizing the battle Musharraf is facing, and helping rather than hindering him. And more so for Pakistan: Musharraf cannot afford to falter or backtrack on the course he has taken. He has to rid Pakistan of the extremists. The US would like to help him and is willing to do just that. India must and should (because it is in their best interests). And Pakistanis have absolutely no choice but to help him in this. That is a battle for us Pakistanis. We cannot expect the Americans to rid us of our baggage - that is a problem of our own doing and we are the ones who have to now reorient ourselves from the path of extremism. Easier said than done, I know, but just look at the reaction of the extremists to Musharraf. Their act speaks of desperation. It says that what Musharraf is doing is having an effect, and that his educational plans will have a still greater and longer lasting effect of removing the narrow focus of the madrassahs. The question is will he be given time? Is the Indian government mature enough to realize this? It looks like Vajpayee may be, but the Advani-types seem to be making things dificult for him.
At the moment, it looks to me like the war posturing is going to back off and the US influence will prevail. What has really helped is the restrained posture Pakistan has taken, in not getting into the tit-for-tat game with India, but realizing that Vajpayee`s government needs to let off some belligerent steam to blunt the emotions of some Indians. The hope is that India will allow a third party (the UN Security Council or the US) to help in the investigative process. It is to the advantage of all (except the terrorists).
#293 Posted by shammi on December 22, 2001 1:00:54 pm
Re: Ferozk on `evidence`
``Pakistan cannot seek shelter under the guise of a freedom struggle in Kashmir,`` he (an un-named senior External Affairs Ministry official) said. ``If the US has acknowledged that the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed operate from Pakistan, it is because WE HAVE PROVIDED EVIDENCE THAT CANNOT BE DENIED.``
http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/22tara.htm
Ferozk, QED. Check out any number of news articles in the Washington Post, NY Times, etc., and you will realize that the public relations campaign for Pakistan is OVER. India does not feel the need to convince Musharraf (for the same reason that I do not need to convince you of the obvious -- you know that official Pakistan supports JeM and LeT). India only needs to convince external powers that matter. Musharraf should see the writing on the wall. He would do well by staying ahead of events (ie do a turn-around on the `terrorists-are-useful-agents-for-executing-foreign-policy`) rather than wait before his hand his forced by ignominy.
``Pakistan cannot seek shelter under the guise of a freedom struggle in Kashmir,`` he (an un-named senior External Affairs Ministry official) said. ``If the US has acknowledged that the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed operate from Pakistan, it is because WE HAVE PROVIDED EVIDENCE THAT CANNOT BE DENIED.``
http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/22tara.htm
Ferozk, QED. Check out any number of news articles in the Washington Post, NY Times, etc., and you will realize that the public relations campaign for Pakistan is OVER. India does not feel the need to convince Musharraf (for the same reason that I do not need to convince you of the obvious -- you know that official Pakistan supports JeM and LeT). India only needs to convince external powers that matter. Musharraf should see the writing on the wall. He would do well by staying ahead of events (ie do a turn-around on the `terrorists-are-useful-agents-for-executing-foreign-policy`) rather than wait before his hand his forced by ignominy.
#292 Posted by shammi on December 22, 2001 1:00:54 pm
Re: Ferozk
``...Musharraf will undertake actions against these groups, because according to CNN he has promised the Chinese to help them fight the Chinese Muslim extermist groups...``
Have the Chinese provided any evidence to Islamabad? If not, then why ask for the obvious from India? It is far from certain that Pakistan groups are even involved in Sinkiang violence, yet Musharraf has offered his support. His doublespeak on violence directed towards India does not go unnoticed in this increasingly small and well-connected world. India may not be able to dictate a time-table to Musharraf, but other events will. It remains to be seen how long he will keep sprinting ahead of internal contradictions that are fast catching up. The war against Al-Qaeda seems to be increasingly focused on the NWFP, and not Somalia/Iraq. When the Americans leave, Musharraf will have some answering to do in Pakistan. CIAO:)
``...Musharraf will undertake actions against these groups, because according to CNN he has promised the Chinese to help them fight the Chinese Muslim extermist groups...``
Have the Chinese provided any evidence to Islamabad? If not, then why ask for the obvious from India? It is far from certain that Pakistan groups are even involved in Sinkiang violence, yet Musharraf has offered his support. His doublespeak on violence directed towards India does not go unnoticed in this increasingly small and well-connected world. India may not be able to dictate a time-table to Musharraf, but other events will. It remains to be seen how long he will keep sprinting ahead of internal contradictions that are fast catching up. The war against Al-Qaeda seems to be increasingly focused on the NWFP, and not Somalia/Iraq. When the Americans leave, Musharraf will have some answering to do in Pakistan. CIAO:)
#291 Posted by harimau on December 22, 2001 1:00:54 pm
Ref whooly-precious-you #: 293
[….so we now have mahathir giving lessons in democracy…somebody should ask anwar ibrahim what he thinks of that….]
