The US Democracy Initiative and Israel

BeeJay:

I should also add that we policy analysts are not geniuses; if we were the world would be a much better place.:-).

Romair#11

``At some point, some US govt. will have to pressurize Israel to give the Palestinians a viable state. However, no govt. can afford to do that, in the USA, due to internal US politics.``

I think that the US policies are currently undergoing a rethinking and reappraisal. Going by the viewpoints expressed by people close to policy makers on the Jim Lehrer programs, indications are that the Americans are perhaps willing to accept democratic governments even if the results are not entirely to their liking initially.

soysauce#12:

The U.S is willing to change its direction in the Middle East precisely because of its own self-interest. It has found that its earlier policies are not resluting in desired outcomes.

Urstruly#13

What is the correct historical perspective according to you?

HP#9:

``The US controlled the Israeli policy and it was never the other way around. Israel did create some lobbying interest and some influence in the US congress but these interests would last as long as the US administration or the establishment is tolerant about it. The minute they turn away from Israel, the lobbying influence would disappear too.``

The way I would put it is that the US allowed Israel to exercise a veto on its Middle East policy. But whenever the US took a firm stand, Israel did have to go along. For example, during the first Gulf War, Israel agreed to not do anything provocative so as to not upset any of the Bush Senior`s middle east rivals. And the veto has been only on its mid-east policies. The US tells Israel what arms it can sell to what countries and it has on at least two occasions punished US civil servants engaged in spying for Israel.

here is a view on democracy in the middle east by one of the leading western orientalists:

Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East.

Lewis, Bernard
5,888 words
1 May 2005
Foreign Affairs
36
ISSN: 0015-7120; Volume 84; Issue 3
English
Copyright (c) 2005 All rights reserved.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

For Muslims as for others, history is important, but they approach it with a special concern and awareness. The career of the Prophet Muhammad, the creation and expansion of the Islamic community and state, and the formulation and elaboration of the holy law of Islam are events in history, known from historical memory or record and narrated and debated by historians since early times. In the Islamic Middle East, one may still find passionate arguments, even bitter feuds, about events that occurred centuries or sometimes millennia ago -- about what happened, its significance, and its current relevance. This historical awareness has acquired new dimensions in the modern period, as Muslims - - particularly those in the Middle East -- have suffered new experiences that have transformed their vision of themselves and the world and reshaped the language in which they discuss it.

In 1798, the French Revolution arrived in Egypt in the form of a small expeditionary force commanded by a young general called Napoleon Bonaparte. The force invaded, conquered, and ruled Egypt without difficulty for several years. General Bonaparte proudly announced that he had come ``in the name of the French Republic, founded on the principles of liberty and equality.`` This was, of course, published in French and also in Arabic translation. Bonaparte brought his Arabic translators with him, a precaution that some later visitors to the region seem to have overlooked.

The reference to equality was no problem: Egyptians, like other Muslims, understood it very well. Equality among believers was a basic principle of Islam from its foundation in the seventh century, in marked contrast to both the caste system of India to the east and the privileged aristocracies of the Christian world to the west. Islam really did insist on equality and achieved a high measure of success in enforcing it. Obviously, the facts of life created inequalities -- primarily social and economic, sometimes also ethnic and racial -- but these were in defiance of Islamic principles and never reached the levels of the Western world. Three exceptions to the Islamic rule of equality were enshrined in the holy law: the inferiority of slaves, women, and unbelievers. But these exceptions were not so remarkable; for a long time in the United States, in practice if not in principle, only white male Protestants were ``born free and equal.&! quot; The record would seem to indicate that as late as the nineteenth or even the early twentieth century, a poor man of humble origins had a better chance of rising to the top in the Muslim Middle East than anywhere in Christendom, including post-revolutionary France and the United States.

Equality, then, was a well-understood principle, but what about the other word Bonaparte mentioned -- ``liberty,`` or freedom? This term caused some puzzlement among the Egyptians. In Arabic usage at that time and for some time after, the word ``freedom`` -- hurriyya -- was in no sense a political term. It was a legal term. One was free if one was not a slave. To be liberated, or freed, meant to be manumitted, and in the Islamic world, unlike in the Western world, ``slavery`` and ``freedom`` were not until recently used as metaphors for bad and good government.

The puzzlement continued until a very remarkable Egyptian scholar found the answer. Sheikh Rifa`a Rafi` al-Tahtawi was a professor at the still unmodernized al-Azhar University of the early nineteenth century. The ruler of Egypt had decided it was time to try and catch up with the West, and in 1826 he sent a first mission of 44 Egyptian students to Paris. Sheikh Tahtawi accompanied them and stayed in Paris until 1831. He was what might be called a chaplain, there to look after the students` spiritual welfare and to see that they did not go astray -- no mean task in Paris at that time.

During his stay, he seems to have learned more than any of his wards, and he wrote a truly fascinating book giving his impressions of post- revolutionary France. The book was published in Cairo in Arabic in 1834 and in a Turkish translation in 1839. It remained for decades the only description of a modern European country available to the Middle Eastern Muslim reader. Sheikh Tahtawi devotes a chapter to French government, and in it he mentions how the French kept talking about freedom. He obviously at first shared the general perplexity about what the status of not being a slave had to do with politics. And then he understood and explained. When the French talk about freedom, he says, what they mean is what we Muslims call justice. And that was exactly right. Just as the French, and more generally Westerners, thought of good government and bad government as freedom and slavery, so Muslims conceived of them as justice and injustice. These ! contrasting perceptions help shed light on the political debate that began in the Muslim world with the 1798 French expedition and that has been going on ever since, in a remarkable variety of forms.

