Can Science Survive?

#27: Tahemd32

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And this maturity of human society is no doubt the result of scientific progress. If there had been no Age of Reason in 17th Europe, there would have been no Bill of Rights in 19th century England or the US.
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Agreed.

Also through the knowledge of Islam ‘baby girls’ are being stopped killed in Arab peninsula, black Bilal got equal right to an white Arab, women got equal right, race/look/tribe prides are disallowed, people in Indian subcontinent and other parts of the world learned about a new social system that does not divide people into sects and makes clay god. People are taught via Quran not to be feared by any body pretending as God or God alike, people are assured that justice will be provided in due time for people who were wronged. Mostly, people will be held countable for their action and their faith. These are the words and believes that sooths one’s heart from a book name ‘Quran’ where man’s inventive ideas/words/philosophy, however well intended is not there.

“All men are created equal” may have learned by American in 17th century, but long before that, people from time to time are taught, “insaan (not men only and muslim, non-muslim alike) are equal regardless of race, color, nation” through various known, un-known prophets and good people.

Should a nation or group of people take credit of what equality and justice is or their standard is a way to measure other society or other nations progress. Are we confident that man-made rules however matured, educated, well intentioned will bring a system through which no wrong will be done. Is there any guarantee of such? By any means do we even understand ‘reasons’, ‘logics’ of one’s own short existence in this universe? Can we simply use science and logic and whatever maturity we may have collectively to pretend that we are advancing. Are we sure people who lived before us are not matured as we are, or are we matured enough comparing to people of 30th century.

Did people learn from WWII (or other wars) that mass killing is not good? Once Americans looked as a benevolent nation, now nations those do not think so anymore, are wrong. Turkey that shouted keeping beard and not wearing hizab are the example of how a muslim nation should progress. Did Roman think ‘that’s it, we ARE the civilization’? Is science, logic, reasoning, maturity, education will guarantee that democratic country with power wouldn’t go bizaark or would stand for justice all the time. If so, should I take Palestinian and Kashmiris are stupid people with stupid religion, which is the reason for not having the ability to be technically superior, hence brought misery by their own. Therefore switching or trying to achieve those technology is a prove that “Islam’ don’t work”.

I certainly do not want to sound like Rumsfield of “known known, known unknown……unknown known”.

There is a tendency of providing credit of ‘goods’ to certain nation, group, race or time, as if that is the only or correct process exist, via by passing an admittance of

“However I am educated, knowledgeable, matured with goods, means, wealth, I or we can only try our best to do best, but ultimate logic, reason, correctness is by no means in our control simply because I believe in God and there is an after life”
-Off course from a believer’s point of view.

I enjoy science, engineering and many other logical things where we brainstorm to come up with fancy, useful, un-useful, good, bad ideas. But as a believer (as a Muslim) I am puzzled when I see “will Islam survive” type-brainstorming topics go sky high crediting almost anything possible of all the grandeur of universe, but when Islam and God is mentioned in plain term, it is not ‘cool’ anymore, or some what backdated or inviting to a self portray of hate mongering stupid Muslim.

shobuz #24 Agreed that science has all too often been used for destructive purposes. But those destructive purposes are not the result of scientific progress, but of primitive impulses residing deep inside the reptilian portion of our brain (the amygdala among other places, if i may be specific).

But then: human societies have increasingly matured to a point where they can render our reptilian instincts ineffective. This is done through the rule of law. Thus, it has been increasingly for the past few decades that democracies dont go to war with one another (since checks and balances negate the aggressive behavior of individuals). Thus: in pakistan the mullah is a menace to society. In the US, their ``mullahs`` (christian fundamentalists) are reduced to yakking on TVs where they are treated as clowns by the rest of society, or trying to slip in an odd mullahism in cartoon strips (as Hart did recently in the comic strip BC and got his rear end shot to pieces by columnists and others).

