A Muslim Pope?
Wait a minute don’t tell me u have forgiven us, are u full of hot air?
Don’t tell me u lack credibility along with gumption.
And yes we are hungry, haven’t slept a wink either. Still waiting for u to ship us galactic warrior.
Sadna
Did u get a wahi/siddhi that they were jihaidst or did they pay u a personal call?
Posted by
hindvi
Jan 3, 2006 06:46 am
Arjunm (m for muscles?) I and my family are still waiting, packed and ready, we are sweating bricks, when are u moving us to Pakistan? Wait a minute don’t tell me u have forgiven us, are u full of hot air?
Don’t tell me u lack credibility along with gumption.
And yes we are hungry, haven’t slept a wink either. Still waiting for u to ship us galactic warrior.
Sadna
Did u get a wahi/siddhi that they were jihaidst or did they pay u a personal call?
Remembering Munish
And you expect me to reveal the location of my family? Are u related to Togadia, by any chance? You would make a great stand up.
Here is some gratuitous advice: Get a life outside of the net, India’s galactic victory doesn’t rely on your cyber skills. After a life time of posting you have done your bit, the amount of hours you are putting in just aint healthy.
And please don’t leave your day job to become a macroeconomist or social scientist.
Chow
Posted by
hindvi
Jan 3, 2006 03:04 am
Pal here is a time line for you: In your life time you will see a solution of the problem that will raise your BP no matter what spin you put on it. Sorry, if this doesn’t satisfy your punch card sensibilities.And you expect me to reveal the location of my family? Are u related to Togadia, by any chance? You would make a great stand up.
Here is some gratuitous advice: Get a life outside of the net, India’s galactic victory doesn’t rely on your cyber skills. After a life time of posting you have done your bit, the amount of hours you are putting in just aint healthy.
And please don’t leave your day job to become a macroeconomist or social scientist.
Chow
Remembering Munish
and whiz why dont you check where I am logged in from?
Posted by
hindvi
Jan 3, 2006 02:09 am
arjun here is a reality check for u, there is a whole wide outside of your coding center, in this world the Kashmiris are more concerned about Pakistan cutting and running than they are of the conflict continuing. This shows a level of comitment that you will never be capable of.and whiz why dont you check where I am logged in from?
Remembering Munish
I know the truth hurts, but you can go ahead and try your best. Take your softest or hardest line, push me and my family out, and u will slowly see Kasmir slipping out of your grasp too. Anyway you have zero credibility with me, for u are safely enconsced far away from your machette wielding brothers.
adios
Posted by
hindvi
Jan 3, 2006 01:42 am
arjunmI know the truth hurts, but you can go ahead and try your best. Take your softest or hardest line, push me and my family out, and u will slowly see Kasmir slipping out of your grasp too. Anyway you have zero credibility with me, for u are safely enconsced far away from your machette wielding brothers.
adios
A Muslim Pope?
Jinnah and gandhi were both were both politicians the difference being that gandhi was a more skilled and reponsible operator than Jinnah, he connected with the masses where as Jinnah never could.
As regards Azad, though he was the wisest, he was not the most representative leader of the congress, gandhi and the Hindu leaders of the congress were within their right to reject his advice. The tragedy of India is that when Jinnah was more reasonable as in the 20s the masses didnt listen to him and when Azad was of more sane counsel in 46 they didnt listen to Azad. having said that i am not absolving Gandhi, Nehru and the others of blame unlike what you are doing to Mr Jinnah, these leaders showed an obstinacy that could only be rivaled by Mr Jinnah, but the difference is Mr Jinnah abandoned approximately half his constituents (including the muslims in east punjab, north rajisthan, delhi, western districts of UP, West Bengal, certain districts of Bihar, the muslims of the rest of India not to speak of the Hindus of Pakistan) and had he been a responsible and duty bound leader he would not have done so remember Kants dictum: the minimum acceptable level of ethics is to do one`s duty.
He showed immaturity and lack of vision in failing to come up with an acceptable counter offer right from the failure of the cabinet mission plan in 46 to the partition of India plan of June-July of 47 when time finally ran out on him, he showed neither initiative nor creative negotiation to the detriment and utter ruination of a huge chunk of muslims and hindus, mind you again I am not absolving Gandhi/Nehru and the congress of their responsibility either, but then unlike you neither am I raising them to the level of Prophets that you are doing with Mr Jinnah.
Posted by
hindvi
Jan 3, 2006 01:29 am
Jinnah`s position from 1940 onwards till his death were duplicitous, he keeps saying muslims and hindus are two distinct nations and then on August the 14th turns around and asks hindus to be Pakistanis and muslims to become Indians, is this upright?. He along with the League fuels a fear psychosis among muslims and then sits down to negotiate with the Congress, heck what was left to negotiate? Indulging in wild rehetoric and inflammatory language for political expediency, is that what you call upright?Jinnah and gandhi were both were both politicians the difference being that gandhi was a more skilled and reponsible operator than Jinnah, he connected with the masses where as Jinnah never could.
As regards Azad, though he was the wisest, he was not the most representative leader of the congress, gandhi and the Hindu leaders of the congress were within their right to reject his advice. The tragedy of India is that when Jinnah was more reasonable as in the 20s the masses didnt listen to him and when Azad was of more sane counsel in 46 they didnt listen to Azad. having said that i am not absolving Gandhi, Nehru and the others of blame unlike what you are doing to Mr Jinnah, these leaders showed an obstinacy that could only be rivaled by Mr Jinnah, but the difference is Mr Jinnah abandoned approximately half his constituents (including the muslims in east punjab, north rajisthan, delhi, western districts of UP, West Bengal, certain districts of Bihar, the muslims of the rest of India not to speak of the Hindus of Pakistan) and had he been a responsible and duty bound leader he would not have done so remember Kants dictum: the minimum acceptable level of ethics is to do one`s duty.