JUSTICE FOR ALL

As Sheikh Tahtawi rightly said, the traditional Islamic ideal of good government is expressed in the term ``justice.`` This is represented by several different words in Arabic and other Islamic languages. The most usual, adl, means ``justice according to the law`` (with ``law`` defined as God`s law, the sharia, as revealed to the Prophet and to the Muslim community). But what is the converse of justice? What is a regime that does not meet the standards of justice? If a ruler is to qualify as just, as defined in the traditional Islamic system of rules and ideas, he must meet two requirements: he must have acquired power rightfully, and he must exercise it rightfully. In other words, he must be neither a usurper nor a tyrant. It is of course possible to be either one without the other, although the normal experience was to be both at the same time.

The Islamic notion of justice is well documented and goes back to the time of the Prophet. The life of the Prophet Muhammad, as related in his biography and reflected in revelation and tradition, falls into two main phases. In the first phase he is still living in his native town of Mecca and opposing its regime. He is preaching a new religion, a new doctrine that challenges the pagan oligarchy that rules Mecca. The verses in the Koran, and also relevant passages in the prophetic traditions and biography, dating from the Meccan period, carry a message of opposition -- of rebellion, one might even say of revolution, against the existing order.

Then comes the famous migration, the hijrat from Mecca to Medina, where Muhammad becomes a wielder, not a victim, of authority. Muhammad, during his lifetime, becomes a head of state and does what heads of state do. He promulgates and enforces laws, he raises taxes, he makes war, he makes peace; in a word, he governs. The political tradition, the political maxims, and the political guidance of this period do not focus on how to resist or oppose the government, as in the Meccan period, but on how to conduct government. So from the very beginning of Muslim scripture, jurisprudence, and political culture, there have been two distinct traditions: one, dating from the Meccan period, might be called activist; the other, dating from the Medina period, quietist.

The Koran, for example, makes it clear that there is a duty of obedience: ``Obey God, obey the Prophet, obey those who hold authority over you.`` And this is elaborated in a number of sayings attributed to Muhammad. But there are also sayings that put strict limits on the duty of obedience. Two dicta attributed to the Prophet and universally accepted as authentic are indicative. One says, ``there is no obedience in sin``; in other words, if the ruler orders something contrary to the divine law, not only is there no duty of obedience, but there is a duty of disobedience. This is more than the right of revolution that appears in Western political thought. It is a duty of revolution, or at least of disobedience and opposition to authority. The other pronouncement, ``do not obey a creature against his creator,`` again clearly limits the authority of the ruler, whatever form of ruler that may be.

These two traditions, the one quietist and the other activist, continue right through the recorded history of Islamic states and Islamic political thought and practice. Muslims have been interested from the very beginning in the problems of politics and government: the acquisition and exercise of power, succession, legitimacy, and -- especially relevant here -- the limits of authority.

All this is well recorded in a rich and varied literature on politics. There is the theological literature; the legal literature, which could be called the constitutional law of Islam; the practical literature -- handbooks written by civil servants for civil servants on how to conduct the day-to-day business of government; and, of course, there is the philosophical literature, which draws heavily on the ancient Greeks, whose work was elaborated in translations and adaptations, creating distinctly Islamic versions of Plato`s Republic and Aristotle`s Politics.

In the course of time, the quietist, or authoritarian, trend grew stronger, and it became more difficult to maintain those limitations on the autocracy of the ruler that had been prescribed by holy scripture and holy law. And so the literature places increasing stress on the need for order. A word used very frequently in the discussions is fitna, an Arabic term that can be translated as ``sedition,`` ``disorder,`` ``disturbance,`` and even ``anarchy`` in certain contexts. The point is made again and again, with obvious anguish and urgency: tyranny is better than anarchy. Some writers even go so far as to say that an hour -- or even a moment -- of anarchy is worse than a hundred years of tyranny. That is one point of view -- but not the only one. In some times and places within the Muslim world, it has been dominant; in other times and places, it has been emphatically rejected.

THEORY VERSUS HISTORY

The Islamic tradition insists very strongly on two points concerning the conduct of government by the ruler. One is the need for consultation. This is explicitly recommended in the Koran. It is also mentioned very frequently in the traditions of the Prophet. The converse is despotism; in Arabic istibdad, ``despotism`` is a technical term with very negative connotations. It is regarded as something evil and sinful, and to accuse a ruler of istibdad is practically a call to depose him.

With whom should the ruler consult? In practice, with certain established interests in society. In the earliest times, consulting with the tribal chiefs was important, and it remains so in some places -- for example, in Saudi Arabia and in parts of Iraq (but less so in urbanized countries such as Egypt or Syria). Rulers also consulted with the countryside`s rural gentry, a very powerful group, and with various groups in the city: the bazaar merchants, the scribes (the nonreligious literate classes, mainly civil servants), the religious hierarchy, and the military establishment, including long-established regimental groups such as the janissaries of the Ottoman Empire. The importance of these groups was, first of all, that they did have real power. They could and sometimes did make trouble for the ruler, even deposing him. Also, the groups` leaders -- tribal chiefs, country notables, religious leaders, heads of guilds, or commanders of the! armed forces -- were not nominated by the ruler, but came from within the groups.

Consultation is a central part of the traditional Islamic order, but it is not the only element that can check the ruler`s authority. The traditional system of Islamic government is both consensual and contractual. The manuals of holy law generally assert that the new caliph -- the head of the Islamic community and state -- is to be ``chosen.`` The Arabic term used is sometimes translated as ``elected,`` but it does not connote a general or even sectional election. Rather, it refers to a small group of suitable, competent people choosing the ruler`s successor. In principle, hereditary succession is rejected by the juristic tradition. Yet in practice, succession was always hereditary, except when broken by insurrection or civil war; it was -- and in most places still is -- common for a ruler, royal or otherwise, to designate his successor.