Hey, hey, hey... Malaysia is YLH`s ideal Islamic democracy, so let us be careful what we say about Malaysia here.
[….so we now have mahathir giving lessons in democracy…somebody should ask anwar ibrahim what he thinks of that….]
Hey, hey, hey... Malaysia is YLH`s ideal Islamic democracy, so let us be careful what we say about Malaysia here.
#290 Posted by ferozk on December 22, 2001 9:36:10 am
Re: Narain
That was my point. It is time that evidence was presented, which would make it difficult for Pakistani government deny the obvivious.
There is no sense in denying an open secret, but the case for the evidence being presented in an open forum is two fold. One, it is to prove, and expose, to the Pakistani public the real face of these organizations and make them question their activities. Secondly, to allow Musharraf to move against them on the basis of his Pakistan First Policy by showing them as a threat to Pakistan`s long term stability.
The problem is that Kashmir is an emotional issue in Pakistan and it has to be tackled very carefully. Musharraf will undertake actions against these groups, because according to CNN he has promised the Chinese to help them fight the Chinese Muslim extermist groups. Musharraf cannot move against these groups on India`s time table, no matter how much New Delhi may threaten him to do.
Having said that, India should still present evidence, because it is a question of India`s word and realistically speaking, there exists a huge credibility gap between the two nations. Unless India gives and shares its evidence, the case against these two organizations will be considered in Pakistan as heresay only.
Re: Shammi
It is your case; any forum other than a trial by the media would be fine.
I was saying that, because India has refused a joint investigation. India says that Pakistani government cannot be trusted. The feeling in Pakistan about India is the same; India`s word cannot be trusted.
Ciao
That was my point. It is time that evidence was presented, which would make it difficult for Pakistani government deny the obvivious.
There is no sense in denying an open secret, but the case for the evidence being presented in an open forum is two fold. One, it is to prove, and expose, to the Pakistani public the real face of these organizations and make them question their activities. Secondly, to allow Musharraf to move against them on the basis of his Pakistan First Policy by showing them as a threat to Pakistan`s long term stability.
The problem is that Kashmir is an emotional issue in Pakistan and it has to be tackled very carefully. Musharraf will undertake actions against these groups, because according to CNN he has promised the Chinese to help them fight the Chinese Muslim extermist groups. Musharraf cannot move against these groups on India`s time table, no matter how much New Delhi may threaten him to do.
Having said that, India should still present evidence, because it is a question of India`s word and realistically speaking, there exists a huge credibility gap between the two nations. Unless India gives and shares its evidence, the case against these two organizations will be considered in Pakistan as heresay only.
Re: Shammi
It is your case; any forum other than a trial by the media would be fine.
I was saying that, because India has refused a joint investigation. India says that Pakistani government cannot be trusted. The feeling in Pakistan about India is the same; India`s word cannot be trusted.
Ciao
#289 Posted by ferozk on December 22, 2001 9:16:16 am
Re: Shammi
You said, ``Pakistan`s questioning of the evidence will destroy India`s political case...``
You said it brother! :)
Ciao
You said, ``Pakistan`s questioning of the evidence will destroy India`s political case...``
You said it brother! :)
Ciao
#288 Posted by nasah on December 22, 2001 12:37:33 am
Dear Shammi:
The column by Kristoff in New York Times and the one in Washington Post accusing Mr. Musharraf of ``temporising`` -- indicate that the crunch on Mr. Musharraf by US, UK nd the Europeans is on -- ban the two Jihadi organizations -- and avert war with India.