He showed immaturity and lack of vision in failing to come up with an acceptable counter offer right from the failure of the cabinet mission plan in 46 to the partition of India plan of June-July of 47 when time finally ran out on him, he showed neither initiative nor creative negotiation to the detriment and utter ruination of a huge chunk of muslims and hindus, mind you again I am not absolving Gandhi/Nehru and the congress of their responsibility either, but then unlike you neither am I raising them to the level of Prophets that you are doing with Mr Jinnah.
A Muslim Pope?
lastly it was Gandhi`s prerogative not to give into every demand of the League and the British, negotiation does not mean capitulation he and the congress was the stronger party and being so were expected to to exert their weight. If gandhi can be faulted than jinnah is even more at fault, no sane man can expect the opposition to cut its own nose in spite. jinnah should have come up with counter proposals rather than take precipitate action.
Your Chauvinism and that of the indian right are but mirror images of each other, no dispasionate reading of history can lend itself to the hero worship of Jinnah that u indulge in. He led a long campaign of negative rehetoric at the national level, further poisining a precarious situation and leaving a legacy in India of a divided nation, at several points he showed extreme hubirous, and an almost childish peevishnes with the congress and gandhi.
utlimately he hurled verbal abuse at one community and did not work in the interests of almost half the people who voted for him, ultimately making a clean volte face, on the other hand Gandhi never verbally attacked another community and certainly took much better care of his own constituency right from the 1919 adoption of non violence as a prudent strategy against an oppenet who could inflict serious damage on his constituents.
Posted by
hindvi
Jan 2, 2006 11:51 pm
How is Gandhi reponsible for Jinnah abandoning his constituency and his position as the ``sole spokesman``? what Indus country are u harping about,? their has never been a country situated on the river indus, the resolution that you talk about itself never used the word Pakistan. The Punjabi of the Central Plains had much less in common with a Pashtun than a sikh of the punjab Plains and let me remind u, without the bengal muslim vote Pakistan would have remained a wet dream, and how did Pakistan payback those dark bengalees?lastly it was Gandhi`s prerogative not to give into every demand of the League and the British, negotiation does not mean capitulation he and the congress was the stronger party and being so were expected to to exert their weight. If gandhi can be faulted than jinnah is even more at fault, no sane man can expect the opposition to cut its own nose in spite. jinnah should have come up with counter proposals rather than take precipitate action.
Your Chauvinism and that of the indian right are but mirror images of each other, no dispasionate reading of history can lend itself to the hero worship of Jinnah that u indulge in. He led a long campaign of negative rehetoric at the national level, further poisining a precarious situation and leaving a legacy in India of a divided nation, at several points he showed extreme hubirous, and an almost childish peevishnes with the congress and gandhi.
utlimately he hurled verbal abuse at one community and did not work in the interests of almost half the people who voted for him, ultimately making a clean volte face, on the other hand Gandhi never verbally attacked another community and certainly took much better care of his own constituency right from the 1919 adoption of non violence as a prudent strategy against an oppenet who could inflict serious damage on his constituents.
A Muslim Pope?
No Icon would stand upto close scrutiny, the masses may be unaware of it but most informed people know of Gandhi`s social conservatism, it was inevitable in a religious mindset, yet one must be aware that while he did not support abolishment of the caste system he did at great personal sacrifice and effort try to remove the most egregious aspects of that system. Your bringing forth his views on race was certainly an eyeopener, but considering he was born in 1869 and considering the situation of the blacks he encountered in south africa and the widespread racism there his views were not unsual. This is not a defence of him or his views but puting of things in the right perspective. every man has his positive and negative attributes and Gandhi certainly had huge positives, he always stood by moderation rather than radicalism, he stood for the preservation of life rather than the destruction, he always made an attempt to maintain peace between hindus and muslims and saved the lives of thousands of members of the other community.
it is also true that he was a religous hindu and he could have pursued a more secular and unifying strategy of national resistance and revival, it is true that he wanted to maintain hindu and muslim as seperate identities as he wanted to maintain each caste as seperate but that was an inevitable outcome of his religosity. atleast he didnt have the evil of violence and hatred that religion most often gives rise to. we can accuse him of being dictatorial within the congress but considering the power he wilded among the masses he was far less dictatorial than Jinnah was withinn the league. was he not as mindful of muslim political rightsa s he could be? certainly but was he as damaging as he could have been? far from it, ultimately it was Jinnah who betrayed the muslims, since it was he who campaigned and cajoled them for 10 long years into nominating him as their solesokesman and reassuring tham that he would protect their interests only to abandon them when push came to shove. it was not Gandhi`s responsibility, gandhi though can be blamed by the hindus who found themselves on the wrong side of the border on 15 august 1947.
If you have taken the highly negative view of gandhi in reponse to the indian denigration of jinnah than that its unfortunate for two wrongs dont make a right. Ultimately one has to bear in mind that Gandhi was a politician and his actions were calculated in that light. and one has to admit that he was far better than almost all who have donned that title
Posted by
hindvi
Jan 2, 2006 10:57 pm
MantoNo Icon would stand upto close scrutiny, the masses may be unaware of it but most informed people know of Gandhi`s social conservatism, it was inevitable in a religious mindset, yet one must be aware that while he did not support abolishment of the caste system he did at great personal sacrifice and effort try to remove the most egregious aspects of that system. Your bringing forth his views on race was certainly an eyeopener, but considering he was born in 1869 and considering the situation of the blacks he encountered in south africa and the widespread racism there his views were not unsual. This is not a defence of him or his views but puting of things in the right perspective. every man has his positive and negative attributes and Gandhi certainly had huge positives, he always stood by moderation rather than radicalism, he stood for the preservation of life rather than the destruction, he always made an attempt to maintain peace between hindus and muslims and saved the lives of thousands of members of the other community.