But the element of consent is still important. In theory, at times even in practice, the ruler`s power -- both gaining it and maintaining it -- depends on the consent of the ruled. The basis of the ruler`s authority is described in the classical texts by the Arabic word bay`a, a term usually translated as ``homage,`` as in the subjects paying homage to their new ruler. But a more accurate translation of bay`a -- which comes from a verb meaning ``to buy and to sell`` -- would be ``deal,`` in other words, a contract between the ruler and the ruled in which both have obligations.

Some critics may point out that regardless of theory, in reality a pattern of arbitrary, tyrannical, despotic government marks the entire Middle East and other parts of the Islamic world. Some go further, saying, ``That is how Muslims are, that is how Muslims have always been, and there is nothing the West can do about it.`` That is a misreading of history. One has to look back a little way to see how Middle Eastern government arrived at its current state.

The change took place in two phases. Phase one began with Bonaparte`s incursion and continued through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Middle Eastern rulers, painfully aware of the need to catch up with the modern world, tried to modernize their societies, beginning with their governments. These transformations were mostly carried out not by imperialist rulers, who tended to be cautiously conservative, but by local rulers -- the sultans of Turkey, the pashas and khedives of Egypt, the shahs of Persia -- with the best of intentions but with disastrous results.

Modernizing meant introducing Western systems of communication, warfare, and rule, inevitably including the tools of domination and repression. The authority of the state vastly increased with the adoption of instruments of control, surveillance, and enforcement far beyond the capabilities of earlier leaders, so that by the end of the twentieth century any tin-pot ruler of a petty state or even of a quasi state had vastly greater powers than were ever enjoyed by the mighty caliphs and sultans of the past.

But perhaps an even worse result of modernization was the abrogation of the intermediate powers in society -- the landed gentry, the city merchants, the tribal chiefs, and others -- which in the traditional order had effectively limited the authority of the state. These intermediate powers were gradually weakened and mostly eliminated, so that on the one hand the state was getting stronger and more pervasive, and on the other hand the limitations and controls were being whittled away.

This process is described and characterized by one of the best nineteenth-century writers on the Middle East, the British naval officer Adolphus Slade, who was attached as an adviser to the Turkish fleet and spent much of his professional life there. He vividly portrays this process of change. He discusses what he calls the old nobility, primarily the landed gentry and the city bourgeoisie, and the new nobility, those who are part of the state and derive their authority from the ruler, not from their own people. ``The old nobility lived on their estates,`` he concludes. ``The state is the estate of the new nobility.`` This is a profound truth and, in the light of subsequent and current developments, a remarkably prescient formulation.

The second stage of political upheaval in the Middle East can be dated with precision. In 1940, the government of France surrendered to Nazi Germany. A new collaborationist government was formed and established in a watering place called Vichy, and General Charles de Gaulle moved to London and set up a Free French committee. The French empire was beyond the reach of the Germans at that point, and the governors of the French colonies and dependencies were free to decide: they could stay with Vichy or rally to de Gaulle. Vichy was the choice of most of them, and in particular the rulers of the French-mandated territory of Syria- Lebanon, in the heart of the Arab East. This meant that Syria-Lebanon was wide open to the Nazis, who moved in and made it the main base of their propaganda and activity in the Arab world.

It was at that time that the ideological foundations of what later became the Baath Party were laid, with the adaptation of Nazi ideas and methods to the Middle Eastern situation. The nascent party`s ideology emphasized pan-Arabism, nationalism, and a form of socialism. The party was not officially founded until April 1947, but memoirs of the time and other sources show that the Nazi interlude is where it began. From Syria, the Germans and the proto-Baathists also set up a pro-Nazi regime in Iraq, led by the famous, and notorious, Rashid Ali al-Gailani.

The Rashid Ali regime in Iraq was overthrown by the British after a brief military campaign in May-June 1941. Rashid Ali went to Berlin, where he spent the rest of the war as Hitler`s guest with his friend the mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini. British and Free French forces then moved into Syria, transferring it to Gaullist control. In the years that followed the end of World War II, the British and the French departed, and after a brief interval the Soviets moved in.

The leaders of the Baath Party easily switched from the Nazi model to the communist model, needing only minor adjustments. This was a party not in the Western sense of an organization built to win elections and votes. It was a party in the Nazi and Communist sense, part of the government apparatus particularly concerned with indoctrination, surveillance, and repression. The Baath Party in Syria and the separate Baath Party in Iraq continued to function along these lines.

Since 1940 and again after the arrival of the Soviets, the Middle East has basically imported European models of rule: fascist, Nazi, and communist. But to speak of dictatorship as being the immemorial way of doing things in that part of the world is simply untrue. It shows ignorance of the Arab past, contempt for the Arab present, and unconcern for the Arab future. The type of regime that was maintained by Saddam Hussein -- and that continues to be maintained by some other rulers in the Muslim world -- is modern, indeed recent, and very alien to the foundations of Islamic civilization. There are older rules and traditions on which the peoples of the Middle East can build.

CHUTES AND LADDERS

There are, of course, several obvious hindrances to the development of democratic institutions in the Middle East. The first and most obvious is the pattern of autocratic and despotic rule currently embedded there. Such rule is alien, with no roots in either the classical Arab or the Islamic past, but it is by now a couple of centuries old and is well entrenched, constituting a serious obstacle.