And this maturity of human society is no doubt the result of scientific progress. If there had been no Age of Reason in 17th Europe, there would have been no Bill of Rights in 19th century England or the US.

And it is this very Age of Reason that the mullahs have fought hard against in muslim societies through the ages, so far quite successfully I think. (and not just the Naqshbandis of the muslim world, but seemingly sensible people who will cook up conspiracy theories out of thin air at a moment`s notice).

I agree that we need balance to science. But the balance that you talk about is best represented by the Romantic revolution of the late 18th early 19th century Europe. Not by religious obscurantism of the kind that did Galileo in in Europe or which hounded Ibn Sina throughout his life (Ibn Sina was seen more than once heading out of town with a horde of mullahs in hot pursuit) and of which our resident man worshipper naqshbandi talks proudly of.

fountainheader #17: ``hey, i respect your beliefs. go on deluding yourself by believing in god``. why is this?````

The answer is quite simple. People have an extreme fear of the unknown. And death is the biggest unknown in the world. Until science can prove what happens after death (or doesn`t happen), those arguing for removal of religion will always be fighting a losing battle.

And so far, other than a self-righteous opinion of themselves, I have yet to see any of the, ``Rationalists`` provide any answers about the above. Usually their arguments are based on calling anyone who doesn`t, ``see the light`` like they do, ignorant and misguided. In a sense this is a the non-relgious equivalent of calling someone a, ``kafir.``

I personally think finding the answer to what happens after the death, and the answer to the basis of creation, i.e. who created the very first creation, is beyond the mental capabilities of human beings. In that sense, both the religious and non-religious ``Rationalists`` are offering nothing but opinions. Just like there is no way anyone can be sure, whether their view of life after death is correct, similarly, until someone provides a scientific reasoning for the creation of beings, one cannot say with any certainity that those following a religion are wrong, either.

This is probably why people have hedged their bets. They have favored the religious argument, because at least it provides some sort of an answer to their questions; even if the answers are non-scientific, in many cases. While the non-religionists have yet to be able to provide any sort of a scientific answer to these questions. Since the later bases its views purely on science, until it can provide a scientific answer, it will generally be disregarded and its arguments will rarely get much popularity.

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..........it pains me to see grown men talk so seriously about cause and effect .......... here, let`s do a simple experiment : walk out to the edge of the freeway, say a little prayer to al-lah, and step out into the traffic ......... if you don`t get hit by a car then we can be sure that there is there is no relationship between stupidity and being hit by a car, and that it all depends on which side of the bed allah woke up on ........

......... and from what little i know about mr ghazzali it is quite evident that the man was a bonafide idiot - anyone who believes in spontaneous combustion deserves to be burned at the stake ..........see if al-lah intervenes to save him!........... we all know that in ancient times people believed in a lot of silly things - there are graves of people 27 feet tall all over pakistan ( ``nau-gaza`` peers) - but only madmen would perpetuate these myths in this day and age .......... what really scares the heck out of me is that people actually name there kids after ghazzali and iqbal - but then we have to remember that these are the same people who name their kids osama.............

......... and then there is naqshbandi

#10 by Naqshbandi on December 2, 2003 5:44pm PT

I think SameerJB, Hameedm 12345 or whatever the number is , won hands (pants if is a right word) down.

What do you have sir. EH?

Woman according to your religion ....I do not know (Starts with Gaza.. some one lwho has lots of problem with the word starting S and ends with X...How many problems I do not know). According to him a woman according Islam is a double digit sinner, no matter what she does. Born sinner.. dies sinner. Will give ALL the URLs if you want. Gazalli or who so ever.

But I know you are smarter than that. You will not ask for it. Its all there anyway.

Your Prophet married a woman who was a business woman. She was conducting it before your...Oh well. Do you have guts to say your prophet was.. wrong?? Marrying a business woman. Boy o boy. She actually might have taken interviews of Males and decided .... May be she actually showd her face...Talked to a male.... Sinner o sinner. And your Prophet actually married her???

