Re-thinking Kashmir

#131 nakhok

Pandit-ji was indeed an eloquent speaker, as well as a man of his word. :)



``I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the state to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or state must be decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this view``.

-Pandit Nehru , (Telegram 402 Primin-2227 dated 27th October, 1947 to PM of Pakistan repeating telegram addressed to PM of UK).



``We are anxious not to finalise anything in a moment of crisis and without the fullest opportunity to be given to the people of Kashmir to have their say. It is for them ultimately to decide - And let me make it clear that it has been our policy that where there is a dispute about the accession of a state to either Dominion, the accession must be made by the people of that state. It is in accordance with this policy that we have added a proviso to the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir``.

--Pandit Nehru, in a broadcast to the nation over All India Radio on 2nd November, 1947

Urstruly #112:
``As if 700,000 gun totting war criminals were not enough to gag a whole nation, Indians are building a wall to incarcerate a whole nation in Kashmir. Is it that India is hiding something that is worst than South Korea? Where will it end?``
Heh heh. The fence is to protect us Indians (including Kashmiris) from Puki terrorist vermin. Anyone who wants to go to the other side legally has to get a passport, get a visa and is ready to go. Urstruly, why is the fence bothering you, given that it is about one km within OUR territory?
If the Indian army is ``gun toting war criminals``, what do you call the Puki army who have conquered Pukistan innumerable times so far - war heroes?
My sincere advice to Pukis is this - dont worry about Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq or anything else. Worry about Pukistan. Fight for the liberation of Sindhudesh, Baloch Nadu, POK and Pakhtoonkhawa from the oppression of the Punjabees.

Jaswant says it best!

``The Pakistanis keep talking about Kashmir as something that was stolen or lost, when in fact it was neither,`` he said.

``Pakistan`s fixation with Kashmir should be understood as an objectification of Pakistan`s predicament as a lost soul among nations, an ersatz country whose founders` only real legacy was a permanent reminder of what a tragic mistake partition had been,`` Singh said.

http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/jul/09us.htm

# 133 rsridhar

thanks for the info, nothings perfect :)

HP:

I see your point about the core issue. There is however a perception, not exactly unfounded, that the the core issue is Pakistani self definition as the Un-India. In the Indian mind, that is the core problem.

However, your thesis about diplomatic maneouvring is equally valid. India percives or wishes the Kashmir issue as one that has already been solved externally. Their regret is its internationalization by Nehru and the failure of Indira Gandhi to end the issue in 1971.

Ofcourse the dormancy was vitiated by the Indian state itself and the fruits are there for us to see. But then again, India percieves the issue to be easier solved if Pakistan is not involved.

I think you misunderstood my reference to ``status quo`` which is used in India at least in a territorial sense.


You said..

``An issue may have several minor issues to go with it but once “the issue” is under challenge, it is or any part of it can not remain under status quo anymore. ``

I disagree to the extent that if the situation again becomes dormant with nothing having changed in a realistic sense then status quo is maintained. Look at the Indian Punjab insurgency as an example.

re:#102 by Urstruly
``With 77% majority of Muslims in Indian Oppressed Kashmir, Muslims can even change the constitution....``.
The 77% muslims in that state can ensure that the majority of MLAs in the state assmembly are muslims. These MLAs in turn can make laws pertaining to the state. That is how it works. To change the constitution, we need 2/3rds majority vote in the parliament (in the center). I hope u now realize how stupid your above statement was.
As always, i am happy to educate the ignorant.
Sridhar

re:#113 by americanFOB
I thought you were a Paki (by which i mean a Pakistani; i use it not in any derogatory sense). I guess all of us suffer from some biases which are inbuilt!

``So assume that the muslims and other minorities are usually underdogs, while the majors groups such as the Hindus are always in massive numbers..``