Another, more traditional hurdle is the absence in classical Islamic political thought and practice of the notion of citizenship, in the sense of being a free and participating member of a civic entity. This notion, with roots going back to the Greek polites, a member of the polis, has been central in Western civilization from antiquity to the present day. It, and the idea of the people participating not just in the choice of a ruler but in the conduct of government, is not part of traditional Islam. In the great days of the caliphate, there were mighty, flourishing cities, but they had no formal status as such, nor anything that one might recognize as civic government. Towns consisted of agglomerations of neighborhoods, which in themselves constituted an important focus of identity and loyalty. Often, these neighborhoods were based on ethnic, tribal, religious, sectarian, or even occupational allegiances. To this day, there is no word in! Arabic corresponding to ``citizen.`` The word normally used on passports and other documents is muwatin, the literal meaning of which is ``compatriot.`` With a lack of citizenship went a lack of civic representation. Although different social groups did choose their own leaders during the classical period, the concept of choosing individuals to represent the citizenry in a corporate body or assembly was alien to Muslims` experience and practice.

Yet, other positive elements of Islamic history and thought could help in the development of democracy. Notably, the idea of consensual, contractual, and limited government is again becoming an issue today. The traditional rejection of despotism, of istibdad, has gained a new force and a new urgency: Europe may have disseminated the ideology of dictatorship, but it also spread a corresponding ideology of popular revolt against dictatorship.

The rejection of despotism, familiar in both traditional and, increasingly, modern writings, is already having a powerful impact. Muslims are again raising -- and in some cases practicing -- the related idea of consultation. For the pious, these developments are based on holy law and tradition, with an impressive series of precedents in the Islamic past. One sees this revival particularly in Afghanistan, whose people underwent rather less modernization and are therefore finding it easier to resurrect the better traditions of the past, notably consultation by the government with various entrenched interests and loyalty groups. This is the purpose of the Loya Jirga, the ``grand council`` that consists of a wide range of different groups -- ethnic, tribal, religious, regional, professional, and others. There are signs of a tentative movement toward inclusiveness in the Middle East as well.

There are also other positive influences at work, sometimes in surprising forms. Perhaps the single most important development is the adoption of modern communications. The printing press and the newspaper, the telegraph, the radio, and the television have all transformed the Middle East. Initially, communications technology was an instrument of tyranny, giving the state an effective new weapon for propaganda and control.

But this trend could not last indefinitely. More recently, particularly with the rise of the Internet, television satellites, and cell phones, communications technology has begun to have the opposite effect. It is becoming increasingly clear that one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union was the information revolution. The old Soviet system depended in large measure on control of the production, distribution, and exchange of information and ideas; as modern communications developed, this became no longer possible. The information revolution posed the same dilemma for the Soviet Union as the Industrial Revolution did for the Ottoman and other Islamic empires: either accept it and cease to exist in the same manner or reject it and fall increasingly behind the rest of the world. The Soviets tried and failed to resolve this dilemma, and the Russians are still struggling with the consequences.

A parallel process is already beginning in the Islamic countries of the Middle East. Even some of the intensely and unscrupulously propagandist television programs that now infest the airwaves contribute to this process, indirectly and unintentionally, by offering a diversity of lies that arouse suspicion and questioning. Television also brings to the peoples of the Middle East a previously unknown spectacle -- that of lively and vigorous public disagreement and debate. In some places, young people even watch Israeli television. In addition to seeing well- known Israeli public figures ``banging the table and screaming at each other`` (as one Arab viewer described it with wonderment), they sometimes see even Israeli Arabs arguing in the Knesset, denouncing Israeli ministers and policies -- on Israeli television. The spectacle of a lively, vibrant, rowdy democracy at work, notably the unfamiliar sight of unconstrained, uninhibited, ! but orderly argument between conflicting ideas and interests, is having an impact.

Modern communications have also had another effect, in making Middle Eastern Muslims more painfully aware of how badly things have gone wrong. In the past, they were not really conscious of the differences between their world and the rest. They did not realize how far they were falling behind not only the advanced West, but also the advancing East - - first Japan, then China, India, South Korea, and Southeast Asia -- and practically everywhere else in terms of standard of living, achievement, and, more generally, human and cultural development. Even more painful than these differences are the disparities between groups of people in the Middle East itself.

Right now, the question of democracy is more pertinent to Iraq than perhaps to any other Middle Eastern country. In addition to the general factors, Iraq may benefit from two characteristics specific to its circumstances. One relates to infrastructure and education. Of all the countries profiting from oil revenues in the past decades, pre-Saddam Iraq probably made the best use of its revenues. Its leaders developed the country`s roads, bridges, and utilities, and particularly a network of schools and universities of a higher standard than in most other places in the region. These, like everything else in Iraq, were devastated by Saddam`s rule. But even in the worst of conditions, an educated middle class will somehow contrive to educate its children, and the results of this can be seen in the Iraqi people today.

The other advantage is the position of women, which is far better than in most places in the Islamic world. They do not enjoy greater rights -- ``rights`` being a word without meaning in that context -- but rather access and opportunity. Under Saddam`s predecessors, women had access to education, including higher education, and therefore to careers, with few parallels in the Muslim world. In the West, women`s relative freedom has been a major reason for the advance of the greater society; women would certainly be an important, indeed essential, part of a democratic future in the Middle East.

