How India won the ’65 war

Based on Y.B. Chavan’s diary
by I. Ramamohan Rao


India fought four wars with Pakistan and one with China. Though officers have written about them, there is no official history. The latest book, 1965 War — The Inside Story, based on Y. B. Chavan’s diary, is by former Union Home Secretary R.D. Pradhan. Chavan was the Defence Minister during that war and Pradhan was his personal secretary.

Chavan replaced Krishna Menon as Defence Minister after the 1962 debacle. A confidant of Morarji Desai, Chavan was the first Chief Minister of Maharashtra. Maharashtrians saw in Chavan the 20th century Shivaji. His main task was to rebuild the Army and boost the morale.

Gen Ayub Khan of Pakistan was a man in a hurry. Before India could rebuild the Army, he was keen to acquire Kashmir. As a member of the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan had received arms assistance from the US, particularly Patton tanks, F-104 star fighters, Sabres and B-57 bombers.

Pakistan had a trial run in the 1965 summer by invading the Rann of Kutch. Before the Indian Army could mobilise troops, a ceasefire was brought about by the intervention of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

Soon after, Pakistan planned the infiltration in Kashmir, hoping that the people would rise in its favour. The Operation Gibraltar was spearheaded by infiltrators. However, the people of Kashmir reported the presence of Pakistani infiltrators to the Indian Army. In the operations, Pakistan lost important strategic points like the Haji Pir Pass. Gen Ayub Khan, however, decided to invade Chhamb. Through Operation Grand Slam, Pakistan almost succeeded in its objective.

Pakistan launched the attack on September 1. The Army formations in Chhamb came under heavy artillery. Chief of Army Staff General J. N. Chaudhury was in Srinagar. Chavan started preparing for the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet.

At 4.45 p.m., Gen Chaudhury and Air Marshal Arjan Singh, the Air Chief, walked into the South Block and sought Chavan’s approval to provide air support to Army troops fighting the Pakistan Army onslaught led by tanks. Pakistan was trying to occupy the Akhnoor bridge and cut off Jammu and Kashmir from India.

Pradhan says, Chavan gave the green signal to the IAF to attack Pakistani forces moving towards Chhamb. It was the first time that the IAF fighters were deployed. The promptness of the decision and the quick mobilisation and action by the IAF, Pradhan says, saved the nation from a major catastrophe.

Chavan also approved the Army Chief’s suggestion to attack Pakistan in the Punjab along the international border. The diary reads: “Had no time to consult ECC (Emergency Committee of the Cabinet) or Prime Minister. Took decision of their advice and asked them to go ahead. COAS (Chief of Army Staff) asked for signal to go ahead for Punjab action, which I gave.”

Later in the evening, Chavan informed the ECC of the air strike, got Prime Minister Shastri’s formal authorisation to the order on air attack and asking the Army to attack Pakistan on the Punjab front.

Significantly, without waiting for the ECC meeting or consulting the Prime Minister, Chavan decided to launch OP Riddle (counter-attack). The entries indicate the close rapport between Shastri and Chavan.

On Sept 4, Chavan recorded that the decision to launch an attack on Pakistan across the international border in Punjab was a desperate move and carried high risks. He wrote: “The step will change the complexion of the entire situation. If we fail— and I cannot even imagine of it — the nation fails”. The nation won.

The air strikes in the Chhamb sector — even though the IAF lost four Vampires in the air battles initially — saved the day and the Pakistan Army was halted before it could cross the Akhnoor Bridge towards Jammu.

Chavan’s diary has entries relating to the reverses in Khem Kharan, and Army Commander Gen Harbaksh Singh’s thoughtless decision to deploy the fourth battalion of the Sikh Regiment after it had captured Burki just because he wanted the battalion to recreate history on the Saragarhi Day anniversary on Sept 12. The battalion suffered over 150 casualties and Commanding Officer Lt-Col Anant was taken prisoner.

Following initial reverses, Gen Chaudhury thought of withdrawing forces to the banks of the Beas. Lt-Gen Harbaksh Singh opposed it and the proposal was dropped after heated exchanges, Chavan mentions.

The Indian Army, having reached the Icchogil Canal on Lahore’s outskirts, had to fall back because of the poor leadership in the 15 Division. Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, who commanded the 3rd Jat could reach the Canal again after the battle of Dograi on the last day of the war, after suffering heavy casualties.

It was not until Sept 12 that India felt confident of the progress of the operations. Pakistan had started the war with a cocky confidence in the superiority of the Patton tanks over India’s Shermans and Centurions. But its losses during the Asal Uttar battle in Khem Karan and at Phillora and Chawinda in the Sialkot sector unnerved Pakistanis.

The Indian Army destroyed 240 Pakistan tanks. In Punjab, it set up a graveyard of Patton Tanks near Bhikhiwind. The IAF’s tiny Gnats were more than a match for Pakistan’s sophisticated F-104 aircraft.

Chavan’s diary discloses how the Union Cabinet dealt with the Chinese threat. He felt that China may launch some diversionary action to ease pressure on Pakistan. On Sept 21 morning, Chinese troops fired across in Nathula and other places. Indian troops were ordered to retaliate, if fired upon, and take defensive positions if a major attack came. China’s threat disappeared in the next 24 hours. The scene then shifted to the UN in New York. India and Pakistan accepted the ceasefire from 3.30 a.m. on Sept 23.

Chavan noted: “So, the first round is over — where is the second round and when?” On Kashmir, he says, the UN’s leading powers are not with us. “The issue of (Kashmir) is basically political. Its solution will have to be political…Unless we make quick and radically new moves to break the political isolation that we find ourselves in. I hope we have the vision and courage to accept the challenge to (our) political leadership.”

The book mentions the events at Tashkent in January 1966 when India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their forces to positions on August 5, 1965. India had to surrender key areas including the Haji Pir Pass. What was won on the battlefield was given up at the negotiating table. Did that trouble Shastri who died on Jan 11, 1966 at Tashkent?

During 1965, as the Army PRO in the Lahore Sector, this writer had visited Dograi, Burki, Khem Karan, Asal Uttar and other places. On the ceasefire day, this writer was at Dograi on the Icchogil Canal’s banks, receiving many media persons. Pradhan, who played the Peshwa’s role to Rajiv Gandhi in crafting of the Punjab, Assam and Mizo Accords, has made a signal contribution by putting together Chavan’s diary.

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