Well, it is true that in a democrazy, there is strength in numbers. But, this is really illusory not real. What matters more is: how much strings can a community pull at the political level (what is called as ``political influence`` or ``lobbying`` in USA).
In these matters, clearly communities like the Parsees or sikhs pull more strings than hindus who are divided along caste lines. Even among hindus, Gujaratis pull more strength than marwaris in Bombay due to their wealth and greater control they exercise over the stock market (i am discounting the influence of goons like Thackeray here).
Even in USA, Jews have disproportionate influence over politics (compared to their numbers).
So, to assume that a community must be holding all the cards just because of their numbers is not true in a democrazy.
Muslims in India have not organized themselves well until very recently. They have let themselves be pampered by selfish ``so called seulcar`` politicians who treated the former as vote banks. This has led to a situation where there is no real leadership among muslims. But, it is gratifying that IMs have realized who their real benefactors are and have been voting cleverly in a clear departure from the previous pattern. The recent general election is a clear proof of that.
``...all I here that: in India politics run hand in hand with religon....``
Religion does play a role in politics in India but not to such a great extent. In fact. BJP and the ``Sangh Parivar`` would like nothing better than to see hindus vote on the basis of religion and give BJP a clear majority. This has not happened as Hindus have traditionally voted along caste lines. AT least in one sense, caste has done India some good in that it has kept away a right wing party from getting an absolute majority!
Sridhar

Re: urstruly #102
“With 77% majority of Muslims in Indian Oppressed Kashmir, Muslims can even change the constitution because that is well over 2/3rd of the population. No wonder Indians need 700,000 guns to stiffle their voice.”

In Pakistan you have 99% majority of Muslims, Muslims can write or change the constitution as much as they like but it does not matter because the 500,000 strong Pakistani army uses it for toilet paper in the morning. Chew on that!

Faruk

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#25 by stuka

“we say it is not a core issue, what we mean is that it is not the only issue bedeviling Indian-Pakistani relations.”

Well! Which issue is bigger or central then the Kashmir issue between the two countries?

Here is what I think Pakistan’s real position in Kashmir:
-Kashmir is an issue that India has to resolve and Pakistan should be part of the settlement whatever form and shape it takes. -

India for a better part of the last 50 years has been trying to sidestep the Pakistani claim though admitting Kashmir to be a major problem that India would rather like to be resolved between Kashmiris and Indians.

When Pakistan claims that Kashmir is a “core issue” between India and Pakistan, it becomes important for the Indian side to diplomatically counter that with the argument that there are other issues that are important. That is another way of saying that Pakistan is not part of the Kashmir issue so there is really no “core issue” to talk about.
To preserve its position it has to always maintain that Kashmir is not a ‘core issue” or it gives into Pakistani argument. The weakness of the Indian argument is that there is really no issue worth talking about even.

Kashmir aside,Pakistan and India have lived w/o each other for a long time now to not to worry about each other but being neighbors, it is the feel-good factor that becomes important in neighborly relations. Pakistan army hates that feel-good thingy and the Indian side knows the importance of feel-good thingy. Imo, There is lot of gamesmanship in Pakistan-India relations and talks than the substance. Then there are some international pressures that both countries have to live with and that makes them talk and talk again.

When I castigated the “core issue” I attacked the way Veeresh has argued about the core issue. India or Pakistan’s existence does not depend on Kashmir. But if you closely study the issue-Kashmir- it is much more important for India than it is for Pakistan. Now you and DM have already discussed this in details so there is no point in getting into it now. But the reality remains that it is an Indian problem as you have stated and it is a big problem where some of post Independent India’s ideological and other essential issue are stake.

Status quo is even more difficult position to defend. The simple logic would be; If the issue is dormant, the status quo can be maintained but once the issue becomes active there is no status quo any more. An issue may have several minor issues to go with it but once “the issue” is under challenge, it is or any part of it can not remain under status quo anymore.

#101 by Dost-Mittar

The ceasefire line after the first Kashmir war of 1947-1948 coincided with the limits of the political influence of Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference. But in the years since the first ceasefire, the LoC has come to acquire religious and cultural significance as well.

Dost-Mittar has noted the wholesale expulsion of all Hindus and Sikhs from Pak occupied Kashmir (PoK) during the 1947-1948 war. And the wholesale expulsion of the Kashmiri Pandits from the Kashmir Valley since 1989 is quite in line with the philosophy of ideologues in the cantonments in Rawalpindi, Lahore or Sialkot who feel that the 1947 partition will remain an unfinished task till they can impose the religious homogeneity of PoK on the rest of the erstwhile kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir as well.

It is only the Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side of the LoC that has retained the legacy from Maharaja`s time that prevents non-residents of the state from acquiring
immovable property.

But that is certainly not true on the Pakistan side of the LoC. This has led to a drastic alteration in the demographic composition of PoK.

To retain Jammu & Kashmir`s sense of identity the Indian Government scrupulously honored a law (enforced by the Dogra Maharajas of the State) which forbade any
non-Kashmiri, someone not born or a resident of the State, from acquiring immovable property of any kind in the State. This was done to ensure that the demographic
character of the State is not altered. The law exists and is enforced to this today.