FUNDAMENTAL DANGERS

The main threat to the development of democracy in Iraq and ultimately in other Arab and Muslim countries lies not in any inherent social quality or characteristic, but in the very determined efforts that are being made to ensure democracy`s failure. The opponents of democracy in the Muslim world come from very different sources, with sharply contrasting ideologies. An alliance of expediency exists between different groups with divergent interests.

One such group combines the two interests most immediately affected by the inroads of democracy -- the tyranny of Saddam in Iraq and other endangered tyrannies in the region -- and, pursuing these parallel concerns, is attempting to restore the former and preserve the latter. In this the group also enjoys some at least tacit support from outside forces -- governmental, commercial, ideological, and other -- in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, with a practical or emotional interest in its success.

Most dangerous are the so-called Islamic fundamentalists, those for whom democracy is part of the greater evil emanating from the West, whether in the old-fashioned form of imperial domination or in the more modern form of cultural penetration. Satan, in the Koran, is ``the insidious tempter who whispers in men`s hearts.`` The modernizers, with their appeal to women and more generally to the young, are seen to strike at the very heart of the Islamic order -- the state, the schoolroom, the market, and even the family. The fundamentalists view the Westerners and their dupes and disciples, the Westernizers, as not only impeding the predestined advance of Islam to final triumph in the world, but even endangering it in its homelands. Unlike reformers, fundamentalists perceive the problem of the Muslim world to be not insufficient modernization, but an excess of modernization -- and even modernization itself. For them, democracy is an a! lien and infidel intrusion, part of the larger and more pernicious influence of the Great Satan and his cohorts.

The fundamentalist response to Western rule and still more to Western social and cultural influence has been gathering force for a long time. It has found expression in an increasingly influential literature and in a series of activist movements, the most notable of which is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928. Political Islam first became a major international factor with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The word ``revolution`` has been much misused in the Middle East and has served to designate and justify almost any violent transfer of power at the top. But what happened in Iran was a genuine revolution, a major change with a very significant ideological challenge, a shift in the basis of society that had an immense impact on the whole Islamic world, intellectually, morally, and politically. The process that began in Iran in 1979 was a revolution in the same sense as the French and the Russian revolutions were. Like! its predecessors, the Iranian Revolution has gone through various stages of inner and outer conflict and change and now seems to be entering the Napoleonic or, perhaps more accurately, the Stalinist phase.

The theocratic regime in Iran swept to power on a wave of popular support nourished by resentment against the old regime, its policies, and its associations. Since then, the regime has become increasingly unpopular as the ruling mullahs have shown themselves to be just as corrupt and oppressive as the ruling cliques in other countries in the region. There are many indications in Iran of a rising tide of discontent. Some seek radical change in the form of a return to the past; others, by far the larger number, place their hopes in the coming of true democracy. The rulers of Iran are thus very apprehensive of democratic change in Iraq, the more so as a majority of Iraqis are Shiites, like the Iranians. By its mere existence, a Shiite democracy on Iran`s western frontier would pose a challenge, indeed a mortal threat, to the regime of the mullahs, so they are doing what they can to prevent or deflect it.

Of far greater importance at the present are the Sunni fundamentalists. An important element in the Sunni holy war is the rise and spread -- and in some areas dominance -- of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is a school of Islam that arose in Nejd, in central Arabia, in the eighteenth century. It caused some trouble to the rulers of the Muslim world at the time but was eventually repressed and contained. It reappeared in the twentieth century and acquired new importance when the House of Saud, the local tribal chiefs committed to Wahhabism, conquered the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and created the Saudi monarchy. This brought together two factors of the highest importance. One, the Wahhabi Saudis now ruled the holy cities and therefore controlled the annual Muslim pilgrimage, which gave them immense prestige and influence in the Islamic world. Two, the discovery and exploitation of oil placed immense wealth at their disposal. What would otherwise! have been an extremist fringe in a marginal country thus had a worldwide impact. Now the forces that were nourished, nurtured, and unleashed threaten even the House of Saud itself.

The first great triumph of the Sunni fundamentalists was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which they saw -- not unreasonably -- as their victory. For them the Soviet Union was defeated not in the Cold War waged by the West, but in the Islamic jihad waged by the guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan. As Osama bin Laden and his cohorts have put it, they destroyed one of the two last great infidel superpowers -- the more difficult and the more dangerous of the two. Dealing with the pampered and degenerate Americans would, so they believed, be much easier. American actions and discourse have at times weakened and at times strengthened this belief.

In a genuinely free election, fundamentalists would have several substantial advantages over moderates and reformers. One is that they speak a language familiar to Muslims. Democratic parties promote an ideology and use a terminology mostly strange to the ``Muslim street.`` The fundamentalist parties, on the other hand, employ familiar words and evoke familiar values both to criticize the existing secularist, authoritarian order and to offer an alternative. To broadcast this message, the fundamentalists utilize an enormously effective network that meets and communicates in the mosque and speaks from the pulpit. None of the secular parties has access to anything comparable. Religious revolutionaries, and even terrorists, also gain support because of their frequently genuine efforts to alleviate the suffering of the common people. This concern often stands in marked contrast with the callous and greedy unconcern of the current wield! ers of power and influence in the Middle East. The example of the Iranian Revolution would seem to indicate that once in power these religious militants are no better, and are sometimes even worse, than those they overthrow and replace. But until then, both the current perceptions and the future hopes of the people can work in their favor.

Finally, perhaps most important of all, democratic parties are ideologically bound to allow fundamentalists freedom of action. The fundamentalists suffer from no such disability; on the contrary, it is their mission when in power to suppress sedition and unbelief.