Let me tell you and URS... (also FV , but she is an Indian)

After you ``realised`` (and so did you and yor Gaza.. or something.)..No business for woman in Macca and Madina. Your prophet was aok with it.

That is progress. That is where Sameerjb and Hameed (what was the number 1? 2? 3?) scores.

I do sometimes or OK do not sometimetimes hate Tahmed 123 or whatever...But I did railed against him once. I do read and love Jay once in a while (Ts eternal love :)). But T, 123 or whatever, never refuted. He actually was the only one who replied.

You will never. Will FV write one single sentence why in Islamic woman ...well... She will always write against Bongos....

Go and bask with urstruely. Those who spit on thalee that feeds them are Truely....

May be T is the one more Islamic (human) than you think. May be Sameerjb or Hamid 100/200 (what is your number??) are saying something you are missing....


Nashq saab

The movement you take out the liberty to question ``WHY`` for every simple or complex thing, including your ``book``.... Well to start with you have loose respect... next you are fanatic.... next you prove a theory Islam is about terrorism.

My way or Highway is your style. You have the gun. Shoot.

Yogiraj

Those nations through its scientific research gains the ability to make ‘parking lot’ of other nation are often mentioned as an exemplary model of what science can achieve to mankind. Mullahs are not only responsible for not marching with science. If that would be the case then nation without mullahs (many African nations) would have scientific progress. Sure you can measure a nation, race through its scientific achievement, but should it be THE way to call names.

Chinese invented gunpowder and used primarily for fun, where West accelerated its usefulness as bullets. Invention of Airplane took a slow pace, but when need for kill came we have F-16 today. Finding atomic structure was great, but A B came on board when mass killing required. Internet itself was invented solely for army’s use. Many inventions that make some nation ‘scientifically strong’ were based on ‘me no go front, but kill many fast & feel brave’. Many uses of modern technology are primarily for dominating other nation. It is quiet understandable why people need technology to claim themselves as ‘advanced people’.

But could there be people who are not disagreeing with any scientific achievement and its usefulness or need to have it, but rather simply pass their life with what they have as generation-to-generation lived (like Amish people in PA). Could it be possible that some people with faith or without faith may not get excited of scientific achievement, specially to those achievement where one need the urge to kill other. Could it be possible like the Native Indians of S America always thought material belongs to every one to share and Spaniards thought it was stupid? Or like the Red-Indians who did not understood the logic of owing land. These people are gone today via the scientific means of West.

There is no quarrel of scientific achievement; only an alternate way of looking, that may be there are other means to measure people/society without looking through scientific prism.

After all, people ‘believing after life’ believes that calling other stupid, naïve, backward via measuring their scientific achievement is certainly not a criteria to enter the next world. AB, fast car, fast plane, modern convenience all are fun and great, but still these are not what I will be measured by. Beside, who knows what I may find out there, where all that ‘earthly grandeur scientific achievement’ may appear insignificant comparing to what I may experience there.

Re: Hamidm #6

Unfortunately, I am not as sanguine as you about science/rationality`s ability to survive the onslaught of the unenlightened hordes. By definition, most people are pretty much average and the average is pretty low. Therefore, stupidity will win out each time. Just look at the US: how many people believe in angels? Talk to God every day? Ask themselves WWJD? Believe that Jesus is personally looking out for them? Etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.

And this is in a country where they try to keep God and the Church out of the schoolroom! Why is it surprising that in a country where they ram Allah down everyone`s throat, from KG to BA and every other minute on TV, our people (those who can read and write and those who can`t) have addled brains and concussions from banging their heads on the floor five times a day and hallucinations from fasting in the middle of summer? (This ramzan being an exception!)