it is also true that he was a religous hindu and he could have pursued a more secular and unifying strategy of national resistance and revival, it is true that he wanted to maintain hindu and muslim as seperate identities as he wanted to maintain each caste as seperate but that was an inevitable outcome of his religosity. atleast he didnt have the evil of violence and hatred that religion most often gives rise to. we can accuse him of being dictatorial within the congress but considering the power he wilded among the masses he was far less dictatorial than Jinnah was withinn the league. was he not as mindful of muslim political rightsa s he could be? certainly but was he as damaging as he could have been? far from it, ultimately it was Jinnah who betrayed the muslims, since it was he who campaigned and cajoled them for 10 long years into nominating him as their solesokesman and reassuring tham that he would protect their interests only to abandon them when push came to shove. it was not Gandhi`s responsibility, gandhi though can be blamed by the hindus who found themselves on the wrong side of the border on 15 august 1947.
If you have taken the highly negative view of gandhi in reponse to the indian denigration of jinnah than that its unfortunate for two wrongs dont make a right. Ultimately one has to bear in mind that Gandhi was a politician and his actions were calculated in that light. and one has to admit that he was far better than almost all who have donned that title
Remembering Munish
Posted by
hindvi
Jan 2, 2006 09:36 pm
another innocent victim of a pointless conflict. When the Pakistani and Indian advocates of a hardline on Kashmir quote Stalin: An individual`s death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic - they somehow block out the individual cases (unless its of their own side). But cases such as Munish Puri bring it all back. let us not forget that for every Munish there are hundreds if not thousands of innocent Kashmiri men and women who have been killed, maimed or raped in the flower of their youth. And lets spare a momemt for those hundred of young Jawans who have been crippled or killed in their primes, in a conflict far from home, where they have landed due to an accident of fate.
A Muslim Pope?
Contours are constantly changing and a few hundred years down the road their may be no India and Pakistan but some decentralised grouping of consanguinous regions. But to evolve beyond the current state of perpetual hostility and competing strong nationalisms we need to resolve Kashmir, for it is the crux and the pivot of Indo pak relations. Here is something to chew on:
Hindustan Times
A solution, anyone?
A.G. Noorani
December 19, 2005
‘The BJP alone can find a solution to our problems with Pakistan, because Hindus will never think whatever we have done is a sell-off,’ L.K. Advani said on March 13, 2004. Ousted from power, the BJP has done its best to obstruct the peace process. A.B. Vajpayee wrote to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on June 16, 2005, criticising the government’s halting steps towards a rapprochement. It would be a great pity if the PM were to allow himself to be deflected from course by the BJP.
The two-year-old peace process has reached a deadlock; but the Kashmir issue has reached a stage from which, with skill and good will, it can be brought to a finale fully consistent with the criteria which the PM propounded in May 2004. He told Jonathan Power that “the Kashmir dispute is stopping us from realising our potential” and “we have an obligation to ourselves to solve the problem”. The correspondent reported: “I pushed him on how far he himself would accept compromise with Pakistan over Kashmir. ‘Short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything’.”
President Pervez Musharraf’s proposal for ‘self-governance’ ensures just that. It marks abandonment of the 58-year-old demand for ‘self-determination’, which implies change of status, unlike self-governance. The contrast is so glaring. Its nuances emerge clearly when the record is recalled. Two years ago, on December 18, 2003, Musharraf said, “We are for the UN Security Council resolutions, whatever that stands for. However, now we have left that aside. We keep saying that if we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility… going beyond stated positions… and meeting halfway.” This was said on the eve of the Saarc summit in Islamabad where he met Prime Minister Vajpayee. The dialogue process was resumed on January 6, 2004.
On October 25, 2004, he suggested a precise, if debatable, formula as “a food for thought for you (the editors). Take Kashmir in its entirety. It has seven regions. Two of the regions are in Pakistan and five are in India... identify a region, whether it is the whole of seven or part. I do not know. Identify the region forever and change its status.” Three features stand out — tentativeness, tacit acceptance of the partition of J&K and change of status, which India could not possibly accept.
A major step was taken this year on April 18 when the president said: “The LoC cannot be permanent. Borders must be made irrelevant and boundaries cannot be altered. Take the three together, and now discuss the solution.” This was amplified on May 20 when ‘self-government’ was first aired. “We need to find a via media where Kashmiris who may be demanding independence, even their concerns are addressed. Self-government must be allowed to the people of Kashmir.” More to the point: “We do understand India’s sensitivity over their secular credentials” and, therefore, “it cannot be, may be on a religious basis”. On demilitarisation, he left open the question whether it “should precede or follow cessation of militancy”. It was like “the egg and the chicken conundrum”. Significantly, he suggested a regional basis as part of which “maximum self-governance must be allowed and borders rendered irrelevant”.
He was perceptibly inching towards acceptance of the status quo. The Rubicon was crossed with an interview at Canberra on June 14 in which he said: “Autonomous Kashmir is my earnest desire, but its complete independence will not be acceptable to both Pakistan and India.” If plebiscite under the UN’s resolutions is ruled out, as it was on December 18, 2003, and so is independence, what else remained but acceptance of the status quo — subject to negotiations on the consequences of the accord? What more can Pakistan possibly concede? Do we expect it simply to accept the LoC, and cry quits?
The interview was published just as the APHC leaders were set to return to Srinagar from their trip to Pakistan. It is unlikely that the president did not give them any inkling of his ideas. It was during this promising phase that Vajpayee decided to throw a spanner in the works. He did not want anyone but the BJP to receive credit for such a historic accord.