The indications are that Mr. Musharraf will comply in some form or other -- within a week or two.
Some heads are going to roll in Pakistan Army and its Intelligence services.
With the Americans as ``house guests`` -- firmly planted in Pakistan governmental household -- there are not very many ``family secrets`` and skeletons -- that can be kept hidden -- from the prying electronic eyes of the snooping ``guests``.
You are right -- Americans know it who did it -- hence the Washington Post -- and NYT columns -- as reminders to Mr. Musharraf -- it`s TIME to ACT and ACT soon -- before it`s too late.
The column by Kristoff in New York Times and the one in Washington Post accusing Mr. Musharraf of ``temporising`` -- indicate that the crunch on Mr. Musharraf by US, UK nd the Europeans is on -- ban the two Jihadi organizations -- and avert war with India.
The indications are that Mr. Musharraf will comply in some form or other -- within a week or two.
Some heads are going to roll in Pakistan Army and its Intelligence services.
With the Americans as ``house guests`` -- firmly planted in Pakistan governmental household -- there are not very many ``family secrets`` and skeletons -- that can be kept hidden -- from the prying electronic eyes of the snooping ``guests``.
You are right -- Americans know it who did it -- hence the Washington Post -- and NYT columns -- as reminders to Mr. Musharraf -- it`s TIME to ACT and ACT soon -- before it`s too late.
#287 Posted by nasah on December 22, 2001 12:37:33 am
Famed Kashmiri poet - Agha Shahid Ali passed away last week in New York -- after a long illness with terminal cancer -- at the young age of 52.
1949 -- 2001
May his anguished soul rest in peace -- and may his beloved paradise on earth -- find peace and tranquility -- in 2002.
Our heart felt condolence and prayers for his family in Kashmir and in New York.
1949 -- 2001
May his anguished soul rest in peace -- and may his beloved paradise on earth -- find peace and tranquility -- in 2002.
Our heart felt condolence and prayers for his family in Kashmir and in New York.
#286 Posted by mohajir on December 22, 2001 12:37:33 am
In Kabul Indians get a bear hug
Agencies/Kabul
Kabul is one place today where an Indian visitor is glad to flaunt his nationality and Pakistanis would hate to be in.
Whether it is government offices or public places, Indians are greeted warmly, sometimes even with a bear hug, by smiling Afghans.
At the Foreign Ministry, the uniformed male receptionist wanted to see the equipment carried by a group of Indian journalists. ``Indians? Indians?`` he asked on being told of their identity. ``No Pakistanis, okay, please go,`` he said, directing the group to the Press office with a back slap and a smile.
``This is one place we are glad to be an Indian,`` commented a scribe. It is not journalists alone who are being greeted with such warmth.
A group of five doctors who have been here for the last three weeks as part of India`s relief effort and have been working at the Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health, set up with Indian aid in the late 1960s, said they had been overwhelmed by the goodwill and affection shown by parents of their patients.
``Many of them remembered names of Indian doctors who had worked at the hospital before and asked about their welfare,`` A R Basu, a surgeon, said.
The Indian doctors are held in such high regard that often parents come to them with prescriptions given by Afghan doctors. ``But because of professional ethics we try to avoid seeing them,`` said B C Nambiar, an anesthetist.
Hindi film music can be heard in street corners and in taxis, and the only two functioning cinema halls here are screening Bollywood movies. Pirated video cassettes of recent Bollywood releases like the Amitabh Bachchan starrer ``Mohabbatein,`` smuggled in through Pakistan, are available in the markets. If the Afghans are effusive towards Indians, their anger against Pakistanis too is vented loudly. They say the Taliban cadres were largely composed of Pakistanis.
``They raped our country. We hate them,`` said Sanjar, a second-year medical student. ``When they were fleeing after the American bombing started, I asked them why they came. They said they came for jehad since we were not firm in our Islamic belief. I told them to go on to do that in their own country.`` ``Why doesn`t India go to war with Pakistan?`` asked Zia, a taxi driver. ``We don`t want the Taliban to come back.``
Ahmed Wali Masood, Afghan ambassador to Britain and brother of the late Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Masood, had this to say: ``We don`t want help from our neighbours like Pakistan. We have paid a heavy price for that. We want help from India, the US and Britain.``
Agencies/Kabul
Kabul is one place today where an Indian visitor is glad to flaunt his nationality and Pakistanis would hate to be in.