Contrast this with the virtual colonization of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and also of the so-called Northern Areas of Pakistan.

Kashmiri remains an Indian language, even as it failed to become a Pakistani language. It needs to be noted that Kashmiri language is far less significant in ``Azad`` Kashmir than it is in Jammu & Kashmir in India across the LoC. In PoK Punjabi/Lahandi/Pothwari is far more important today than Kashmiri:

(1) According to latest census figures, only about 100,000 in PoK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) claim Kashmiri as their mother tongue. This is in sharp contrast to Jammu & Kashmir across the LoC where more than 4 million claim Kashmiri as their mother tongue.

(2) Kashmiri speakers lack the critical mass to be significant in PoK. They form a mere 2% of the population. In sharp contrast, nearly the half the population of Jammu & Kashmir claim Kashmiri as their mother tongue.

(3) Institute of Kashmir Studies in Muzaffarabad does some language promotion - but observers have acknowledged that it is a lost cause in PoK.

The Friday Times, Lahore, Pakistan
June4-10, 2004

Pakistan at war with itself?
By Khaled Ahmed

..... Kashmir forms the central plank in Pakistan`s national consensus, firmed up through years of the army`s paramountcy as allowed by Pakistan`s nationalism. The unspoken agenda of the army is defeat of India and reclamation of Kashmir. Pakistan has lost national consensus for many reasons but the big reason is that it has not been able to defeat India within a reasonable period of time. The state no longer believes that the nation can go on seeking India`s defeat - not even through jihad – or hoping that India would somehow collapse by itself for following the flawed doctrine of secularism. The state wants to purge the early consensual folly of adopting the formula of palpable external threat. It wants to replace the threat-of-India theory with a more realistic economic dream. It wants to ‘rationalise` India to be able to live alongside it. But the doctrinal demons it released earlier in its history refuse to exorcise. .....

The Friday Times, Lahore, Pakistan
July 2-8, 2004

A n a l ys i s
Are jihadis waiting in the wings?
By Khaled Ahmed

..... Recent incidents demonstrate that the jihadis are continuing to kill the Shias in Pakistan quite freely. In some cases the police has been found involved in this Shia-killing spree. It has been trying to spare the sectarian killers of Al Qaeda by interpreting murders as family feuds or the doing of the ‘foreign hand`, India or American, in the latter case an extension of what is happening in Najaf in Iran. .....

..... Mahnaz Ispahani, of the New York-based think-tank, Council for Foreign Relations, wrote in her article ‘Religious Sword hangs over Pakistan` in Los Angeles Times (22 May 2004): ‘Even as Musharraf bans certain groups and speaks out against sectarian violence, the militants flourish and the number of dead rises. One wants deeds as unflinching as his words. Only if he is able to put a full stop to the kind of Islamisation that makes a mockery of an inclusive Muslim homeland; only if he eliminates the sectarian jihadi complex that feeds off Shias and other minorities` lives, only then will Pakistan will have secure future. If Musharraf fails then the question ``Who is a Pakistani Muslim?`` could destroy all hope for a more progressive and peaceful Pakistan`. .....

..... Available literature on Al Qaeda reveals close contacts between Lashkar-e-Tayba and Osama bin Laden. .....

..... Jaish, together with Lashkar-Tayba, was the top ‘freedom-fighting` organisation in Held Kashmir. Its leader Maulana Masood Azhar, a graduate of Karachi`s Banuri Masjid seminary, was on the side of Osama bin Laden in Sudan when the Pakistani troops were representing the UN in Somalia. .....

..... President Musharraf should grasp the nettle of terrorism in Pakistan and get rid of it even if it means no option on the resumption of jihad in Kashmir. The administration is trying very hard to play down the sectarian violence of the jihadi militias to stave off public resentment. The Shia-killers of Brigade 313 are being secured against the stain of fratricide in Pakistan. The price for the ‘Kashmir option` is very high and the people of Pakistan may finally refuse to pay it with their blood.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-6-2004_pg3_2

The Daily Times, Lahore, Pakistan
Sunday, June 20, 2004

[..... the only workable solution is to convert the Line of Control into a soft border with India and Pakistan retaining sovereignty on their respective sides]

Solving the Kashmir dispute
By Ishtiaq Ahmed
Ishtiaq.Ahmed@statsvet.su.se

..... no zero-sum approach or ‘winner takes all` solution is going to succeed.

The UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite have failed to work. Since they are under Ch VI of the Charter, they require the contending parties to agree to UN mediation. India has ruled out any such possibility.

The third option of an independent Kashmir has no serious takers among the Indian and Pakistani establishments. One can also wonder if indeed the overall security concerns of India and Pakistan will lessen if a weak state emerges in this volatile region bordering Afghanistan, Iran and central Asia. Indeed, such a state could well increase the sense of insecurity and set in motion another round of confrontational politics between the two states. An independent state will also be opposed tooth and nail by the Hindus and Buddhists on the Indian side.

Similarly, the idea that Kashmir should be partitioned along religious lines is a non-starter. The Muslims of Jammu and the Shia minority of Ladakh would have their own reasons for opposing it. The former would be left behind in India and become an even smaller minority. They would thus be precariously placed and would very likely face the anger of militant Hindus who would hold them responsible for India losing much of its Kashmir to Pakistan.

Such a situation is already faced by Indian Muslims who stayed behind in India after Partition. The Shias only have to look at the way their sect is being targeted by terrorists in Pakistan. Neither the Pakistani fundamentalists nor the Kashmiri militants present a tolerant and peaceful image of Islam. It is futile to believe that the spread of a terrorist political culture in the garb of freedom struggle will impress the world or deter the Indian state.

There is also the proposal that the Kashmir Valley should be made independent. The tiny but very vocal Kashmiri pandits who have been driven away by the militants and now live in camps in Jammu and Delhi would oppose any such idea. Also, India will never agree to grant self-determination on the basis of religious differences.

Under the circumstances, the only workable solution is to convert the Line of Control into a soft border with India and Pakistan retaining sovereignty on their respective sides. The idea of a soft border should be understood as a series of measures aiming to provide substantial autonomy to the various sub-regions on both sides. Such an approach would require both states to withdraw or at least drastically reduce the number of troops stationed on both sides of the Line of Control. Kashmiris on both sides should be permitted to move freely
across the border though without the automatic right to settle on the other side.

But solving the Kashmir dispute is impossible without India and Pakistan agreeing to a comprehensive peace and cooperation agreement. The Kashmir issue is not the cause but a symptom of a deeper mistrust between India and Pakistan. The two sides have to appreciate the fact that they are two sovereign states and that is a settled fact of history. .....

..... One may rhetorically argue that India is an imperialist Hindu state or Pakistan heads a worldwide Islamic expansionist movement. But the fact remains that the United States and other Western states remain the real determiners of international economic and political policies.

Therefore instead of wasting time on mutual recrimination and hostile propaganda India and Pakistan should close ranks and along with the other players in South Asia try to develop robust economic and social ties. That is the only way this region can justly claim respect and admiration from the rest of the world. .....

..... It is most important that extremists and militants are weeded out from the whole of South Asia and especially from Kashmir. .....

Faruk#123:
It may be of interest to note that Asma Khan Lone is the daughter of the JKLF leader, Amanullah Khan and was brought up in POK/Pakistan. She was married to the son of a hurriyet leader, Abdul Ghani Lone, in a much heralded cross-border wedding four years ago.

http://www.indianexpress.com/archive_frame.php

Pakistan’s paranoid Great Gamers
For Pakistan, if Afghanistan has meant strategic depth, then Kashmir always means historic defeat. As Pakistan jostles to gain control over Kashmiri politics, the people are left out of their State’s destiny
ASMA KHAN LONE


Of the many analogies between Kashmir and Afghanistan, the most distinctive is the imposition by Pakistan of an elite group of seven on the political horizons of these respective places, in stark negation of the prevailing realities. After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghan soil, the logical end game seemed the return of sovereign power to the people of Afghanistan followed by a process of national reconstruction.

However, not so for the covert agencies of Pakistan which had ‘‘better’’ alternatives in the offing. (It is important to differentiate between the people of Pakistan and a minuscule albeit powerful mindset within its establishment.) The turn of events characterised for these agencies the unique opportunity to capitalise on the fluid political situation of its neighbourhood and materialise its cherished doctrine of ‘‘strategic depth’’ — securing and control over its western border which in the eventuality of an Indian attack from the East would provide tactical territory and time to absorb a first strike and reinforce for a follow-up response. As a corollary, the border dispute over the Durrand Line would also be laid to rest, enabling Pakistan to retain the vast expanse of its North-West Frontier region.