Against this background, stretching over two years, the president’s latest offer acquires particular significance. He told the BBC on October 21 that it was necessary to identify exactly “what is Kashmir”; demilitarise the identified region and then give self-government to the people there. “I have always believed there is an opportunity of a lifetime to solve the dispute,” adding. “Let’s make the LoC irrelevant. Let’s open it out.”
He did not demand either abrogation of the LoC or a change in status of any region as he had on October 25, 2004. He used the terms self-government and autonomy synonymously. They both imply tacit acceptance of the sovereignty of the State that administered the territory. That on November 13, during the Saarc summit at Dhaka, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz mooted the proposal to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggests that Pakistan is in earnest about it.
Musharraf’s proposal must be read in the context of his strong, repeated encouragement to the APHC to parley with India, in total contrast to Pakistan’s opposition to such talks in the past. In Kashmir, the proposal has been welcomed by the APHC, the PDP and the NC. The Urdu weekly, Chattan, published from Srinagar and edited by an upright journalist, Tahir Mohiuddin, has over the past years been sharply critical of all — Pakistan, India, the APHC, the NC, the PDP and the militants. Its banner headlines on November 28 reflected some dismay in Kashmir: ‘Is Musharraf trying to wash his hands off (Kashmir)?’ Most unlikely. But he has been desperately seeking a solution, honourable to all, so that he can concentrate on pressing problems at home.
The trend since July 16, 2001 is unmistakable. At the Agra breakfast, he pleaded that each side should exclude extreme proposals. One concession followed another thereafter.
Not churlish indifference but constructive exploration should be India’s response. Ten questions are inescapable: will self-governance extend to POK as well as the northern territories? With whom will Pakistan negotiate its quantum? Will such an accord be subject to India’s approval as well? Will India concede to Pakistan a voice in the quantum of self-governance it accords to Kashmir? With whom will India negotiate the quantum of autonomy? After a fresh poll?
Will this be part of an Indo-Pak agreement on the lines of the Aaland and South Tyrol accords — bilateral accords whereby a State agrees with its neighbour to respect the autonomy of a territory under its sovereignty? Will the LoC be rationalised? And recognised as an international boundary with free access to Kashmiris on both sides of the divide? What mechanism will be set up to oversee this? Finally, if Pakistan accepts the status quo, what concessions has India to offer to it and to Kashmiris?
This is the most promising overture India has ever received from Pakistan. The peace dividend will be enormous. It will be arrogant folly to let such an opportunity slip from our hands.
Posted by
hindvi
Dec 31, 2005 01:44 am
RanjitContours are constantly changing and a few hundred years down the road their may be no India and Pakistan but some decentralised grouping of consanguinous regions. But to evolve beyond the current state of perpetual hostility and competing strong nationalisms we need to resolve Kashmir, for it is the crux and the pivot of Indo pak relations. Here is something to chew on:
Hindustan Times
A solution, anyone?
A.G. Noorani
December 19, 2005
‘The BJP alone can find a solution to our problems with Pakistan, because Hindus will never think whatever we have done is a sell-off,’ L.K. Advani said on March 13, 2004. Ousted from power, the BJP has done its best to obstruct the peace process. A.B. Vajpayee wrote to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on June 16, 2005, criticising the government’s halting steps towards a rapprochement. It would be a great pity if the PM were to allow himself to be deflected from course by the BJP.
The two-year-old peace process has reached a deadlock; but the Kashmir issue has reached a stage from which, with skill and good will, it can be brought to a finale fully consistent with the criteria which the PM propounded in May 2004. He told Jonathan Power that “the Kashmir dispute is stopping us from realising our potential” and “we have an obligation to ourselves to solve the problem”. The correspondent reported: “I pushed him on how far he himself would accept compromise with Pakistan over Kashmir. ‘Short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything’.”
President Pervez Musharraf’s proposal for ‘self-governance’ ensures just that. It marks abandonment of the 58-year-old demand for ‘self-determination’, which implies change of status, unlike self-governance. The contrast is so glaring. Its nuances emerge clearly when the record is recalled. Two years ago, on December 18, 2003, Musharraf said, “We are for the UN Security Council resolutions, whatever that stands for. However, now we have left that aside. We keep saying that if we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility… going beyond stated positions… and meeting halfway.” This was said on the eve of the Saarc summit in Islamabad where he met Prime Minister Vajpayee. The dialogue process was resumed on January 6, 2004.
On October 25, 2004, he suggested a precise, if debatable, formula as “a food for thought for you (the editors). Take Kashmir in its entirety. It has seven regions. Two of the regions are in Pakistan and five are in India... identify a region, whether it is the whole of seven or part. I do not know. Identify the region forever and change its status.” Three features stand out — tentativeness, tacit acceptance of the partition of J&K and change of status, which India could not possibly accept.
A major step was taken this year on April 18 when the president said: “The LoC cannot be permanent. Borders must be made irrelevant and boundaries cannot be altered. Take the three together, and now discuss the solution.” This was amplified on May 20 when ‘self-government’ was first aired. “We need to find a via media where Kashmiris who may be demanding independence, even their concerns are addressed. Self-government must be allowed to the people of Kashmir.” More to the point: “We do understand India’s sensitivity over their secular credentials” and, therefore, “it cannot be, may be on a religious basis”. On demilitarisation, he left open the question whether it “should precede or follow cessation of militancy”. It was like “the egg and the chicken conundrum”. Significantly, he suggested a regional basis as part of which “maximum self-governance must be allowed and borders rendered irrelevant”.