Whether it is government offices or public places, Indians are greeted warmly, sometimes even with a bear hug, by smiling Afghans.
At the Foreign Ministry, the uniformed male receptionist wanted to see the equipment carried by a group of Indian journalists. ``Indians? Indians?`` he asked on being told of their identity. ``No Pakistanis, okay, please go,`` he said, directing the group to the Press office with a back slap and a smile.
``This is one place we are glad to be an Indian,`` commented a scribe. It is not journalists alone who are being greeted with such warmth.
A group of five doctors who have been here for the last three weeks as part of India`s relief effort and have been working at the Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health, set up with Indian aid in the late 1960s, said they had been overwhelmed by the goodwill and affection shown by parents of their patients.
``Many of them remembered names of Indian doctors who had worked at the hospital before and asked about their welfare,`` A R Basu, a surgeon, said.
The Indian doctors are held in such high regard that often parents come to them with prescriptions given by Afghan doctors. ``But because of professional ethics we try to avoid seeing them,`` said B C Nambiar, an anesthetist.
Hindi film music can be heard in street corners and in taxis, and the only two functioning cinema halls here are screening Bollywood movies. Pirated video cassettes of recent Bollywood releases like the Amitabh Bachchan starrer ``Mohabbatein,`` smuggled in through Pakistan, are available in the markets. If the Afghans are effusive towards Indians, their anger against Pakistanis too is vented loudly. They say the Taliban cadres were largely composed of Pakistanis.
``They raped our country. We hate them,`` said Sanjar, a second-year medical student. ``When they were fleeing after the American bombing started, I asked them why they came. They said they came for jehad since we were not firm in our Islamic belief. I told them to go on to do that in their own country.`` ``Why doesn`t India go to war with Pakistan?`` asked Zia, a taxi driver. ``We don`t want the Taliban to come back.``
Ahmed Wali Masood, Afghan ambassador to Britain and brother of the late Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Masood, had this to say: ``We don`t want help from our neighbours like Pakistan. We have paid a heavy price for that. We want help from India, the US and Britain.``
#285 Posted by shammi on December 21, 2001 4:08:40 pm
``…In case of 9-11, the United States did share its evidence of OBL`s crime with Pakistan; granted Pakistan had no choice, but the United States DID share the evidence. If India share the evidence with the world, it will only increase India`s moral standing in the war against terrorism...It makes no sense why India is so adamnt and refuses from sharing its evidence with world. Logic would suggest that it could only help the Indian cause and not hurt it…``
Ok - I am back from the meeting. It was boring. Glad to back for some fun stuff. So, here goes:
It was easier for the US to share its evidence because the asymmetry in Pak national power and US is very large. Pakistan was in no position to challenge the US evidence - doing so would have been suicidal. Indo-Pak asymmetry is smaller. Further, Pakistan does not carry the same misgivings when it comes to relations with the West like it does with India, and has few qualms agreeing with the West on Afghanistan/Taleban, unlike with India over Kashmir. Pakistan CAN challenge India, and both sides know it. There is the added problem of Kashmir, on which the twain shall never meet. Thus, since the two sides disagree on virtually everything, chances are that they would disagree even if the evidence were conclusive. From the Indian perspective, since India is convinced that Pakistan WAS behind the attack, and indeed other similar incidents elsewhere, no amount of evidence is going to change the mind of the Pakistani military. Thus, the risk for India in this situation is very high. Pakistan`s questioning of the evidence will destroy India`s political case, and India can ill afford it at this juncture. Maj. Gen. Qureshi`s remarks also sapped Indian confidence in the Pakistan government`s ability to be objective. Thus, India is sharing the evidence (to, as you say it, to `increase its moral standing`) with Western allies whom she deems more even-handed, but not with Pakistan.