All through the Afghan war the CIA-backed mujahideen were based in Peshawer, Pakistan, which served as their base camp. At the time of the Soviet retreat, 21 major mujahideen organisations were based in Peshawer, not all amicable to the new Pakistani Great Game. This posed a dilemma for Pakistan, which at no cost was ready to forego such a strategic prize. Thus began a spate of negotiations, which after the spending of $25 million in a week and other carrot-and-stick tactics, finally yielded the desired results.

A group of seven lesser known, with lesser public support hence lesser stakes, coalition was cobbled together and placed at the helm of a new political dispensation in Afghanistan with its command structure firmly in Pakistan. This was bound to create resentment, triggering a bloody civil war and thus setting the stage for the next round of turmoil within Afghanistan.

At about the same time a mass-based armed struggle erupted in Kashmir. After decades of political suppression, the Kashmiris were left with no other discourse. ‘‘Azaadi’’ became the buzzword, epitomising Kashmiri pride and aspiration. However ‘‘azaadi’’ in certain quarters of Pakistan became misconstrued to mean accession to Pakistan. Though Kashmiris had welcomed the ‘‘moral support’’ extended by Pakistan, they were in no way ready to repay by a merger with it. As this reality sank in in Pakistan so did the desperation to secure its gameplan in Kashmir.

If Afghanistan had represented ‘‘strategic depth’’, Kashmir symbolised ‘‘historic defeat’’. After a series of high-profile purges, the mantra of the magic seven was transported to the Valley and thus was born, in 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The APHC was a motley group of various organisations having various ideologies. The APHC’s all-powerful Executive Council comprised the ‘‘mighty seven’’, constituting both heavyweights and non-entities. Some joined the conglomerate out of the tactical need to forge a united front, others due to ideological proximity, still others to simply have a slice of the accruing pie.

Ostensibly established to strengthen the ongoing movement and provide it the much needed focus and organised direction, the APHC increasingly came to denote Pakistani interest, often to the detriment of the indigenous Kashmiri cause. This till a point where Pakistani interests and the Kashmiri struggle unfortunately came to symbolise two diametrically opposing notions. This in turn bred a fresh set of dissidents both within and outside the APHC, only to be conveniently ‘‘silenced’’ like their predecessors. Meanwhile, for the remaining APHC it was ‘‘business’’ as usual, only now with the tragic departure of the balancing voice within its ranks it further became a prisoner of its myopic vision, faltering like a pack of cards to the earliest machinations directed at dividing and weakening it, thus finally imploding its inflated myth.

Like its counterpart in Afghanistan, the legacy of the APHC in Kashmir has been that of devastation and destruction. Also like its counterpart in Afghanistan, the APHC ultimately met its nemesis, robbing itself of a sobering epitaph. As the reigns of the movement shifted from the indigenous leadership to Pakistan, so did the character of the movement, from its secular nationalism to a parochially interpreted fundamentalist Islam — a paradigm alien to the common Kashmiri. The notion of Jehad catapulted to the centrestage in all its rhetorical finery, in actuality reduced to the clausewitzian ‘‘continuation of policy’’.

Islam is an all-pervading belief system. In order to preserve its dynamism and relevance to changing realities, its teachings have been dealt in a broad framework avoiding detailed specifics so as to accommodate a wider range of issues. This open-endedness has often led to varying and conflicting interpretations, giving rise to the debate ‘‘Spirit vs Ritual’’ — is the essence to have precedence or the sheer act of undertaking a certain exercise. The concept of Jehad also runs into this debate especially in the context of Kashmir.

Jehad is a central concept of Islam. The word Jehad has been derived from the Arabic word ‘‘Jehd’’ meaning, to exert. In Islamic tradition, Jehad means to exert against evil, for good to triumph over bad and truth to prevail over fallacy. Jehad has further been divided into various types, organised into a hierarchy based on importance and obligation. The primary and most intrinsic kind of Jehad is ‘‘Jehad-al-nafs’’ or Jehad against one’s desires, against the innate human traits of deceit, temptation and lust. Jehad-al-nafs in a way sums up the core of Islamic teachings, the practical embodiment of its reigning spirit. Jehad-al-nafs is mandatory upon every Muslim, the pivotal aspect of his everyday life.

It is later that Jehad-al-saif or Jehad by sword follows, again an important concept but not central. Where Jehad-al-nafs signifies the spirit, Jehad-al-saif represents the ritual. Though Jehad-al-nafs is mandatory upon every Muslim Jehad-al-saif is obligatory, and that too with Jehad-al-nafs as its cornerstone.