As far as I am concerned, anyone who insists on a public profession of their faith should be hunted down in the streets. Same for anyone who insists on public accomodation for their particular brand of superstition, whether it is time off for prayers or kosher food being served in the cafeteria. But I fear that the rationalists are fighting a losing battle against the forces of ignorance. As that French philosopher said, ``God is dead, Marx is dead and I am not feeling too well myself.``

Yo Gill sahib, nice one! I`m always waiting for your articles. :-)

Can Science Survive?

Ofcourse it will! As someone has already made clear how dependent even the strictest of mullahs are on scientific advancements, the fact that science is and will remain a very important part of every muslim, christian, jewish, hindu populace of the world is undeniable. The, the strict religionist mullahs moulanas drive around posh neighborhoods in large expensive cars and fancy mobile phones flashing near their ears, they try to follow all sorts of latest trends which inculde buying the best Levis jeans in town, going to the most talked of restraunt and fast food outlet and things like that. The point is that everyone from every category is following a single path yet a certain hypocrite group within each category apparently wants to cloak its association with and practise of moderenity! Maybe they are too ashamed to admit their hypocrisy, and coerce others to follow them without making everyone realize their true selves. This is the true evil that should be rooted out from a nation and not the evil which mullahs associate with atheism, rationality and freethinking.

Atheism? Atheists, in my opinion, are THE biggest losers if they are willing and happy to call themselves atheists. Hypocrisy comes in all colors, shapes and sizes... and the number of atheists, moualanas, scientists and others within the circle of evil is large! If someone really wants to be a freethinker and believes in Causality then why should he as a reasonable rational person associate him with a group and put an end to his creativity of thought as soon as he enters the door of his supposed freedom?

The Holy Qur`an is said to have explanations of all new scientific breakthroughs and amazing new discoveries... through indirect words ofcourse. And this is the concept that religiously inclined scientists and researchers strictly adhere to that all that is discovered and will be discovered is due to the will of the Almighty Allah, and the complexity within each and every particle, atom, molecule or superstring is evident of His greatness. None of them would dare say that every event solely depends upon divine intervention, and that all other scientific explanation is nonsense. Thus it is quite clear from this scientific evolution that eventually the future would have more of science and lesser hypocrisy! I do not say `less of religion` because it is here to stay, and it is indeed necessary.

Against the strict determinism of Naqshabandi

Few passages in Arabic philosophy have attracted as much attention as al-Ghazâlî`s discussion of causality in the seventeenth discussion of Tahâfut al-Falâsifa, along with the response of Ibn Rushd (Averroës) in his Tahâfut al-Tahâfut. A question which has been addressed several times is to what extent al-Ghazâlî can be called an occasionalist: whether he here follows other Kalâm thinkers in restricting causal agency to God alone. (1) What has not been addressed in studies of this text is a question which al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd both see as decisive in the seventeenth discussion: what theory of causality is sufficient to explain human knowledge? (2) In this paper I will show that al-Ghazâlî`s and Ibn Rushd`s theories of causality are closely related to their epistemologies. The difference between the two thinkers can be quickly summed up by saying that for Ibn Rushd the paradigm of human knowledge is demonstrative science, whereas for al-Ghazâlî the paradigm of human knowledge is, or at least includes, revelation. In closing I will suggest that al-Ghazâlî`s commitment to this paradigm sheds light on the guiding intent of his critique of philosophy in the Tahâfut.

But before turning to the epistemic aspect of the seventeenth discussion, let me say briefly what I take to be al-Ghazâlî`s basic position on causality. As others have noted, his critique here imputes a very strong notion of causality to the philosophers: namely that given the existence of a cause, the existence of its effect is necessary. (3) Al-Ghazâlî holds that, on such a notion of causality, only God is a cause. This is because, given the existence of miracles, and accepting the proposition that God can do anything, no cause other than God can necessitate its effect. It is always possible that God might will the expected effect not to proceed, or will an entirely different effect to proceed. Al-Ghazâlî defends this view against both philosophers who claim that a natural cause, such as the fire which causes the burning of cotton, is the sole and sufficient cause for its effect, and against those who, like Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna), would say that there is a giver of forms in the celestial world which imposes form once a sublunar cause has prepared some matter for that form. Against the first view, al-Ghazâlî gives the famous argument which has been compared to Hume`s: observation of simultaneity does not prove that causation has occurred. Against the latter view, al-Ghazâlî says that if effects are brought about by higher principles, they depend ultimately on God`s will, and God can do anything except the absolutely impossible. Therefore, no effect proceeds necessarily from its cause, unless the cause in question is God Himself.