Ok - I am back from the meeting. It was boring. Glad to back for some fun stuff. So, here goes:
It was easier for the US to share its evidence because the asymmetry in Pak national power and US is very large. Pakistan was in no position to challenge the US evidence - doing so would have been suicidal. Indo-Pak asymmetry is smaller. Further, Pakistan does not carry the same misgivings when it comes to relations with the West like it does with India, and has few qualms agreeing with the West on Afghanistan/Taleban, unlike with India over Kashmir. Pakistan CAN challenge India, and both sides know it. There is the added problem of Kashmir, on which the twain shall never meet. Thus, since the two sides disagree on virtually everything, chances are that they would disagree even if the evidence were conclusive. From the Indian perspective, since India is convinced that Pakistan WAS behind the attack, and indeed other similar incidents elsewhere, no amount of evidence is going to change the mind of the Pakistani military. Thus, the risk for India in this situation is very high. Pakistan`s questioning of the evidence will destroy India`s political case, and India can ill afford it at this juncture. Maj. Gen. Qureshi`s remarks also sapped Indian confidence in the Pakistan government`s ability to be objective. Thus, India is sharing the evidence (to, as you say it, to `increase its moral standing`) with Western allies whom she deems more even-handed, but not with Pakistan.
#284 Posted by nasah on December 21, 2001 2:22:16 pm
Dear SaeerJB:
re#266 #286
Here is another one from NYT:
December 21, 2001
Our Friends the Terrorists
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
Just to puncture our hypocrisy for a moment: We`ve been battling terrorism by bolstering backers of terrorism in Pakistan.
Pakistan, our new ally in the war on terrorism, has a long history of supporting indiscriminate attacks in India and especially Kashmir.
The latest, headline-grabbing attack was the assault on the Parliament building in New Delhi that now threatens war between two nuclear powers, but many thousands of civilians have been killed over the years by Pakistani-financed terrorist organizations.
All in all, Pakistan`s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, or I.S.I., is responsible for many more killings than Osama bin Laden.
But however hypocritical it may be to bolster one government that harbors terrorists while overthrowing another, there is no good alternative.
The Bush administration is exactly right to be simultaneously supporting Gen. Pervez Musharraf and twisting his arm to fight terrorism, for he may be Pakistan`s last hope to rescue his country.
Pakistan today is not only a catastrophe for Pakistanis but a threat to the entire region. Its economy is quasi-feudal, some 55 percent of adults are illiterate and more than 10 percent of children die by the age of 5. Pakistan now has more drug addicts than college graduates.
In the last 20 years public schooling has been partly replaced by madrasas that preach extremism, the pursuit of nuclear weapons has isolated the government, and foolish policies have crippled the economy.
The I.S.I.`s installation of the Taliban in Afghanistan has backfired, and now there is a risk of the ``Talibanization`` of Pakistan, as religious extremists return from their ``crusades`` in Afghanistan and Pashtuns perhaps revive their quest for an independent ``Pashtunistan.``
In Pakistan earlier this month, I flinched whenever I read the newspapers.
Guerrillas in Kashmir were ``freedom-fighters`` if they lived, ``martyrs`` if they died.
And on The Nation`s editorial page appeared this rant: ``The Christian world has not accepted us [Muslims] as human beings even. These nations are determined to exterminate the Muslims.``
General Musharraf is in charge of this morass, and — under strong pressure from President Bush, and less visible nudging from China — he has acted decisively to pull his country toward reality.
He ousted the head of the I.S.I., permitted the entry of U.S. troops to oust the Taliban, and sent troops for the first time into tribal areas to capture Taliban escapees.
He has moved to sideline the religious fanatics, close the extremist madrasas and deport foreign religious students.
Next he must clamp down on the Kashmiri fighters.
Over the last two years General Musharraf has shown himself capable of brutally tough decisions, and there is some reason to think that he can regain control of the I.S.I. (which may have run the latest Indian attack as a rogue operation), cut off state support for Kashmiri terrorists, nurture a growing market economy — and prepare for democratic elections.(a tall order indeed)
The religious parties get less than 5 percent of the vote in Pakistan, and so democracy can delegitimize extremism as well.
When I first traveled around Pakistan as a student backpacker two decades ago, I sneaked into closed tribal areas and visited a village that was a center for heroin and gun-running.