He was perceptibly inching towards acceptance of the status quo. The Rubicon was crossed with an interview at Canberra on June 14 in which he said: “Autonomous Kashmir is my earnest desire, but its complete independence will not be acceptable to both Pakistan and India.” If plebiscite under the UN’s resolutions is ruled out, as it was on December 18, 2003, and so is independence, what else remained but acceptance of the status quo — subject to negotiations on the consequences of the accord? What more can Pakistan possibly concede? Do we expect it simply to accept the LoC, and cry quits?
The interview was published just as the APHC leaders were set to return to Srinagar from their trip to Pakistan. It is unlikely that the president did not give them any inkling of his ideas. It was during this promising phase that Vajpayee decided to throw a spanner in the works. He did not want anyone but the BJP to receive credit for such a historic accord.
Against this background, stretching over two years, the president’s latest offer acquires particular significance. He told the BBC on October 21 that it was necessary to identify exactly “what is Kashmir”; demilitarise the identified region and then give self-government to the people there. “I have always believed there is an opportunity of a lifetime to solve the dispute,” adding. “Let’s make the LoC irrelevant. Let’s open it out.”
He did not demand either abrogation of the LoC or a change in status of any region as he had on October 25, 2004. He used the terms self-government and autonomy synonymously. They both imply tacit acceptance of the sovereignty of the State that administered the territory. That on November 13, during the Saarc summit at Dhaka, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz mooted the proposal to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggests that Pakistan is in earnest about it.
Musharraf’s proposal must be read in the context of his strong, repeated encouragement to the APHC to parley with India, in total contrast to Pakistan’s opposition to such talks in the past. In Kashmir, the proposal has been welcomed by the APHC, the PDP and the NC. The Urdu weekly, Chattan, published from Srinagar and edited by an upright journalist, Tahir Mohiuddin, has over the past years been sharply critical of all — Pakistan, India, the APHC, the NC, the PDP and the militants. Its banner headlines on November 28 reflected some dismay in Kashmir: ‘Is Musharraf trying to wash his hands off (Kashmir)?’ Most unlikely. But he has been desperately seeking a solution, honourable to all, so that he can concentrate on pressing problems at home.
The trend since July 16, 2001 is unmistakable. At the Agra breakfast, he pleaded that each side should exclude extreme proposals. One concession followed another thereafter.
Not churlish indifference but constructive exploration should be India’s response. Ten questions are inescapable: will self-governance extend to POK as well as the northern territories? With whom will Pakistan negotiate its quantum? Will such an accord be subject to India’s approval as well? Will India concede to Pakistan a voice in the quantum of self-governance it accords to Kashmir? With whom will India negotiate the quantum of autonomy? After a fresh poll?
Will this be part of an Indo-Pak agreement on the lines of the Aaland and South Tyrol accords — bilateral accords whereby a State agrees with its neighbour to respect the autonomy of a territory under its sovereignty? Will the LoC be rationalised? And recognised as an international boundary with free access to Kashmiris on both sides of the divide? What mechanism will be set up to oversee this? Finally, if Pakistan accepts the status quo, what concessions has India to offer to it and to Kashmiris?
This is the most promising overture India has ever received from Pakistan. The peace dividend will be enormous. It will be arrogant folly to let such an opportunity slip from our hands.
Voyage to the Valley
Hindustan Times
A solution, anyone?
A.G. Noorani
December 19, 2005
‘The BJP alone can find a solution to our problems with Pakistan, because Hindus will never think whatever we have done is a sell-off,’ L.K. Advani said on March 13, 2004. Ousted from power, the BJP has done its best to obstruct the peace process. A.B. Vajpayee wrote to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on June 16, 2005, criticising the government’s halting steps towards a rapprochement. It would be a great pity if the PM were to allow himself to be deflected from course by the BJP.
The two-year-old peace process has reached a deadlock; but the Kashmir issue has reached a stage from which, with skill and good will, it can be brought to a finale fully consistent with the criteria which the PM propounded in May 2004. He told Jonathan Power that “the Kashmir dispute is stopping us from realising our potential” and “we have an obligation to ourselves to solve the problem”. The correspondent reported: “I pushed him on how far he himself would accept compromise with Pakistan over Kashmir. ‘Short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything’.”
President Pervez Musharraf’s proposal for ‘self-governance’ ensures just that. It marks abandonment of the 58-year-old demand for ‘self-determination’, which implies change of status, unlike self-governance. The contrast is so glaring. Its nuances emerge clearly when the record is recalled. Two years ago, on December 18, 2003, Musharraf said, “We are for the UN Security Council resolutions, whatever that stands for. However, now we have left that aside. We keep saying that if we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility… going beyond stated positions… and meeting halfway.” This was said on the eve of the Saarc summit in Islamabad where he met Prime Minister Vajpayee. The dialogue process was resumed on January 6, 2004.
On October 25, 2004, he suggested a precise, if debatable, formula as “a food for thought for you (the editors). Take Kashmir in its entirety. It has seven regions. Two of the regions are in Pakistan and five are in India... identify a region, whether it is the whole of seven or part. I do not know. Identify the region forever and change its status.” Three features stand out — tentativeness, tacit acceptance of the partition of J&K and change of status, which India could not possibly accept.
A major step was taken this year on April 18 when the president said: “The LoC cannot be permanent. Borders must be made irrelevant and boundaries cannot be altered. Take the three together, and now discuss the solution.” This was amplified on May 20 when ‘self-government’ was first aired. “We need to find a via media where Kashmiris who may be demanding independence, even their concerns are addressed. Self-government must be allowed to the people of Kashmir.” More to the point: “We do understand India’s sensitivity over their secular credentials” and, therefore, “it cannot be, may be on a religious basis”. On demilitarisation, he left open the question whether it “should precede or follow cessation of militancy”. It was like “the egg and the chicken conundrum”. Significantly, he suggested a regional basis as part of which “maximum self-governance must be allowed and borders rendered irrelevant”.
