Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Re: # 280 Tahmed

"...in the US constitution, the all-important "etc." (i.e. powers not specifically placed anywhere) are placed with the states. I am not sure what the situation is in the indian constitution...."

Through the Indian Constitution the states enjoy relative autonomy in India. There is autonomy in the legislative, executive as well as the judicial powers for the states of India. However, the autonomy is limited by clear powers that are vested on the Union. The division of the powers of the Union and the State can be traced to the distribution of the powers as stated by the three lists laid down by the Indian Constitution. Derived from the Australian constitution, these lists clearly divide the powers vested on the State and the Union. They are the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List.

The Union List: Also referred to as List I, this list contains legislations, on which the Union enjoys exclusive control. Of the total 99 subjects that are included in the Union list, some are enlisted below:
Defence
Banking
Taxes
Coinage
Insurance
Currency
Union Duties
Foreign Affairs

The State List: This is the List II of the Indian Legislative. There are a total of 69 subjects in this particular list, all of which are exclusive legislative powers of the State. Some of the subjects enlisted in the State list are as follows:
Public Order and Police
State Taxes and Duties
Agriculture
Sanitation
Local governments
Forests
Fisheries
Public Health


The Concurrent List: This list contains 52 items, which are powers vested on the State as well as the Union. Some of the subjects included in the Concurrent List are as follows:
Economic and Social Planning
Criminal Law and Procedure
Civil Procedure
Torts
Trusts
Marriage
Education
Welfare and Labor
Contracts



However, in case there is any repugnance, the Union legislature will prevail over the State legislature. In case a State Law has already been reserved for the consent of the President, or if such an assent has already been granted, then the State Law will hold irrespective of the repugnance. However, the Parliament can override the Law through subsequent legislation.

The Residuary Powers are the legislative powers that fall in none of the above categories. The lists are usually exhaustive enough to include all possible subjects, and it is generally believed that the field of application will be very narrow. These powers are neither under the legislative powers of the State nor the Union, but is under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary.


source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/events/republic-day/India-union-states-relation.html

Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Re: # 232 HP

I read Stuka's post and agree with him on both counts (CTBT and the BJP election plank), although he did not provide an elaborate explanation for the motives behind testing that I did (i.e why did BJP chose to differentiate itself from the other parties in wanting to test?). As I pointed out, 'nationalist Hinduism' aside, there were other plausible reasons to test. Can you point out where my facts are wrong? I'd be more than happy to defend or correct them.

Before you conclude that, 'is true that nuke tests were a nationalist Hindu or otherwise agenda for BJP and that was the sole reason for the tests', I recommend that you ask yourself if (a) Indira Gandhi was a 'nationalist Hindu' or from the BJP? and (b) if Narasimha Rao was a 'nationalist Hindu' since he wanted to test too when he was PM?

Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Re: # 213 HP

“…First, the reported Pakistan warning to India was delivered in response to Indian military build up along the international borders in 1984 and not in the 90s…”

I don’t disagree with that, and the above is fully consistent with my assertion that, ‘Pakistani threats of using the bomb in case India escalated a conventional war were delivered privately to Indian leaders and considered credible (to PM IK Gujral, in particular, comes to mind), but not publicly’. Recall, I said that ‘Gujral comes to mind’ – I could have also mentioned Rajiv Gandhi’s government. This does not change my findings.

“…So if there was any possibility of nuke escalation, it was from India and not Pakistan…”

I was referring to conventional escalation by India to be responded to by a Pakistani first-use policy, not a ‘nuke escalation by India’.

“…Why India could not do what it did in 1965 was due to the nature of the insurgency in Kashmir…”

I meant that India could not escalate a conventional war like it did in ’65 by opening a new front outside Kashmir (e.g. Sind/Punjab in ‘65). India had the option, but chose not to for reasons well known.

“…On top of that the Indians had already been given an earful of Pakistani nuke capabilities so the chances of Indian crossing the international borders were minimal and no Indian government was willing to take the chance…”

Precisely my point!

“…Before the BJP Gambit, India did try to test the nukes but was thwarted by the US…”

Yes, this was when Rao was the PM. And the BJP subsequently ran an election based upon reversing this policy and they did so! You prove my point.