But al-Ghazâlî goes on to say, in essence, that natural causes can be regarded as causes if we invoke a weaker notion of causality. He admits that a natural cause has a nature which gives rise to certain effects: fire, for instance, has a nature such that it burns whatever is in contact with it. But this does not mean that fire is a necessary cause, in the sense that the existence of fire in contact with cotton logically entails the existence of burning cotton. The nature of fire itself, says al-Ghazâlî, derives from God, and God chooses whether or not this nature will give rise to its normal effect or not. On al-Ghazâlî`s view, natural causes are only contingently causes -- their effects only proceed if the true Agent who gave them their natures wishes it. (4) Ibn Rushd was the first of many to see this position as an inconsistent concession to the philosophers on al-Ghazâlî`s part, because al-Ghazâlî seems at first to say that God is the only cause, and then asserts that created things do have natures which lead them to cause their effects. But al-Ghazâlî`s view is not inconsistent: it merely sees created natures as inherently contingent and provisional, relying on God`s continued will for their efficacy and very existence.

Ibn Rushd`s response to al-Ghazâlî is based on the objection that if any form of occasionalism is accepted, there is no possibility for human knowledge. He remarks that if what he perceives to be al-Ghazâlî`s denial of causality is accepted, `there is no fixed (thâbit) knowledge of anything,` because `certain (yaqînî) knowledge is the knowledge of the thing according to what it is in itself.` (5) Here Ibn Rushd is tacitly relying on two principles of Aristotelianism. The first is what we might call epistemic optimism: as an Aristotelian, Ibn Rushd takes it for granted that humans have knowledge, so that if a theory of causality is incompatible with our knowing things as they are, then this is itself a sufficient refutation of that theory. The second is the principle that things are only known demonstratively through their causes. This is of course a basic tenet of medieval epistemology: elsewhere in Arabic philosophy, it is used to argue for the impossibility of positive theology in the Liber de Causis, and it is the basis for St. Thomas Aquinas` notion of a propter quid demonstration. (6) For Ibn Rushd these two principles are the guidelines along which a theory of causality must be developed. He says, for instance, that `if the things whose causes are not perceived are unknown by nature and sought after, then what is not unknown necessarily has perceived causes.` (7) On the strength of the two principles, he is confident that he can rule out any form of occasionalism.

The first thing that should be noted about Ibn Rushd`s objection to al-Ghazâlî here is that it does not seem, at first, to be relevant. The objection assumes that al-Ghazâlî rejects the idea that things have natures, which are both the principles of demonstrative knowledge and the principles of causality. By denying causality, Ibn Rushd argues, al-Ghazâlî has also rejected the possibility of knowledge. But as we saw above, al-Ghazâlî does not in fact completely reject natures: he thinks a created thing has a created nature which causes a proper effect, but that this nature and causation are always subject to God`s will. Still, one can readily see how Ibn Rushd`s objection might be adapted to meet this rather less occasionalistic view. If natures only possibly give rise to their effects, then our knowledge of them is not necessary, but only probable: natures must remain always the same if they are to be the objects of demonstrative, scientific knowledge. (8) Ibn Rushd alludes to this requirement when he remarks that knowledge based on natures must be `fixed` -- in other words, it must always be the case that natures cause a proper effect, by the very definition of `nature.` (9) This is one reason why Ibn Rushd insists that miracles, i.e. those cases in which God does step in and disturb the natural course of causation, are not even something we can rationally discuss. Supernatural events, as the very name implies, are beyond any knowledge we can have of nature, and therefore are not properly to be included in any discussion of causality or philosophy in general.