He was perceptibly inching towards acceptance of the status quo. The Rubicon was crossed with an interview at Canberra on June 14 in which he said: “Autonomous Kashmir is my earnest desire, but its complete independence will not be acceptable to both Pakistan and India.” If plebiscite under the UN’s resolutions is ruled out, as it was on December 18, 2003, and so is independence, what else remained but acceptance of the status quo — subject to negotiations on the consequences of the accord? What more can Pakistan possibly concede? Do we expect it simply to accept the LoC, and cry quits?
The interview was published just as the APHC leaders were set to return to Srinagar from their trip to Pakistan. It is unlikely that the president did not give them any inkling of his ideas. It was during this promising phase that Vajpayee decided to throw a spanner in the works. He did not want anyone but the BJP to receive credit for such a historic accord.
Against this background, stretching over two years, the president’s latest offer acquires particular significance. He told the BBC on October 21 that it was necessary to identify exactly “what is Kashmir”; demilitarise the identified region and then give self-government to the people there. “I have always believed there is an opportunity of a lifetime to solve the dispute,” adding. “Let’s make the LoC irrelevant. Let’s open it out.”
He did not demand either abrogation of the LoC or a change in status of any region as he had on October 25, 2004. He used the terms self-government and autonomy synonymously. They both imply tacit acceptance of the sovereignty of the State that administered the territory. That on November 13, during the Saarc summit at Dhaka, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz mooted the proposal to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggests that Pakistan is in earnest about it.
Musharraf’s proposal must be read in the context of his strong, repeated encouragement to the APHC to parley with India, in total contrast to Pakistan’s opposition to such talks in the past. In Kashmir, the proposal has been welcomed by the APHC, the PDP and the NC. The Urdu weekly, Chattan, published from Srinagar and edited by an upright journalist, Tahir Mohiuddin, has over the past years been sharply critical of all — Pakistan, India, the APHC, the NC, the PDP and the militants. Its banner headlines on November 28 reflected some dismay in Kashmir: ‘Is Musharraf trying to wash his hands off (Kashmir)?’ Most unlikely. But he has been desperately seeking a solution, honourable to all, so that he can concentrate on pressing problems at home.
The trend since July 16, 2001 is unmistakable. At the Agra breakfast, he pleaded that each side should exclude extreme proposals. One concession followed another thereafter.
Not churlish indifference but constructive exploration should be India’s response. Ten questions are inescapable: will self-governance extend to POK as well as the northern territories? With whom will Pakistan negotiate its quantum? Will such an accord be subject to India’s approval as well? Will India concede to Pakistan a voice in the quantum of self-governance it accords to Kashmir? With whom will India negotiate the quantum of autonomy? After a fresh poll?
Will this be part of an Indo-Pak agreement on the lines of the Aaland and South Tyrol accords — bilateral accords whereby a State agrees with its neighbour to respect the autonomy of a territory under its sovereignty? Will the LoC be rationalised? And recognised as an international boundary with free access to Kashmiris on both sides of the divide? What mechanism will be set up to oversee this? Finally, if Pakistan accepts the status quo, what concessions has India to offer to it and to Kashmiris?
This is the most promising overture India has ever received from Pakistan. The peace dividend will be enormous. It will be arrogant folly to let such an opportunity slip from our hands.
Posted by
hindvi
Dec 30, 2005 11:34 pm
Instead of groping in the dark about what we ``think`` is the situation let us read some one who is better informed:Hindustan Times
A solution, anyone?
A.G. Noorani
December 19, 2005
‘The BJP alone can find a solution to our problems with Pakistan, because Hindus will never think whatever we have done is a sell-off,’ L.K. Advani said on March 13, 2004. Ousted from power, the BJP has done its best to obstruct the peace process. A.B. Vajpayee wrote to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on June 16, 2005, criticising the government’s halting steps towards a rapprochement. It would be a great pity if the PM were to allow himself to be deflected from course by the BJP.
The two-year-old peace process has reached a deadlock; but the Kashmir issue has reached a stage from which, with skill and good will, it can be brought to a finale fully consistent with the criteria which the PM propounded in May 2004. He told Jonathan Power that “the Kashmir dispute is stopping us from realising our potential” and “we have an obligation to ourselves to solve the problem”. The correspondent reported: “I pushed him on how far he himself would accept compromise with Pakistan over Kashmir. ‘Short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything’.”
President Pervez Musharraf’s proposal for ‘self-governance’ ensures just that. It marks abandonment of the 58-year-old demand for ‘self-determination’, which implies change of status, unlike self-governance. The contrast is so glaring. Its nuances emerge clearly when the record is recalled. Two years ago, on December 18, 2003, Musharraf said, “We are for the UN Security Council resolutions, whatever that stands for. However, now we have left that aside. We keep saying that if we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility… going beyond stated positions… and meeting halfway.” This was said on the eve of the Saarc summit in Islamabad where he met Prime Minister Vajpayee. The dialogue process was resumed on January 6, 2004.
On October 25, 2004, he suggested a precise, if debatable, formula as “a food for thought for you (the editors). Take Kashmir in its entirety. It has seven regions. Two of the regions are in Pakistan and five are in India... identify a region, whether it is the whole of seven or part. I do not know. Identify the region forever and change its status.” Three features stand out — tentativeness, tacit acceptance of the partition of J&K and change of status, which India could not possibly accept.