In Kashmir, Jehad-al-saif was undertaken against the forces of oppression to restore the Kashmiri’s right of self-determination. However, as the Kashmiri movement metamorphosed from an indigenous struggle to a limited war by proxy, so did the nature and objectives of the Jehad. From a cause it transported to a livelihood. Perceived as a means to salvation it became a mode of power. While the indoctrinated young starry-eyed fighter spilled his blood on the ground, the ‘‘sipah-i-salaar’’ at the higher echelon indulged in stratagem perpetuating his authority and that of the vested interests.

This fractionalised the movement into factious ‘‘warlordism’’ — with one group pitted against fellow comrades of another. Starting with the elimination of ideological rivals JKLF vs Jamaat (which at a plane could be read as pro-Kashmir vs pro-Pakistan), it further splintered into obscure sectarianism with Barelvism vs Wahabbism, stripping the movement of its fundamental cohesion and purpose.

Jehad also became subjected to selective derivation. The provision of a social security net for the affected — schools for the orphaned, vocational self-sufficiency for the widows and healthcare for the maimed — a practice undertaken by groups like the HAMAS in Palestine, so central to the concept of Jehad, was conspicuously missing in Kashmir. With the volume of funds being funnelled into Kashmir, a successful model of the Islamic Welfare System could have been set up. However these unaccountable funds had other utility.

The essence of Jehad gradually evaporated from the exercise leaving behind a sorry caricature of the ritual. The impetus of the movement progressively shifted from combating the oppressor to conservation of peculiar interests. This eroded not only the credibility but also the legitimacy of the Jehad, an essential pre-requisite to continue it under the premise of Islam. With its moral justification long lost, its legal pretext too lay at stake. What had started off as a noble cause against human suffering degenerated into an unholy alliance of interests, its sole achievement the tainting of the sacrosanct institution of Jehad.

The changed regional and international dynamics post-9/11 had directed greater focus on Kashmir. This was a cause for cautious hope. Where Pakistan had its internal interests to allow peace in Kashmir, India too had its stakes. Years of turbulence and pain, alongwith a freedom movement gone dreadfully awry, had taken its toll on the Kashmiris. Internal turmoil within Pakistan had further forced them to reassess their predicament. Matured by the cruelty of events, they were ready to take a more realistic and probably futuristic stock of things. Psychologically, this was a fluid and transitory phase for the Kashmiris. Though still suspicious of Indian overtures, they were ready to give peace a chance and play ball. For India, this represented a unique opportunity to reach out to the Kashmiris and win their trust, if not their hearts. Instead, the Indian establishment, unable to break from its traditional mould, committed itself to the same mistakes. Driven partly by the compulsions of electioneering, partly the desire to mount pressure on Pakistan and overwhelmingly the urgency to showcase to the diplomatic community Kashmiri support for its peace process, New Delhi rushed into a dialogue with a group of Kashmiri politicians, in the process eroding its own credibility and that of the Kashmiri politicians within Kashmir. The old cycle of events was once again being resurrected.

What seemed a more plausible and long-term proposition was the engagement of representatives of a wide section of society, which in turn would be able to mobilise an entire public opinion. However, the Indian government chose to talk to a select few, with ironically nominal collective public support. This not only drew a large question mark over the entire process, limiting its appeal to a few individuals, but also alienated other more potent forces. The inability on the part of the Kashmiri leaders to chalk out a substantive and forceful agenda for the talks further undermined the process. However the singularly most overwhelming implication of the whole exercise was the breeding of a Generation Next of rebellious youth.

Unable to legitimise the talks with the masses, these leaders resorted to double and often contradictory talk, the hallmark of all Kashmiri leaders. At a recent rally in Srinagar marking the death anniversary of a religious leader, also ostensibly a show of strength for the talks process with India, there emerged besides the understandable slogans of ‘‘Azaadi’’, simultaneous pro-Pakistan slogans. This was reminiscent of the 1977 elections, when fresh on the heels of the Indira-Abdullah accord these very leaders waved green handkerchiefs at the people, signifying affinity with Pakistan. The contradicting loyalties then had resulted in the cataclysmic eruption of the generation that followed; the contrary pulls of the dogma practiced by these leaders now will only result in the same. History has to be allowed a natural course. A truce with the people, not a few individuals, is required.

The writer is a freelance journalist based in Srinagar