One gunsmith tried to sell me a pen that could not only write but also shoot a .22 bullet out the end.Not even a Palm Pilot can do that, and it was only $7!
This incredibly nifty gadget enthralled me as a symbol of Pakistani ingenuity — and it`s also apt because Pakistan has squandered its considerable potential and excelled far more at things destructive than constructive.
_________________________________________________
Now Pakistan is at a moment of maximum danger, threatened by the instability caused by returning Taliban fighters on the west and by the risk of war with India on the east.
Similarly, it was at a time when India was near economic collapse, in the summer of 1991, that New Delhi moved decisively toward a path of economic reform — and toward more sensible domestic and international policies across the board.
Pakistan, after so many wrong turns in its history, has tentatively taken a right one in the last few months.
Now it must build on that by clamping down on its own terrorists.
And, whatever the stench of blood in Islamabad, we Americans must hold our noses and do all we can to help General Musharraf hold his course. (NYT)
__________________________________________________
And that may go for India as well— the Indians ``must hold their noses and do all they can to help General Musharraf hold his course.``
re#266 #286
Here is another one from NYT:
December 21, 2001
Our Friends the Terrorists
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
Just to puncture our hypocrisy for a moment: We`ve been battling terrorism by bolstering backers of terrorism in Pakistan.
Pakistan, our new ally in the war on terrorism, has a long history of supporting indiscriminate attacks in India and especially Kashmir.
The latest, headline-grabbing attack was the assault on the Parliament building in New Delhi that now threatens war between two nuclear powers, but many thousands of civilians have been killed over the years by Pakistani-financed terrorist organizations.
All in all, Pakistan`s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, or I.S.I., is responsible for many more killings than Osama bin Laden.
But however hypocritical it may be to bolster one government that harbors terrorists while overthrowing another, there is no good alternative.
The Bush administration is exactly right to be simultaneously supporting Gen. Pervez Musharraf and twisting his arm to fight terrorism, for he may be Pakistan`s last hope to rescue his country.
Pakistan today is not only a catastrophe for Pakistanis but a threat to the entire region. Its economy is quasi-feudal, some 55 percent of adults are illiterate and more than 10 percent of children die by the age of 5. Pakistan now has more drug addicts than college graduates.
In the last 20 years public schooling has been partly replaced by madrasas that preach extremism, the pursuit of nuclear weapons has isolated the government, and foolish policies have crippled the economy.
The I.S.I.`s installation of the Taliban in Afghanistan has backfired, and now there is a risk of the ``Talibanization`` of Pakistan, as religious extremists return from their ``crusades`` in Afghanistan and Pashtuns perhaps revive their quest for an independent ``Pashtunistan.``
In Pakistan earlier this month, I flinched whenever I read the newspapers.
Guerrillas in Kashmir were ``freedom-fighters`` if they lived, ``martyrs`` if they died.
And on The Nation`s editorial page appeared this rant: ``The Christian world has not accepted us [Muslims] as human beings even. These nations are determined to exterminate the Muslims.``
General Musharraf is in charge of this morass, and — under strong pressure from President Bush, and less visible nudging from China — he has acted decisively to pull his country toward reality.
He ousted the head of the I.S.I., permitted the entry of U.S. troops to oust the Taliban, and sent troops for the first time into tribal areas to capture Taliban escapees.
He has moved to sideline the religious fanatics, close the extremist madrasas and deport foreign religious students.
Next he must clamp down on the Kashmiri fighters.
Over the last two years General Musharraf has shown himself capable of brutally tough decisions, and there is some reason to think that he can regain control of the I.S.I. (which may have run the latest Indian attack as a rogue operation), cut off state support for Kashmiri terrorists, nurture a growing market economy — and prepare for democratic elections.(a tall order indeed)
The religious parties get less than 5 percent of the vote in Pakistan, and so democracy can delegitimize extremism as well.
When I first traveled around Pakistan as a student backpacker two decades ago, I sneaked into closed tribal areas and visited a village that was a center for heroin and gun-running.
One gunsmith tried to sell me a pen that could not only write but also shoot a .22 bullet out the end.Not even a Palm Pilot can do that, and it was only $7!