A major step was taken this year on April 18 when the president said: “The LoC cannot be permanent. Borders must be made irrelevant and boundaries cannot be altered. Take the three together, and now discuss the solution.” This was amplified on May 20 when ‘self-government’ was first aired. “We need to find a via media where Kashmiris who may be demanding independence, even their concerns are addressed. Self-government must be allowed to the people of Kashmir.” More to the point: “We do understand India’s sensitivity over their secular credentials” and, therefore, “it cannot be, may be on a religious basis”. On demilitarisation, he left open the question whether it “should precede or follow cessation of militancy”. It was like “the egg and the chicken conundrum”. Significantly, he suggested a regional basis as part of which “maximum self-governance must be allowed and borders rendered irrelevant”.
He was perceptibly inching towards acceptance of the status quo. The Rubicon was crossed with an interview at Canberra on June 14 in which he said: “Autonomous Kashmir is my earnest desire, but its complete independence will not be acceptable to both Pakistan and India.” If plebiscite under the UN’s resolutions is ruled out, as it was on December 18, 2003, and so is independence, what else remained but acceptance of the status quo — subject to negotiations on the consequences of the accord? What more can Pakistan possibly concede? Do we expect it simply to accept the LoC, and cry quits?
The interview was published just as the APHC leaders were set to return to Srinagar from their trip to Pakistan. It is unlikely that the president did not give them any inkling of his ideas. It was during this promising phase that Vajpayee decided to throw a spanner in the works. He did not want anyone but the BJP to receive credit for such a historic accord.
Against this background, stretching over two years, the president’s latest offer acquires particular significance. He told the BBC on October 21 that it was necessary to identify exactly “what is Kashmir”; demilitarise the identified region and then give self-government to the people there. “I have always believed there is an opportunity of a lifetime to solve the dispute,” adding. “Let’s make the LoC irrelevant. Let’s open it out.”
He did not demand either abrogation of the LoC or a change in status of any region as he had on October 25, 2004. He used the terms self-government and autonomy synonymously. They both imply tacit acceptance of the sovereignty of the State that administered the territory. That on November 13, during the Saarc summit at Dhaka, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz mooted the proposal to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggests that Pakistan is in earnest about it.
Musharraf’s proposal must be read in the context of his strong, repeated encouragement to the APHC to parley with India, in total contrast to Pakistan’s opposition to such talks in the past. In Kashmir, the proposal has been welcomed by the APHC, the PDP and the NC. The Urdu weekly, Chattan, published from Srinagar and edited by an upright journalist, Tahir Mohiuddin, has over the past years been sharply critical of all — Pakistan, India, the APHC, the NC, the PDP and the militants. Its banner headlines on November 28 reflected some dismay in Kashmir: ‘Is Musharraf trying to wash his hands off (Kashmir)?’ Most unlikely. But he has been desperately seeking a solution, honourable to all, so that he can concentrate on pressing problems at home.
The trend since July 16, 2001 is unmistakable. At the Agra breakfast, he pleaded that each side should exclude extreme proposals. One concession followed another thereafter.
Not churlish indifference but constructive exploration should be India’s response. Ten questions are inescapable: will self-governance extend to POK as well as the northern territories? With whom will Pakistan negotiate its quantum? Will such an accord be subject to India’s approval as well? Will India concede to Pakistan a voice in the quantum of self-governance it accords to Kashmir? With whom will India negotiate the quantum of autonomy? After a fresh poll?
Will this be part of an Indo-Pak agreement on the lines of the Aaland and South Tyrol accords — bilateral accords whereby a State agrees with its neighbour to respect the autonomy of a territory under its sovereignty? Will the LoC be rationalised? And recognised as an international boundary with free access to Kashmiris on both sides of the divide? What mechanism will be set up to oversee this? Finally, if Pakistan accepts the status quo, what concessions has India to offer to it and to Kashmiris?
This is the most promising overture India has ever received from Pakistan. The peace dividend will be enormous. It will be arrogant folly to let such an opportunity slip from our hands.
A Muslim Pope?
Posted by
hindvi
Dec 28, 2005 08:23 am
salim ur knowledge of both Indian and muslim history is poor. I reccomend u read more.
A Muslim Pope?
The league was going for maximum sovereignty from now onwards and the congress` aim was to give them minimum autonomy. in the event the british delivered a deal, the deal was accepted by the league because it had been better than anything they would have got on their own but was rejected by the congress. The congres wanted to deal with the league later on unecumbured by any prior agreement in parliament, where it would be able to exploit the divisions within the muslims.
Jinnah was aware of the fact that he appeared stronger than he was, there wer strong forces in the Punjab, NWFP and Bengal which could work against him and in alliance with the much bigger Congress, thats why he wanted to cut a deal now.
A bittertone already had been set as a result of the long campaign and rehetoric by the league and the institution of seperate electorates along with the british playing their game both in the heyday of the RAJ and then again in the desperate days of the war for survival. Jinnah and the league had also played a spoiler`s role in the interim coalition Govt in order to convince everybody that unless they got their pakistan things would not be good.
The congress was obssesed with a strong center, the right because of the fascination of a strong state and the left in order to bring socialist development policies, which would both be fouled by a conservative and strong league was unable to adjust expectations, and with the league`s uncooperative behaviour told the league it wont negotiate and either come to an unencumbered parliament or take a completely independent pakistan.
At this point the league which had so far been relying on the congres commitment toa united India was dumbfounded and showed both a complete lack of sagacity, it went ahead with its cocka mamie plan without giving a counter offer.
Remarkably Jinnah a dying man was willing to give the negotiations more time and postpone independence than the impatient congress and the desperate british.
Posted by
hindvi
Dec 28, 2005 08:13 am
The thing about not adjusting to changed circumstances applies to both Congres and the League. After the elections of 45 the congress, which had looked set to be the successor to the British raj as little as 6 years away at the eve of the war was unable to accept the league as a major player on the Indian scene, the league in turn had never tasted success like that so it strengthened Jinnah`s ambitions and his position within the league as well at an all india level.The league was going for maximum sovereignty from now onwards and the congress` aim was to give them minimum autonomy. in the event the british delivered a deal, the deal was accepted by the league because it had been better than anything they would have got on their own but was rejected by the congress. The congres wanted to deal with the league later on unecumbured by any prior agreement in parliament, where it would be able to exploit the divisions within the muslims.