Despite these difficulties, there are signs of hope, notably the Iraqi general election in January. Millions of Iraqis went to polling stations, stood in line, and cast their votes, knowing that they were risking their lives at every moment of the process. It was a truly momentous achievement, and its impact can already be seen in neighboring Arab and other countries. Arab democracy has won a battle, not a war, and still faces many dangers, both from ruthless and resolute enemies and from hesitant and unreliable friends. But it was a major battle, and the Iraqi election may prove a turning point in Middle Eastern history no less important than the arrival of General Bonaparte and the French Revolution in Egypt more than two centuries ago.

FEAR ITSELF

The creation of a democratic political and social order in Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East will not be easy. But it is possible, and there are increasing signs that it has already begun. At the present time there are two fears concerning the possibility of establishing a democracy in Iraq. One is the fear that it will not work, a fear expressed by many in the United States and one that is almost a dogma in Europe; the other fear, much more urgent in ruling circles in the Middle East, is that it will work. Clearly, a genuinely free society in Iraq would constitute a mortal threat to many of the governments of the region, including both Washington`s enemies and some of those seen as Washington`s allies.

The end of World War II opened the way for democracy in the former Axis powers. The end of the Cold War brought a measure of freedom and a movement toward democracy in much of the former Soviet domains. With steadfastness and patience, it may now be possible at last to bring both justice and freedom to the long-tormented peoples of the Middle East.

Dost Sahib # 15:
``...
Support for Saddam, despite his hostility towards Israel, was only because of his enemity with the Mullahs of Iran. This was at a time when Iran was considered to be inhabited by the ``fanatic shia sect`` of Islam out to export its brand of extremist Islam to other Muslim countries while the ``moderate Wahabi Sunni Islam`` practised by the Saudis was supposed to provide an antidote to the shiite organizations like Hizbullah. ...``

Iran since dismantling of Shah has showed a political belief of Islam and I disagree of its been thrust a label of ``Fanatic Shia Occupant``... Pushing out the monarchy from Iran and seizing corrupt activiites of Shah was enough to paralyze Carter`s Presidency and after inaguration of Ragon Iran was to be taught a lesson by supporting Saddam Hussain for using Bological and Chemical Weapons against Iran. However Saddam practised anti shia-ism in his territory as well causing hundreds of Shia muslim Immigrants and casualities. In that time Khomeini played a heroic role of speaking for Iran and grooming it towards prosperity. Whereas modern approach to Islam called as Wahabism is just a 180 degrees turn to demolish values and temper the religion.
Iran and its leadership are alleged to support terrorism in middle east by holding up terrorist organizations as Hizbullah which has brutually saved Lebanon and freed it from U.S inch by inch. Though they are blamed for initiating suicide bombing and hijacking but there existed a power to knock down U.S and its millitancy.

ERIC MARGOLIS of the TORONTO SUN is a known anti US writer and here is his article. The tone is taunting and effort is to discredit the US but he captures the new US policy in the Mideast pretty much accurately. Remove the tainted glasses that he wears and the US policy would be clear to all.

With out shaking up the ME nothing would change. The writing is on the wall. Islamic militants and their supporters should now be ready to eat the dust.
This is as close to the US policy description that any one can be. Of course Margolis as usual brings in his age old rhetoric/bile in the article too.
Some excerpts.
(Emphasis mine)

“U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went to Cairo last week to tell her Egyptian hosts and the Saudis, America`s two most important Arab allies: No more stalling, you have to hold honest elections now.

Rice`s tough talk was certainly long overdue. She admitted America`s policy of supporting Mideast despots and oligarchs for the past 30 years had been wrong. (Actually, Condi, it`s 60 years, but never mind.)

The Bush administration has correctly concluded the kings, sheiks and generals who run the Mideast under American tutelage are a spent force. They have lost all legitimacy and are increasingly unable to repress the wave of Islamic militancy fuelled by Osama bin Laden that is sweeping the strategic region.

So Washington decided its loyal Mideast satraps are due for regime change.
Bush`s Mideast policy team and its Israeli mentors concluded the best way to defuse Islamic militancy is to bring in new ``moderate`` civilian regimes elected in what appears, at least from afar, to be a democratic process.

The new model of Mideast rulers Washington has in mind can be seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. Turbans and general`s hats are out. The Mideast`s new look will be ``moderates`` -- low-key, non-flamboyant, fluent English-speakers in sober business suits who are ``Muslims lite`` and owe their total financial and political support, as well as personal protection, to Washington.
Finding pliable ``moderates`` in other Arab nations will be hard. Their ruthless, U.S.-supported regimes long ago crushed any legitimate opposition, leaving only underground extremist groups.

Control of the Arab world and its oil is a pillar of U.S. power. It`s unlikely Washington will ever countenance genuinely free Mideast elections.”

http://torontosun.canoe.ca/News/Columnists/Margolis_Eric/
2005/06/26/1105205-sun.html

#15 Dost-Mittar:

The culture that we are originally from teaches us to be respectful toward people who are older (and presumably wiser) than us. The culture that I have adopted and surrounded myself with also teaches me to speak my mind clearly on issues that I consider important, no matter how old the ignorant other party is. So, I’ll try to balance the two.

Dear Sir, first of all please stop putting self-serving (to you) words into my mouth. I never said that your conclusions were “brave and speculative”, so stop “agreeing” on that score! What I didn’t have the heart to say in #1, but am saying now in no unclear terms is that your conclusions are pieces of crap and they stink to high heavens! It’s stereotyping of the first order to say that “Jews have this” and “Jews have that”. The “neo-cons” that you refer to so derisively are not one group of people, there is a lot of variety there (mostly non-Jews) and these are very patriotic Americans (I have my doubts that you are one, sir, otherwise you would not reveal such a level of contempt for U.S. ability to make its own foreign policy decisions!) (How about this food for thought – the “Beej” considers himself a neo-con, too, because he AGREES with the neo-cons on a lot of issues!)