This incredibly nifty gadget enthralled me as a symbol of Pakistani ingenuity — and it`s also apt because Pakistan has squandered its considerable potential and excelled far more at things destructive than constructive.
_________________________________________________
Now Pakistan is at a moment of maximum danger, threatened by the instability caused by returning Taliban fighters on the west and by the risk of war with India on the east.
Similarly, it was at a time when India was near economic collapse, in the summer of 1991, that New Delhi moved decisively toward a path of economic reform — and toward more sensible domestic and international policies across the board.
Pakistan, after so many wrong turns in its history, has tentatively taken a right one in the last few months.
Now it must build on that by clamping down on its own terrorists.
And, whatever the stench of blood in Islamabad, we Americans must hold our noses and do all we can to help General Musharraf hold his course. (NYT)
__________________________________________________
And that may go for India as well— the Indians ``must hold their noses and do all they can to help General Musharraf hold his course.``
#283 Posted by narain on December 21, 2001 2:22:16 pm
ref: Ferozek
Dear Feroze,
Can Pakistan deny:
1. That the LeT and the JeM both operate from Pakistani terriotery? That their leaders live there, collect funds there, and have their offices there?
2. That the LeT and the JeM have at the very minimum tacit support from the Pakistani government in conducting their affairs? That the government has placed no limitations on their operations?
3. That the JeM claimed responsibility for attacking the J&K state assembly initially? That even if we give them both the benefit regarding their actual involvement, both the LeT and the Jem have clearly stated their intentions to attack Indians, civilians or otherwise, everywhere, and are therefore a terrorist threat to India?
If Pakistan cannot deny the above, then the Pakistani govt. is as complicit in their actions as the Taliban were in the operations of Al-Quaeda.
AS for evidence, rest assured that India will try and get the maximum mileage from it. Even now the evidence is being presented to countries in the anti-terrorist coalition. As for Pakistan, I am not sure what the use is of presenting evidence to a government which one, already knows the truth, and two, definitely does not want to see it.
-narain
Dear Feroze,
Can Pakistan deny:
1. That the LeT and the JeM both operate from Pakistani terriotery? That their leaders live there, collect funds there, and have their offices there?
2. That the LeT and the JeM have at the very minimum tacit support from the Pakistani government in conducting their affairs? That the government has placed no limitations on their operations?
3. That the JeM claimed responsibility for attacking the J&K state assembly initially? That even if we give them both the benefit regarding their actual involvement, both the LeT and the Jem have clearly stated their intentions to attack Indians, civilians or otherwise, everywhere, and are therefore a terrorist threat to India?
If Pakistan cannot deny the above, then the Pakistani govt. is as complicit in their actions as the Taliban were in the operations of Al-Quaeda.
AS for evidence, rest assured that India will try and get the maximum mileage from it. Even now the evidence is being presented to countries in the anti-terrorist coalition. As for Pakistan, I am not sure what the use is of presenting evidence to a government which one, already knows the truth, and two, definitely does not want to see it.
-narain
#282 Posted by concerned on December 21, 2001 1:43:16 pm
shammi,
[...the US State Dept. today included the JeM and the LeT on its list of foreign terrorist organizations...]
i don`t see any such news in the media.
[...the US State Dept. today included the JeM and the LeT on its list of foreign terrorist organizations...]
i don`t see any such news in the media.
#281 Posted by shammi on December 21, 2001 12:52:04 pm
Re: Ferozk
``… Bring this man before the world and let it ask the question as to who really did it…``
Please be specific when you say `the world`. Do you mean the media? Or do you mean the UN Court of Criminal Justice (?) Or do you mean an international criminal tribunal? Please note that even in the case of the 2 Libyans tried for bombing Panam 103, they were tried by a SCOTTISH court (not any `world` court) albeit outside Scotland. At no time was any evidence shared with the Libyans outside of the court.