“…Indian test were greeted with condemnation right away throughout the world…”

Yawn. What matters is acceptance by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA for FULL civilian nuclear cooperation. That offer is on the PMs of India’s desk awaiting his signature. In other words, give India the benefits of NPT and a nuclear-weapon state by making an exception, but DENY the same to Pakistan. Why do you think that the Pakistan government has been clamoring for equal status and being repeatedly denied? Even the Chinese have not warmed up to the idea of offering a similar deal to Pakistan.

“…If the world had accepted the Indian tests, then why the prerequisite of the recently proposed treaty between the US-India calls for a complete nuke test ban from India?...”

Read the draft text of the civil nuclear agreement carefully! The language states that ‘They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.’ In plain English, this means that should India test in response to a changed security environment, the any unilateral termination of the agreement by the US (or India) should consider the reasons why this testing was necessary – in other words, it won’t be a slam dunk.

“…Proliferation was a non issue at that time…”
Precisely my point! Proliferation had been going on, but the US was not sensitive to it throughout the ‘80s and most of the ‘90s. Remember, Reagan looked the other way and even Bush senior (GHW Bush) looked the other way until the Afghan war was pretty much over and the utility of Pakistani support went down in the early ‘90s. Indian complaints were falling on deaf ears. Not so any more. In fact, proliferation is now a US problem, not an Indian one – this is something that testing achieved.

“…The Pakistanis have made it very clear that they would not hesitate to use the nukes if they faced a perceived disaster in any conventional war…”

Yes, but they are no longer actively supporting the Kashmir insurgency like they were in the ‘90s under a nuclear umbrella with a first-use threat when their possession of nukes could be plausibly denied. Not so any more. The world simply will not have any of that any more. You see, if one party (India) is not interested in the status quo through conventional war, then a first-use threat by the other (Pakistan) decreases in utility.

“…Indian government was forced to offer more concessions to the Kashmiris including putting Musharaf’s picture smack in the middle of Srinagar….the real PM of India Sonia Gandhi, had to come down to Kashmir to start the Bus service”

I have even seen a picture of Musharraf on India’s Parliament House :)! And the buses are running on time! This one really made me chuckle!

Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Re: # 183 Shankar to Tahmed

Shankar, I had not read your post until I posted mine in #205 - I basically agree with what you wrote, and simply provided a more elaborate explanation

Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Re: # 168 Tahmed32

Tahmed, while your sequence of events is reproduced seemingly correctly, your conclusions are unfortunately wrong. They are wrong because your are viewing the India nuclear tests entirely through the Pakistani lens. You need to look at the whole picture through a 'global' lens.

What you need to understand is that prior to 1999 the existence of nukes in the Subcontinent was an ambiguity - both sides claimed to the rest of the world they had the technology, but did not have the 'bomb'. This left India in a limbo - Pakistani threats of using the bomb in case India escalated a conventional war were delivered privately to Indian leaders and considered credible (to PM IK Gujral, in particular, comes to mind), but not publicly. Gujral never took Parliament in confidence about these threats in the '90s, and as a result could do little - neither escalate, nor bring international pressure to bear on Pakistan to stop the Kashmir jehad. In other words, Pakistani nuclear weapons had served their purpose way before '99 - otherwise, Pakistan would not have had the gumption to escalate the Kashmir jehad in the first place (recall, it took a lot less for Shastri to expand the war in '65 - but successive Indian governments in the '90s were reticent. Why? Because, it was understood in India that Pakistan would not hesitate to use nukes). The Kashmir Jihad was on full swing, leaving India with limited options. BJP was in Opposition.

Add to the above that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was being floated with India left out in the cold forever in a 'non-nuke' status. (The US Senate only later rejected the treaty).

The Chinese were secretly assisting the Pakistanis in nuclear and missile weaponry in defiance of the NPT.

The tests were a BJP gambit (BJP actually ran and won their first election on that plank, if you recall) to convert what was until then an ambiguity to a clear 'black and white' picture and let the chips fall where they may. They correctly gambled that the world would (i) not tolerate Pakistani nuclear threats under which a Kashmir jehad could be waged, and (ii) the world will accept Indian nuclear weapons, but not Pakistani ones until Pakistan stopped proliferaton (which was known until that time privately by various governments, but the issue was never forced into the open), and (iii) the Chinese would be forced to cease covert nuclear cooperation with the Pakistanis.