Jinnah was aware of the fact that he appeared stronger than he was, there wer strong forces in the Punjab, NWFP and Bengal which could work against him and in alliance with the much bigger Congress, thats why he wanted to cut a deal now.
A bittertone already had been set as a result of the long campaign and rehetoric by the league and the institution of seperate electorates along with the british playing their game both in the heyday of the RAJ and then again in the desperate days of the war for survival. Jinnah and the league had also played a spoiler`s role in the interim coalition Govt in order to convince everybody that unless they got their pakistan things would not be good.
The congress was obssesed with a strong center, the right because of the fascination of a strong state and the left in order to bring socialist development policies, which would both be fouled by a conservative and strong league was unable to adjust expectations, and with the league`s uncooperative behaviour told the league it wont negotiate and either come to an unencumbered parliament or take a completely independent pakistan.
At this point the league which had so far been relying on the congres commitment toa united India was dumbfounded and showed both a complete lack of sagacity, it went ahead with its cocka mamie plan without giving a counter offer.
Remarkably Jinnah a dying man was willing to give the negotiations more time and postpone independence than the impatient congress and the desperate british.
A Muslim Pope?
Posted by
hindvi
Dec 28, 2005 02:13 am
I mean why did the congress reject the cabinet mission plan? what is wong with a hindu ruling the hindu majority part and a muslim the muslim majority part? and why did jinnah launch direct action after that? Why did the congress not press the mahasabha on an issue like joint electorates which was so crucial in forming a common Indian Identity? Its all a mess.
A Muslim Pope?
Posted by
hindvi
Dec 28, 2005 02:05 am
he also seemed to have a grievance at the way he had been treated by the hindus/congress/gandhi. And lets not forget their was an allround failure at prudent politics including by the congress, none of the side were accomadting or understanding of th other`s point of view.
A Muslim Pope?
And in the day of mass politics ``aggressive minorities`` cant do a thing unless they have financial capital, in which too muslims were in a weaker position than caste hindus, (which is how they maintain their position vis a vis lower castes). Infact even the days of the fair and lovely castes are numbered, the darkening of India is already well underway at the lower and mid levels of govt (have a look at the MPs caught in the sting), industry and the services and it will slowly take place at the upper levels as well.
The days of the gorey gorey Nehru-gandhis is numbered, India will slowly revert, wether one likes it or not, to the brown masses who constitute its majority.
By the way this is not a defense of Jinnah, I think he should have thought more rationally than he did when he made those choices but things outside ones control such as institutional structures (separate electorates etc) and pre existing social environment play a large part in shaping an individuals decisions. But he is on record to have stated (in the early 30s) that the one good that the British did was to create a united India. And he did his best to convince the hindus to give the concessions which he had convinced the muslims would be enough to undo separate electorates, but the congres right and the mahasabha scuttled that. And for the longest period of his life he strove to bring the two communities together by being a joint member of the congress and the league. I think he was not able to adjust to changing circumstances (both after gandhi’s arrival on the scene and after the Pakistan movement picked up steam.) a trait not uncommon in humans.
Posted by
hindvi
Dec 28, 2005 01:54 am
Ranjit I am not defending Jinnah but a man is the product of his circumstances, the scenario that you paint was no where on the horizon even as late as 1937. Jinah/azad were always muslim leaders even within the congress, never indian leaders. High caste hindus dominated the Center, though in muslim majority states it was the other way round, even the lower castes were no political force.And in the day of mass politics ``aggressive minorities`` cant do a thing unless they have financial capital, in which too muslims were in a weaker position than caste hindus, (which is how they maintain their position vis a vis lower castes). Infact even the days of the fair and lovely castes are numbered, the darkening of India is already well underway at the lower and mid levels of govt (have a look at the MPs caught in the sting), industry and the services and it will slowly take place at the upper levels as well.
The days of the gorey gorey Nehru-gandhis is numbered, India will slowly revert, wether one likes it or not, to the brown masses who constitute its majority.
By the way this is not a defense of Jinnah, I think he should have thought more rationally than he did when he made those choices but things outside ones control such as institutional structures (separate electorates etc) and pre existing social environment play a large part in shaping an individuals decisions. But he is on record to have stated (in the early 30s) that the one good that the British did was to create a united India. And he did his best to convince the hindus to give the concessions which he had convinced the muslims would be enough to undo separate electorates, but the congres right and the mahasabha scuttled that. And for the longest period of his life he strove to bring the two communities together by being a joint member of the congress and the league. I think he was not able to adjust to changing circumstances (both after gandhi’s arrival on the scene and after the Pakistan movement picked up steam.) a trait not uncommon in humans.
A Muslim Pope?
The muslims and hindus both were extremely parochial in prepartion India, both the communities were dogged by illwil and mistrust and things are little better now.
Posted by
hindvi
Dec 28, 2005 12:21 am
I mean That India never had a tradition of cross communal voting, not a single muslim majority state in pre partion India had a non muslim chief minister and vice versa. Ditto after partition, with the possible exception of AR Antulay who I never knew was a muslim until someone told me. It was even more rare in Jinnah`s time, he was typically called a ``Mohomaden leader`` (even by Gandhi) much before he styled himself as one, at a time when his greatest desire was to be known as an ``Indian Leader`` both out of his true secular nature and out of political prudence for an ambitious young man belonging to a minority.The muslims and hindus both were extremely parochial in prepartion India, both the communities were dogged by illwil and mistrust and things are little better now.
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