``…and if India is a democracy, as it claims, then it should give Pakistan the chance to question this person before it unilaterally condemns Pakistan…``
You mean cross-examination by the defence? Sure, but then do you also not unwittingly concede that Pakistan is really not on the same side as India when it makes claims for a `joint-inquiry`? I think that when the DG ISPR Maj. Gen. Qureshi made the blithe comment that `India staged the attack` it dispelled any notions that the military junta would be an objective participant in a `joint-inquiry`. However, reality is fast catching up with the General. India HAS been sharing evidence with several Western countries. On the weight of such evidence, the US State Dept. today included the JeM and the LeT on its list of foreign terrorist organizations. This is one of many salvoes across Pakistan`s bows. So now, it is not just India that Musharraf has to placate, it must placate the US too. The US has suddenly, but predictably raised the stakes for Musharraf. It would have been far better for Musharraf to have taken action against JeM and LeT himself on his own initiative, and therefore earn the respect of the US and India, but by letting external events dictate a course of action to him (first in Afghanistan and now in India), the General has not only earned the hostility internally (from his would-be rival officers/successors) but also externally. External friends would have bolstered his support against any internal rivals. Unfortunately for him, he picked a wrong fight...More later...gotta run for a meeting:)
``… Bring this man before the world and let it ask the question as to who really did it…``
Please be specific when you say `the world`. Do you mean the media? Or do you mean the UN Court of Criminal Justice (?) Or do you mean an international criminal tribunal? Please note that even in the case of the 2 Libyans tried for bombing Panam 103, they were tried by a SCOTTISH court (not any `world` court) albeit outside Scotland. At no time was any evidence shared with the Libyans outside of the court.
``…and if India is a democracy, as it claims, then it should give Pakistan the chance to question this person before it unilaterally condemns Pakistan…``
You mean cross-examination by the defence? Sure, but then do you also not unwittingly concede that Pakistan is really not on the same side as India when it makes claims for a `joint-inquiry`? I think that when the DG ISPR Maj. Gen. Qureshi made the blithe comment that `India staged the attack` it dispelled any notions that the military junta would be an objective participant in a `joint-inquiry`. However, reality is fast catching up with the General. India HAS been sharing evidence with several Western countries. On the weight of such evidence, the US State Dept. today included the JeM and the LeT on its list of foreign terrorist organizations. This is one of many salvoes across Pakistan`s bows. So now, it is not just India that Musharraf has to placate, it must placate the US too. The US has suddenly, but predictably raised the stakes for Musharraf. It would have been far better for Musharraf to have taken action against JeM and LeT himself on his own initiative, and therefore earn the respect of the US and India, but by letting external events dictate a course of action to him (first in Afghanistan and now in India), the General has not only earned the hostility internally (from his would-be rival officers/successors) but also externally. External friends would have bolstered his support against any internal rivals. Unfortunately for him, he picked a wrong fight...More later...gotta run for a meeting:)
#280 Posted by shammi on December 21, 2001 12:52:04 pm
Stuka:
Here is another tidbit from the NY Times which shows that the recent joint US-Pak investigation into the activities of the 2 top nuclear scientists suspected of links with OBL has FAILED with Pakistan refusing cooperation. Given this failure, does it not raise questions about the integrity of any joint Indo-Pak investigations into the activities of JeM and LeT over the Parliament attack? Still in giving the benefit of the doubt to the General?
``Today, it became clear the effort (sharing information and seeking common ground) had failed. Just last weekend, the son of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, twice arrested in the case with the other nuclear scientist, Chaudry Abdul Majeed, said both men had been released and declared innocent. Today, diplomats speculated that General Musharraf had decided, in releasing the two scientists, to send a signal that Pakistan was drawing a ``line in the sand`` of its own...``
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/21/international/21MUSH.html
Here is another tidbit from the NY Times which shows that the recent joint US-Pak investigation into the activities of the 2 top nuclear scientists suspected of links with OBL has FAILED with Pakistan refusing cooperation. Given this failure, does it not raise questions about the integrity of any joint Indo-Pak investigations into the activities of JeM and LeT over the Parliament attack? Still in giving the benefit of the doubt to the General?
``Today, it became clear the effort (sharing information and seeking common ground) had failed. Just last weekend, the son of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, twice arrested in the case with the other nuclear scientist, Chaudry Abdul Majeed, said both men had been released and declared innocent. Today, diplomats speculated that General Musharraf had decided, in releasing the two scientists, to send a signal that Pakistan was drawing a ``line in the sand`` of its own...``
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/21/international/21MUSH.html
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