Let me put it this way, Sir, the diplomatic niceties that you read so much into – they don’t mean didley! (Have you forgotten sir, how Zia-ul-Haque would come and watch cricket in India during the mid-eighties – and does it not tickle your fancy that during all that time, his minions were simultaneously pumping arms to the Khalistani crowd?! (Who knows, perhaps some of your current best friends were involved in that racket, too.))

You claim to be a policy analyst, I find it extremely difficult to believe that with such a simplistic approach to issues, anybody would take you seriously; I can only imagine what kind of heap of trouble they would land into! Also, I am not surprised that you use a nick to hide behind as an author – with views like this you would probably be run out of town in minutes!

To me, it’s utterly disgusting how whole bunch of “authors” at the chowk web site (with the possible exception of NHK) constantly beat up on the Jewish people. I think a point could be legitimately made that you are one wise “owl” who doesn’t give a hoot about stereotyping, racism, and other forms of discrimination as long your own fanny stays safe. Jews to you sir, are an easy target, because you hope that nobody in THIS crowd will come after you for your irresponsible blanket statements because this crowd only cares about India or Pakistan. Dear Sir, you are wrong as wrong can be! THIS interactor does care and will not let you get away with such garbage, because although I may be younger than you, I at least understand that condoning racism in one form is condoning racism in all its forms! So wake up, Sir!!!

For once and for all, stop beating up on the Jewish people to please some of your narrow-minded Pakistani “friends” (to whom you would probably always be in second-tier anyway – no matter how much of beef-eating you try to impress them with). The Jewish people are a fine bunch, they are hard workers (yes there is no magic wand for them, either!) and Indians could learn a lot from them – especially on how to survive Islamic terrorism!

Sincerely,
BeeJay

BeeJay:

Yes, I agree that the conclusion is somewhat brave and speculative. But one can see some pointers already. The U.S has started to appear more even-handed in its dealings with the Israelis and Palestinians. Sharon got a lecture when he came to Washington recently and Abbas was given equal prominence and treated with kid gloves. Rice too gave equal prominence to the two sides during her visit to the Middle East.

``The reality is there is NO gridlock held by any Pro-Israeli lobby on the U.S. This country (USA) does what is in ITS national interest, which at a particular moment may coincide with Israel’s (and has done that quite often, perhaps not unexpectedly, since Israel is the ONLY democratic country in the region).``

I would disagree on this point. Please see the composition of neocons who surround the White House policy making apparatus; some of them are said to be even members of the Israeli Likud Party. Israel being a democracy had little to do with the U.S support; lack of democracy was never a criterion for the U.S support. It is a moot point whether U.S interests were served by antagonising the entire Arab/Muslim world.

cayenne:

``Dost, why are you so interested what Arab-American relations should be?.Stop beating up on the Israelis, fer crissakes.They`re a small nation trying to survive in an hostile environment.``

I am interested because what happens in the Middle East has a huge effect on Muslim populations and can affect the entire world. Have you forgotten 9-11 already? Nobody is denying Israel`s right to exist, but its true security lies in its genuine acceptance by its Arab neighbours, which, in turn, depends upon an acceptable solution to the Palestine issue.

rahulmal#3:
``The newfound love of US for democracy is a chimera. They may be able to sell this to gullible Americans, but we are nobody`s fools. There is no sight of democracy in KSA, Jordan, Egypt and a host of other corrupt, despotic and anti-people regimes. The march of `freedom` is only apparent in oil-rich countries with anti-US governments.``

I don`t know about the rest of the world but I think they do mean business and prepared to take some risks in that direction in the Middle East. It is not a coincidence that all sheikhdoms, even KSA, and Egypt have started to take some baby steps towards democracy. But if it turns into one disaster after another, the U.S may be forced to step back; in my opinion, this is unlikely to happen if the US is genuinely seen to be even-handed in its dealings with Israelis and Palestinians.

#11 by Romair on June 27, 2005 12:45pm PT

Ok capt clueless...we get it....America is kaput

This article is grossly incorrect in historic perspective.

Stability? For whom? American policy in the middle east and elsewhere has been America First. If the US was alarmed by the election of someone they view as inimical to their economic interests they would engineer instability. Democracy, only so long as it coincided with American ecomonic interest, could be tolerated.
Condi Rice as with everyone else in this administration either lies or dissembles.

I am not sure how the USA is going to get out of this whole situation. USA policy in the Middle East is directed by two conflicting interests:

- Unconditional support to Israel
- Easy access to oil

The former is dictated by the pressure groups that exist inside the USA. Anyone who thinks these pressure groups are immaterial has very little knowledge of how US politics works. The most powerful political pressure group in the USA is the NRA. The second most powerful group is AIPAC. Any Congressman or Senator that takes a stand opposite to these groups is specifically targeted for defeat by these groups. And these groups usually succeed. This is why one sees pictures of John Kerry with guns in his campaign ads. This is also why, not a single Presidential candidate comes even close to criticizing Israel. One would think, at least someone would criticize Israel. In fact, there are more political leaders inside Israel, itself, criticizing Israeli policies, than in the USA……The EU, a block on which USA’s trade future is dependent is regularly criticized by American politicians, but never Israel…….

All opinion polls in the USA clearly show that the American public favors a Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza, with a capital in East Jerusalem. Yet the USA govt. has not even come close to being able to get the Israeli govt. to agree to that……This indicates the power of the AIPAC lobbyists and supporters…….