Look what has happened since:

a) Pakistan has stopped delivering covert and overt threats regarding use of nuclear weapons. To understand this, you need to compare the rhetoric of the late '90s and the early 2000s vs. today. The Kashmir Jehad is for all practial purposes off - the world opinion no longer buys sponsoring insurgencies under a nuclear umbrella. India achieved through nuclear testing, what it could not through conventional war escalation. Political aims were achieved through means other than war. By forcing the Pakistanis to unzip their fly, the BJP knew that the tumbling wall of bricks will fall unevenly and more heavily on Pakistan. 9/11 simply reinforced this even more so. No wonder, that Musharraf declared that 'safeguarding strategic assets' (code word for nuclear weapons) was a high priority after 9/11. This never was an issue for Indian nukes. In fact, even the US was forced to publicly acknowledge the danger from Pakistani loose nukes that until then they had ignored for expediency. Today, loose Pakistani nukes are no longer an Indian problem - they are a US problem. In this scenario, words (whether belligerent or otherwise) by Advani mean little -- as head of a coalition government, he probably could never have carried Parliament into a major war anyway. What matters is the end result. Having invited Pakistan to unzip their fly, Advani could afford to talk sweetly. Conventional war was no longer an easy option since the late '80s when Pakistan is though to have first developed nuclear weapons. But, until '99, India could not count on world opinion to turn off the Kashmir jehad, because the world could conveniently believe that Pakistani nukes were just a myth. After '99 all that changed.

b) A full civilian nuclear cooperation deal (i.e. de facto inclusion in NPT) was offered to India after the test, but not to Pakistan - it is India's decision whether to sign up for it or not. Bush pointedly mentioned to Musharraf at a press conference that this could never be offerred to Pakistan. This deal would never have been offered if India had not tested. This is a huge achievement for Indian foreign policy.

c) Chinese nuclear proliferation has significantly scaled down (in fact, the Chinese are now engaging the Indians more seriously on the border dispute than they have ever in the past)

Hope this makes sense.

Ciao

Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Re: # 139 Dost

Yes, but you can blame him for destroying what little there was and for not cultivating any civil institutions. He did remove an elected government after all. Far better for the Pakistani voter to vote them out than through a coup d'etat. Improved ties with India will not come through the whims of one man, but through an organic process starting at the grassroots.

Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Re: # 130 Arjun_5

I should have put additional qualifiers. Namely, 'it is highly unlikely that a freely elected parliament with no pressure from the Army/ISI on its foreign policy and relations with Indiain Pakistan will support a Kashmiri Jehad when it know that the consequence will be unremitting hostility with India. '

It is unlikely that Benazir's government had no pressure from the Army/ISI towards its India policy. My point: put the Army in its proper role (i.e. take orders from elected parliament) and relations with neighbors will improve.

Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Re: # 109

"...I am not sure that the erosion of the Pakistani institutions had a negative effect on neighbourly relations..."

I'll be more specific - it is highly unlikely that a freely elected parliament in Pakistan will support a Kashmiri Jehad when it know that the consequence will be unremitting hostility with India. Such a parliament has never existed for long in Pakistan because of the Army's interference. Musharraf did nothing to cultivate one either.

Pervez Musharraf and India Pakistan Rapproachment Dost Mittar:

I read your article carefully (twice!). You were careful to not directly praise Musharraf for the changed relations between the 'two twins separated violently at birth'. But, you undoubtedly implied that the change is due to Musharraf when you write, 'But what one can say, with some degree of certainty, is that another leader could not have made a complete about-turn in his policies towards India as Musharraf did…Musharraf’s personality, especially his penchant for taking quick decisions and decisive actions under the changed circumstances in which Pakistan found itself following the US “war on terror” undoubtedly played a significant part in changing the direction of Indo-Pak relations.'

Your assessment of Musharraf is half true - the other truth is that India-Pakistan relationship nosedived with Musharraf's ascent. Nawaz Sharif and even Bhutto had cultivated better relationship with India. This omission is a serious one. You did not pin blame on Musharraf for reckless adventurism, without which any analysis of his impact on neighborly relations is incomplete.