It is a measure of how inapt is the comparison so often made between al-Ghazâlî and Hume that al-Ghazâlî both anticipates this objection and takes it seriously. His goal is certainly not a kind of Humean skepticism; on the contrary, he is just as committed as Ibn Rushd to Aristotelian epistemic optimism, and in a sense he is even committed to the principle that knowledge is only through causes. Thus al-Ghazâlî himself raises the question of why miracles do not prevent our knowledge of the empirical world, admitting that if they did, a man who left a book in his home would have to say, `I do not know what is in the house now, and the extent of what I know is only that I left a book in the house, and perhaps now it is a horse.` (10) Al-Ghazâlî`s response to the objection is most intriguing: he suggests that God continually creates in us the knowledge that He will not perform these miracles. Thus the source of a man`s knowledge that, say, his book is still in the house, is God Himself. Indeed, al-Ghazâlî seems to be contrasting the so-called `knowledge` of experience, which only leads to the habit of expecting given natures to cause given effects, with a certain knowledge created in us by God. It should be noted here that it has been questioned whether this passage represents al-Ghazâlî`s own views -- the dispute turns on a point of translation. (11) We need not, however, decide this question here, because even outside this passage al-Ghazâlî continues to propose that knowledge can be created in us by God, both in the seventeenth discussion and elsewhere. (12)

A modern reader is likely, I think, to reject al-Ghazâlî`s solution as inadequate: a knowledge created by God in a human hardly seems to qualify as knowledge in the proper sense at all. This is in fact exactly the objection put by Ibn Rushd, who argues that one only has knowledge if that knowledge has a direct relationship to the natural cause that is known. Even assuming that God does create knowledge in a person, that person is only said to know if the knowledge `is something dependent on the nature of the existent, because the true is [when] one believes something to be as it is in existence.` (13) Thus our two authors are, at root, at odds with one another over the epistemic question: what are the conditions for certain knowledge? For al-Ghazâlî, the habit of knowing brought about by experience is not knowledge of what is necessary; only a knowledge produced by God is certain. For Ibn Rushd, the situation is precisely reversed: if God creates a knowledge in us, that knowledge is properly designated as knowledge only if it corresponds to a real nature.

Modern intuitions about this question notwithstanding, it must be admitted that al-Ghazâlî`s view on justification is perfectly consistent with his view on causality. Al-Ghazâlî admits that we do know that certain things will and will not happen. But if causes are always contingent on God`s will in producing their effects, then certain knowledge can only derive from the real source of necessity in the causal relationship, namely God. Thus, as already remarked, there is a sense in which al-Ghazâlî would agree to the second Aristotelian principle that knowledge is always through causes. But for him this means that certain knowledge is always through God, because causality is only through God. That this is really al-Ghazâlî`s intent can be seen from the fact that he puts knowledge of normal events on the same plane as the special knowledge that is enjoyed by prophets. The knowledge that comes about through the habitual course of nature is just as certain as the knowledge of a prophet that there will be an exception in the course of nature, because both sorts of knowledge are created by God. (14) Thus it makes sense to say that, for al-Ghazâlî, revelation or prophesy is the paradigmatic form of knowledge for humans.