This interest of supporting Israel, unconditionally, is in contrast with the USA’s own interest of getting easy access to oil. The more the USA supports Israel, the more the people of the oil producing countries turn against the USA. This has reached extreme proportions. A situation now exists where any election in any Middle East country will result in an anti-US govt. In many, if not most cases, it will result in religious parties winning. This has happened in Iran and Iraq. It happened in Algeria. And even in Turkey. It will happen in Egypt, if elections are allowed. And in Saudi Arabia also. And in various other countries…….

Due to this, the USA is forced to support dictators, many of whom do not have the better interests of their own countries in mind, in the area, since that is the only way to guarantee access to easy oil and simultaneously support Israel, unconditionally. The support of the Saudi kings, Mubarak, King of Jordan, Saddam (in the 80s), Shah of Iran, restoration of Sabah family in Kuwait after Gulf I etc. are prime examples. The list goes on and on……

The above is a very fragile imbalance for the USA. Sooner or later something was bound to give. Al-Qaeda and the recent Iraq War is a result of this imbalance…….I don’t know of any way of correcting this imbalance, other than forcing Israel to accept Palestine, at least uptil 67 borders. A solution that the Arab countries have agree to. That will change public opinion in Arab countries for the USA. At which point, elections may not produce anti-US govts…….

The other solution is to the bomb the hell out of any dictator, like Saddam, who opposes the USA. And keep in power, even against public opinion in the dictator’s country, any dictator, like the Sauds and Mubarak and Abdullah, who supports the USA. This policy, however, is only making the problem worse……..

At some point, some US govt. will have to pressurize Israel to give the Palestinians a viable state. However, no govt. can afford to do that, in the USA, due to internal US politics. This has become even more difficult, now, since Christian Evangelists have now become an even bigger pressure group than NRA. And they believe that Israel has to be supported, due to issues related to the second coming of Christ………

ballukhan #4

`` It is time a group of NRI pooled in resources to exterminate Dawood and his henchmen from Karachi and Dubai by taking the services of ex-army men...........................................................shame on India for not eliminating this ISI pest for long.............``

What makes you think Dawood even deserves any attention ? If he was really a threat to the Indian elite he would be long gone.

“It is generally believed that the U.S Mid-East policy is a prisoner to the Israeli interests. While this is largely true,”

As BJ has pointed out this has never been the case. Israel, a small country, stuck between several antagonist regimes, had no chance to survive unless it tied itself with a behemoth power. Israel first survived with the brits support and then with the US.

The US controlled the Israeli policy and it was never the other way around. Israel did create some lobbying interest and some influence in the US congress but these interests would last as long as the US administration or the establishment is tolerant about it. The minute they turn away from Israel, the lobbying influence would disappear too.

With a competing power soviet Union in the area during the cold war, Israel did become a lynchpin of the US policy in the area. After the cold war, the impotent Clinton regime was happy with just mediating and status quo.

After the 2WW, Mostly the Republican Party has taken lead in shaking things up in the international arena. It has brought new thinking and some novel approaches and overall has proven to be more cognizant of the new and emerging realities in the world.

The ME policy needed a full scale review especially after the Jihadi elements shook the area and showed enormous aggressiveness in challenging the US without any provocation from the US.
Whether the US policy makers like it or not, those uncouth and stupid Jihadis have become a force that needs to be tackled in the ME. They are a small problem but create a huge psychological impact on the general masses in the ME. They needed to be confronted both militarily and politically. While the US is confronting them in Iraq militarily, it also needs to confront them in other peaceful Arab states to reduce the sense of betrayal in the Arab community. The Arab leadership needs to be shaken too.

With strong support of democracy in the area and reduced emphasis on Israel, the US would be able to challenge Jihadi on the streets of Ramalla and Mecca. In other words, in the next ten-twenty years we may see a couple of more Israels in the ME.

The former communists and socialists are natural allies of the US in the ME and countries like Pakistan and India. The US will have to bring them aboard, if it wants changes to be permanent in nature.

Dost

I hope your last sentence comes true.

I think the Iraq blunder has cost them a lot - more in the psychological sense of infallibility in front of rest of the world.

They were going great guns since the First Gulf War. Now they will think twice before moving into another country.

The American people almost changed the course - but Kerry lost.

The Unipolar world of US is fast getting opposing contenders like the EU and China.

They can still salvage their reputation and stakes by being a little more fair towards the Palestineans. (Now Arafat has gone and even that excuse is no more there)

nhk

Dost Sahib:

Putting aside Rice`s speech this was a way simple approach of infering reference of hero Gamal Abdel Nasser. A revolutionest in history of Arabs to throw out colonialism and will be reminded for his anti-Israel efforts and who made U.S amend his policies towards Mid-east...

``Under this policy, despots and dictators who depended more on the support of Mullahs than of civil society, were given support and military protection as long as they supported the West and opposed communists``

Apart this led america to support Bastards like Saddam Hussain whose brutuality for his country defected not his state but also Iran to a heavy extent. Ironically he was also thrown off when expectations got materialized.
Its the irony too that Taliban forces were formulaized by Americans with full support to defeat Soviet Union by urging the inside Mullahism of Afghans using thick Generals of Pakistan and then post 9/11 they were to pay the price of being ignorant faithfuls.

The fresh elective democracy selecting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as their young President in Iran is strong set back for America who in his first press conference talked to work out nuclear plans and assured making better Social Freedom in continuance to apprehend the spirits of ``Murg Ba America`...``Murg Ba Israel``