You also gloss over the decay of Pakistani civil society and the systematic erosion of Pakistani institutions that Musharraf presided over - this alone has a tremendous negative impact on neighborly ties.

Last, but not the least, you did not analyze Musharraf's mindset for the Pakistani turnaround on the Taliban in his 'India - Lay Off!' speech after 9/11. Specifically, Musharraf alluded to the ultimatum that Richard Armitage gave him - "Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. The decision we take today can have far-reaching and wide- ranging consequences. The crisis is formidable and unprecedented. If we take wrong decisions in this crisis, it can lead to worst consequences... The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity."

This speech is also interesting because it clearly illuminates his thinking about India as a 'threat' and 'competitor', not a 'partner'.

If plainspeak about the US ultimatum was not enough, then Musharraf went one step further by referring to the 'Treaty of Hudaibiya'. This reference is critical. The Treaty of Hudaibiya was signed by Prophet Mohammed with the 'non-believers' of Mecca and brought temporary truce with his enemies while he focused his attention on the Jews. By referring to this treaty, Musharraf was highlighting the need for expediency over shared values (which the Prophet did not share with 'non-believers').

So, in sum, Musharraf as a statesman is a pretty short one. Don't be fooled, and worse, do not talk him up by ignoring the expedient shifts in position that he is capable of.

Source of Musharraf's 9/11 speech:
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/pakistanpresident.htm

The ANP Challenge Re: # 282 Saharanpuri

That was a beautiful article!

The ANP Challenge Re: # 116 Bulleya

That was funny:)

The ANP Challenge Re: # 122 Arjunm

Those were absolutely delectable, delightful and most savory quotes from Field Marshall Clueless. The words of this information technology genius, entrepreneur, master war strategist, ace pilot, and the butt of jokes on Chowk have been enshrined for all time!

Thank you, Chowk, Google and Arjunm!

Voting For Change Re: # 495 Tahmed

"It is the Chief Justice who has finally, after 60 years, inspired millions of Pakistanis with the ideals of respect for individual freedom, basic rights and democracy"

I agree - the CJ is the first person (other than Sheikh Mujib) in Pakistan who has the spunk to stand up for what he believes in and suffer the privation that was not his due.

The bumbling politicians, even as they make a virtue out of a necessity by forming a coalition, will still serve Pakistan better than the 'smart' uniformed men. This is a heavy burden that the ordinary Pakistani must be willing to lift.

Voting For Change Re: # 154

I think that the reference that is being alluded to by 'hindutva pea-brain' is:

Unilateral Strike Called a Model For U.S. Operations in Pakistan
By Joby Warrick and Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, February 19, 2008; Page A01

"In the predawn hours of Jan. 29, a CIA Predator aircraft flew in a slow arc above the Pakistani town of Mir Ali. The drone's operator, relying on information secretly passed to the CIA by local informants, clicked a computer mouse and sent the first of two Hellfire missiles hurtling toward a cluster of mud-brick buildings a few miles from the town center...Having requested the Pakistani government's official permission for such strikes on previous occasions, only to be put off or turned down, this time the U.S. spy agency did not seek approval...It is an approach that some U.S. officials say could be used more frequently this year, particularly if a power vacuum results from yesterday's election and associated political tumult."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2008/02/18/AR2008021802500.html

Voting For Change Re: # 139 Bulleya

There are 'soft' and 'hard' versions of Islamists. The PPP/PML(N) are 'soft'. The MMA is 'hard'. The issue is not that 'islamic parties are still strong and islamisation is still on the roll in pakistan', but what this election means for the sanctuary for global terror in Pakistan territory. Will this election roll that back? The new victors are raising the spectre of 'talks with militants' - how is this different than the various cease fires the Pak Army reached with the same crowd? This talk will invite the now familiar cynicism from Washington. That is the point.

Voting For Change Re: # 138
Yes, I think that the next Pakistani government will have to face up to unrelenting US demands. The Pakistan Army has in the past tried to outsource the 'difficult' work to elected governments and then has rushed in to pick up the pieces when they begin to totter.