In the face of this view, Ibn Rushd`s insistence on the Aristotelian definition of knowledge as perception in conformity with a nature seems to be little more than begging the question. This is because, as already mentioned, Ibn Rushd assumes that the supernatural -- which for al-Ghazâlî is fundamental -- is a subject which cannot be understood nor even rationally discussed. Indeed, he chastises al-Ghazâlî repeatedly for bringing into the arguments of the Tahâfut things that should not be disputed, lest the political function of religion be compromised. In the seventeenth discussion, Ibn Rushd`s political argument against al-Ghazâlî is buttressed by an epistemological one: knowledge as such has to do with natures, and therefore excludes supernatural causes and events. Whether Ibn Rushd believes that miracles really do happen, or are only said to happen for the sake of common believers, they will by definition not fall within the realm of scientific, Aristotelian discourse: `it is necessary to say about [the shari`a] that its principles are divine matters transcending human intellects, and they must be recognized without fail despite ignorance of their causes.` (15) By itself, this assertion is question-begging because it does not address possible counter-examples to the `philosophical` paradigm of knowledge -- such as miracles -- assuming in effect that `cause` and `knowledge` are simply terms which do not apply to the supernatural.

Ibn Rushd does, however, have a more elaborate response to give against the accusation of question-begging, because of his own account of the importance of God for natural causes. The regularity and predictability of natural causes, according to Ibn Rushd, is a testament to God`s wisdom. Ibn Rushd can gain support for this view from the Qurân, which he quotes explicitly: `And you will not find any alteration in the doings (sunna) of God, and you will not find any change in the doings of God.` (16) Scientific knowledge is not, then, an affront to God`s power, but is only made possible by God`s wisdom, which does not allow natures and therefore causal relationships to change. The defense is deepened by Ibn Rushd`s allusion to another doctrine he holds in the Tahâfut, namely that God`s knowledge of things is the cause of their existence. Ibn Rushd goes so far as to remark that God`s knowledge of natures must have the same objects as our own, though in God`s case the relationship is causal, as well as epistemic: `if we have knowledge of these possibles, then there is a condition (hâl) in the possible existents to which our knowledge pertains... and this is what the philosophers designate as nature. Likewise, the knowledge of God is through the existents, although [God`s knowledge] is their cause... and therefore it is necessary that the existents come about in accordance with His knowledge.` (17) But the rejoinder open to al-Ghazâlî is clear: Ibn Rushd has here effectively raised scientific knowledge to the level of divine knowledge; indeed, he has identified the two. Thus it also becomes clear how much the paradigm of knowledge, for Ibn Rushd, is that of natural science. But against al-Ghazâlî, the view remains question-begging. This is because Ibn Rushd assumes, rather than argues, that divine wisdom and knowledge would be incompatible with a change in the course of nature, whereas al-Ghazâlî insists precisely that such changes are possible.

Yet, does not Ibn Rushd have a legitimate criticism of al-Ghazâlî insofar as al-Ghazâlî`s stance does not allow for scientific knowledge at all? If al-Ghazâlî holds to some kind of epistemic optimism regarding natural science, this should remain a problem for him. The answer to this question sheds light on al-Ghazâlî`s general attitude towards philosophy in the Tahâfut. Recall that al-Ghazâlî does, in fact, concede to the philosophers that there are natures which give rise to effects. So he leaves room for scientific knowledge of those natures (e.g. the knowledge that fire burns). What al-Ghazâlî denies is that such knowledge constitutes necessary knowledge -- scientific discourse is partial, because it cannot establish whether a given natural cause will be superseded by supernatural intervention. Thus al-Ghazâlî does not reject scientific or philosophical knowledge altogether. What he does do is to show that it does not measure up to the rather high standard the philosophers have set for themselves, namely that knowledge be of relationships which are logically necessary.

This is, I would submit, representative of al-Ghazâlî`s strategy in the Tahâfut. His goal is not to show the `incoherence` of the philosophers, if this is taken to mean that all of philosophy is incoherent. His goal is rather to show that philosophy must be subsumed within an intellectual enterprise which includes revelation -- and further, that revelation must be regarded as the most superior kind of knowledge. The strategy of the Tahâfut is to show that philosophy, mostly as represented by Ibn Sînâ, has overreached itself in a number of cases, reaching false conclusions where reason should simply be recognized as inadequate. Thus in the seventeenth discussion he remarks, regarding prophetic miracles, that `although the extent of [the prophet`s] power is not determined in the intellect, there is still no need to deny what is traditionally handed down and what revelation mentions.` (18) Similarly, in the second discussion, taking an approach like that of Maimonides, al-Ghazâlî argues, `since it is clear that we do not at all dismiss the permanence of the world from the viewpoint of the intellect, but allow as possible the permanence and extinction [of the world], we only know which possibility is really the case through revelation; thus insight into this does not belong to reason.` (19)

Although al-Ghazâlî has traditionally been seen as an anti-rationalist, a mere opponent of philosophy, our analysis of the seventeenth discussion suggests that his attitude towards philosophy is both more subtle and less radical. The al-Ghazâlî of the Tahâfut should be classed not with the anti-rationalists, but with those concerned to keep philosophy in its proper place. For an analogous position in medieval Europe, we need look no further than St. Thomas Aquinas. Though Aquinas is usually considered to be far more of a rationalist than al-Ghazâlî, a Ghazâlîan strategy of limiting the claims of philosophy can be found in, for example, Question 12 of the Prima Pars, where Aquinas argues that human reason by itself is unable to know God, so that humans require the supernatural assistance of grace to achieve their perfection. This is not to suggest that Aquinas` view on the more specific issue of causality is comparable to al-Ghazâlî`s. Rather, it is to suggest that, like Thomas, al-Ghazâlî can be seen as sympathetic to philosophy within its proper limits, even though he holds that philosophy is not the highest paradigm of human knowledge.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Medi/MediAdam.htm

#14 by nasah on December 2, 2003 9:27pm PT
HA! The purest Gnostic I have seen in my life-- his arrogance about his PURITY of Character and NOBILITY of thoughts are exemplary!!!

#6 hamidm2

I completely and totally agree.douglas adams, in one of his serious essays, wrote something to the effect-

``If I am a Tory and I meet a Labour guy, I can tear his ideas to shreds in public. If I like Arsenal and I meet a ManU fan, he can launch a detailed verbal assault on the team I follow. But when it comes to religion, we are supposed to say ``hey, i respect your beliefs. go on deluding yourself by believing in god``. why is this?``

# 15

Have they really begun to award Ph.Ds for that sort of trash?

Naqsh to Hamidm -- ``you are a kafir pure and simple.

``Naqshi miaN -- your Sufi `tareeqa` teaches you to call other poeple Kafir? -- you may be a Simpleton but what makes YOU so sure of your own PURITY.......?

Naqshbandi,

Can you share the title of your upcoming doctoral thesis with us?...or the titles of any 3 of your papers?

Gill sahib: this is an well written and informative article on what has unfortunately become a very important subject for muslims - namely, should they follow reason or should they follow what someone claims is God`s will? The sheer stupidity that underlies the latter thinking, not to mention the crass transgression of the message of Islam itself, is beyond belief.

There have indeed been two trains of thought in muslim societies, the one driven by reason and the other by irrationality. Al Ghazali and Al Taiymiyaah representing the irrational school, and Ibn Sina the archetype of the rational school. It is interesting, as you note, that Iqbal too subscribed to this irrational aspect, and failed to recognize that the material progress of the west that he admired so much was rooted in the Age of Reason that had dawned upon the west in the 17th century.

Your mention of Iranian attempts at developing a nuclear bomb is also interesting: the mullahs are doing what the decaying ottoman empire tried unsuccessfully to do in the 19th century, namely adopt western military techniques and technologies but reject the tree that bore this fruit (namely, rationality).

The outcome i dont think is in doubt - you cant live off stolen fruit, which is what the mullahs in effect would like to do. You must grow your own trees, and that means accepting rationality as the distinguishing feature of a human being. This respect for reason and rationality certainly has the full support of the Quran behind it.